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Abstract 
  Signifying Nothing: Intelligence and Intellectual Disability in Modern British Literature 
and Culture, 1919-1969 investigates the confluences between literary and scientific approaches 
to intelligence in the mid-twentieth century. It stages two central arguments. First, it argues that 
in multiple domains, intelligence was constituted as a biopolitical resource that required 
management and care. As a biopolitical resource, intelligence became a criterion through which 
subjects could make claims to belonging in the decades of sociopolitical upheaval before, during, 
and after the Second World War in Britain. Second, this project argues that a significant body of 
midcentury literature models how competing theories of intelligence, if they were accorded 
cultural authority, could affect imagined communities. Examining literary works by H.D., 
Rebecca West, Olive Moore, H.G. Wells, Virginia Woolf, Samuel Beckett, Harold Pinter, and 
Peter Nichols, I show that scientific and political concerns about intelligence and intellectual 
disability animated literary approaches to the relationships among subject, society, and state in 
the midcentury. 
The chapters of this project examine how literary authors circulate contemporaneous 
understandings of intelligence and its inverse, intellectual disability, to envision and critique 
collectivities at the levels of identity, species, and—most centrally—nation. In doing so, these 
texts test and contest intelligence as a measure of the human for the purposes of defining a 
community. These chapters trace how mid-twentieth century works of literature established 
intelligence as a distinct, transpersonal essence with biopolitical meaning (Chapter 1: Interwar 
Imaginings of Collective Intelligence); explored how ideas about intellectual disability could 
challenge contemporaneous approaches to narrative and language (Chapter 2: “Contemplating 
the idiot”: Mental Privacy, Intellectual Disability, and the Possibility of Private Language in 
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Virginia Woolf’s Between the Acts); revalued the culturally maligned experience of ignorance 
(Chapter 3: Information, Ignorance, and Ways of Reading Samuel Beckett); and employed 
questions of intelligence to assess the welfare state’s potentially conflicting promises of care and 
efficiency (Chapter 4: Cognitive Citizenship and the Welfare State in Harold Pinter and Peter 
Nichols). As a whole, this project shows that midcentury literature robustly engages in 
multidisciplinary debates about the nature and meaning of intelligence. 
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Introduction 
The figure of a “deafmute idiot” opens “Circe,” the fifteenth episode of James Joyce’s 
Ulysses (1922).1 The episode takes the form of a dramatic script that dissolves distinctions 
between characters’ interior and exterior experiences. On the first page of “Circe,” the idiot 
emerges, individuated from the crowds of “stunted men and women” and “Children” who inhabit 
“nighttown” (350)2: 
(A deafmute idiot with goggle eyes, his shapeless mouth dribbling, jerks 
past, shaken in Saint Vitus’ dance. A chain of children’s hands imprisons 
him.) 
THE CHILDREN 
Kithogue! Salute! 
THE IDIOT 
(lifts a palsied left arm and gurgles) Ghahute! 
THE CHILDREN 
Where’s the great light? 
THE IDIOT 
(gobbling) Ghaghahest. 
(They release him. He jerks on. …) (350) 
In this passage, the idiot’s quavering body contrasts the children’s cohesive collectivity. While 
the idiot’s body is leaky and irregular, “dribbling” and “jerk[ing]” as he moves along the street, 
																																								 																				
1 Circe offers both a hallucinatory exploration of Stephen’s and Bloom’s unconscious desires and also a 
recapitulation of key phrases and themes from the novel as a whole. Surveying several manuscripts that 
surfaced in the 2000s, Ronan Crowley provides genetic criticism of “Circe,” noting “its conspicuous and 
sustained recurrence to earlier episodes of Ulysses” (341). 
2 This figure first appears at the beginning of Episode 10, “Wandering Rocks.” He is an “onelegged 
soldier” who has fought on the side of the British in the First World War (180).  
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the children’s bodies are restrictive and uniform. Their hands form a “chain” that “imprisons” the 
idiot, and they demand a “Salute” from him: a sign of allegiance to social hierarchies. When they 
call him a “Kithogue”—which Don Gifford reports is Anglicized Irish for a “‘left-handed [and 
hence unlucky] person’” (452)—the idiot responds by raising his “palsied left arm.” He attempts, 
in other words, to participate in the social ritual, but his unsteady “locomotor apparatus” marks 
his difference from the group.3 The idiot’s style of language also distinguishes him from the 
children and primes the reader to participate in the associative reading practice that “Circe” 
invites. His verbalizations deflect definition, requesting instead open-ended guesswork. 
“Ghahute” imitates, perhaps, the children’s call for a “Salute”; “Ghahahest”—as a response to 
the children’s question “Where’s the great light?”—might be read as “in the west,” indicating 
nightfall and the psychic and physical transgressions that it invites.4 But these connotations are 
speculative and flexible, especially in contrast to the children’s commands, which demand action 
and communicate specific, socially recognizable meanings. The idiot’s imprecise utterances 
underscore the ambiguous and generative relationship between the written and aural aspects of 
language. At the end of the sequence, the children release the idiot, sanctioning his non-
normative comportment and, consequently, the themes of irregularity, intoxication, fantasy, and 
imagination that follow in the episode. Like the chorus in a Greek drama, Joyce’s idiot figure 
prepares the reader for dramatic action while remaining detached from the drama’s events.  
 The idiot figure in “Circe” emblematizes modernism’s approach to idiocy, a cognitive 
style we are now more likely to call “intellectual disability.” The idiot is gendered male. The 
																																								 																				
3 In Joyce’s schema for Ulysses, the technique of “Circe” is hallucination and the organ is the “locomotor 
apparatus” (Gifford 452).  
4 Steven Connor reads this interrogation by the children of the idiot as an introduction to the “various 
kinds of impaired, impeded or imperfectly articulated utterance” that circulate throughout Circe (114). In 
fact, for Connor, the entire episode works against the normative “balance or regulated reciprocity between 
body and mind, sense and intelligence, matter and form” (115). 
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language he uses is indefinite or unintelligible; his speech acts foster loose association and 
confusion rather than narrative momentum. His physical differences, including his 
“deafmuteness” and “Saint Vitus’ dance” movements, correspond to his cognitive difference. His 
body is porous, messy, and narratively instigating.5 And his interiority remains uninvestigated, 
even in a novel intent on voicing thoughts, behaviors, and forms of subjectivity not commonly 
featured in literary representations.  
Most fundamentally, the idiot is an outsider: he stands apart from the community with 
which he interacts. He is isolated from the social order; his visual, verbal, and kinesthetic 
peculiarity emerges against the backdrop of an undifferentiated group. His presence, in fact, 
temporarily coalesces the community, the heterogeneity of which diminishes in contrast to his 
perceived strangeness. The idiot’s brief dialogue with the children makes plain that his belonging 
in nighttown is in question. Even though the children ultimately authorize his strange trajectory 
and the unusual forms of experience it predicts, their words and actions suggest that the idiot’s 
incorporation into the community is not a given. The idiot, in other words, raises questions about 
belonging. 
This project is about why intellectual disability and its conceptual inverse, intelligence, 
become meaningful for addressing questions of belonging in the imagined communities of mid-
twentieth century literature in Britain. It makes two related claims. The first is that c. 1920 – 
1970, intelligence was constituted as a resource that could be cultivated for the benefit of 
imagined communities, particularly the nation. The second is that a significant body of literature 
composed during this period models the effects of new ideas about intelligence for 
																																								 																				
5 In Narrative Prosthesis: Disability and the Dependencies of Discourse, David Mitchell and Sharon 
Snyder argue that disability instigates narrative by shoring up normalcy elsewhere in the text: “disability 
has been used throughout history as a crutch upon which literary narratives lean for their representational 
power, disruptive potentiality, and analytical insight” (49). 
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understandings of human subjects and communities. As a whole, this project proposes that 
midcentury literature actively participates in multidisciplinary debates about the biopolitical 
stakes of intelligence. The chapters of this project demonstrate that intelligence became a rubric 
for stabilizing imagined communities in the midcentury, a moment when such imagined 
communities appeared to be changing rapidly. Figuring intelligence as a national resource posed 
problems for individuals who did not appear to have the capacity to contribute to such a 
resource—people with intellectual disabilities, but also other subjects who did not meet 
expectations for normative cognition. This explains why questions of intelligence become active 
in discourses on immigration, as I discuss in this project’s final chapter. Immigrants, like 
intellectually disabled subjects, belong to national communities shaped by commitments to 
enhancing and managing intelligence only to the extent that they are socially legible as 
intelligent. Often concentrated in idiot figures, questions of intelligence emanate outwards to 
other subjects, the organizing principles of communities, and the definitions of personhood and 
citizenship upon which imagined communities rely in their claims to collectivity.6  
For Benedict Anderson, the nation is an imagined community, which is made coherent by 
print culture: “it is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know 
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion” (6); “it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the 
actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a 
																																								 																				
6	Throughout this dissertation, I follow Robert Esposito’s understanding of the terms person and 
personhood. Esposito argues that “a gap—a transcendental, if not ontological, difference—between the 
subject and the biological substrate underlying it” animates the “essential failure of human rights” in the 
twentieth century (8; 5). This is because, he claims, modern life “re-establishes in every individual the 
separation between personal subject and human being” (11). For this reason, “personhood is qualified as 
the sovereignty that each human being exercises over his or her animal being” (12). Personhood, in other 
words, is the category of being between human and citizen, which, for Esposito, creates inherent 
inequality. 
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deep, horizontal comradeship” (7).7 In moments when a nation’s borders, place in the world, and 
internal organization are in transition, as were Britain’s c. 1920 – 1970, new measures are needed 
to demarcate where this communal comradeship begins and ends. In response to heightened 
uncertainties about how to parse belonging in the imagined community of the midcentury British 
nation, multiple domains—including psychometrics and psychology, education and health 
policy, and literature—searched for a concept that would solidify increasingly unstable 
distinctions among categories of personhood and non-personhood. Intelligence, I claim, provided 
one way to establish criteria for belonging and feelings of national stability in a period of 
volatility and transformation.  
At the same time, framing intelligence as method for demarcating categories of 
personhood was contested, in part because the meaning of intelligence was itself unstable. In 
1927, Charles Spearman, one of the most influential psychologists of the twentieth century, 
bemoaned the discursive indeterminacy of the word “intelligence”: 
Chaos itself can go no farther! The disagreement between different [intelligence] 
testers—indeed, even the doctrine and the practice of the selfsame tester—has 
reached its apogee. If they still tolerate each other’s proceedings, this is only 
rendered possible by the ostrich-like policy of not looking facts in the face. In 
truth, “intelligence” has become a mere vocal sound, a word with so many 
meanings that it finally has none. (Abilities of Man 14) 
																																								 																				
7 In her response to Anderson, Trish Loughran argues that rather than being “the central and centralizing 
agent in the processes of […] nation formation,” print services in the American context were diffuse and 
diverse (xix). What is important for my analysis is not so much the formation of imagined communities 
via print culture but rather the ways in which print and media sustain understandings of nations as 
imagined communities. 
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Spearman admits that intelligence is a messy concept and that this messiness makes it a flexible 
rubric that is consequently available to various ideological demands for organizing subjects into 
social groups.  
Despite the discursive slipperiness of the concept of intelligence, many early and mid-
twentieth century mind scientists sought to constitute intelligence as a stable object of study. In 
doing so, they imbued intelligence with a veneer of scientism that made—and continues to 
make—it attractive for the circulation of claims about what it means to be a person. These claims 
materially affect the lives of people who are understood to be on the margins of intelligence. In 
her video piece “In My Language,” contemporary disability theorist and artist Mel Baggs 
explains that her work 
is meant as a strong statement on the existence and value of many different kinds 
of thinking and interaction in a world where how close you can appear to a 
specific one of them determines whether you are seen as a real person or an adult 
or an intelligent person. And in a world in which those determine whether you 
have any rights there are people being tortured, people dying because they are 
considered non-persons, because their kind of thought is so unusual as to not be 
considered thought at all. (n.p.) 
Here, Baggs suggests that cognitive style—including the extent to which a subject is perceived 
as intelligent or intellectually disabled—affects the kinds and qualities of life availability to 
subjects and whether or not subjects are recognized as belonging to the category of “person.” 
Baggs’s comments illuminate how intelligence became in the twentieth century a contested 
boundary term used to establish and sort categories of personhood and even life.8 
																																								 																				
8 According to Matt Wray, “Boundary work is a shorthand term for any of the activities that go into the 
formation, maintenance, or transformation of boundaries. The various social and cultural mechanisms that 
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As I wrote this dissertation, watching my father’s gradual mental deterioration caused me 
to think deeply about intellectual disability both as a concept and as an experience. In 2010, a 
few months before I began graduate school, my father had a stroke that permanently affected his 
memory, personality, and capacity to participate in language. A Computed Tomography scan 
revealed that he had experienced dozens of previously undetected mini-strokes, which left 
infarcts—small areas of dead tissue—in his brain. These strokes, combined with my father’s 
family history of early-onset Alzheimer’s disease, make it difficult to know the cause of the 
intellectual changes I observed in him during the time that I completed my graduate degrees. I do 
know that these intellectual changes, which I understand as both an emerging form of difference 
and a process of loss, have affected the forms of community available to him and the extent to 
which others, perhaps even myself, recognize his humanity. Intellectual disability challenges 
some of the most deeply held criteria upon which we make claims to personhood and belonging. 
This dissertation is about why this is the case and how this came to be. 
 
What Is Intelligence? 
 One of the core claims of this project is that intelligence is not an ideologically neutral 
concept. Rather, what intelligence means and to whom it is ascribed have historically functioned 
to disguise, enforce, and promote regimes of power. This section provides a genealogy of how 
intelligence became, to use Michel Foucault’s phrase, “an especially dense transfer point for 
relations of power” (History of Sexuality 103). In The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, Foucault 
traces how sexuality does not necessarily resist flows of power but rather is “capable of serving 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
do this work are just now being inventoried and catalogued by sociologists. One of the common, 
everyday ways that boundary work is performed is through the use of words and concepts that serve as 
sociocultural dividing lines, of boundary terms. Boundary terms typically arise when groups with 
differing values, ideas, and practices come into contact and when such encounters involve conflict of any 
kind” (14).
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as a point of support, as a linchpin, for the most varied strategies” of power relations (103). As a 
dense transfer point, sexuality, in Foucault’s view, became a site for expanding, consolidating, 
and refining various techniques of power. Here, I propose that intelligence is another dense 
transfer point through which twentieth-century understandings of what humans subjects are or 
can be are worked out. As such, in the twentieth century, intelligence gained biopolitical 
meaning. 
 One root of the biopolitical significance of intelligence can be found in Charles Darwin’s 
theory of human evolution, which explains intelligence as a byproduct of evolutionary processes. 
In fact, as Steven A. Gelb argues, the related concept of intellectual disability was crucial for 
establishing Darwin’s theory of human evolution in Descent of Man (1871). In Descent, Darwin 
argues that humans evolve through similar principles as those outlined in On the Origin of 
Species (1859). To make this argument, in Descent, Darwin frames “idiots” as atavistic 
throwbacks to an earlier moment in humans’ evolutionary history, thereby positioning people 
with intellectual disabilities as “an intermediate rung on the evolutionary ladder connecting 
humans and primates” (Gelb n.p.). For example, incorporating research by his contemporary 
Karl Vogt in Descent’s second edition, Darwin writes that “idiots” 
are strong and remarkably active, continually gambolling and jumping about, and 
making grimaces. They often ascend stairs on all fours; are curiously fond of 
climbing up furniture or trees. […] Idiots also resemble the lower animals in some 
respects; thus several cases are recorded of their carefully smelling every 
mouthful of food before eating it. One idiot is described as often using his mouth 
in aid of his hands while hunting for lice. (40-41)
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Framing intellectually disabled subjects as closer in comportment and behavior to non-human 
animals than to humans, Darwin claims that they provide evidence of an evolutionary moment 
when humanity was in the process of branching off from animal life.9 Elsewhere in Descent, 
Darwin writes that idiots’ “intelligence” is notably “feeble,” which, for him, signals that their 
cognition is also evolutionarily atavistic (117). Darwin proposes, in other words, that intelligence 
offers a method for delineating the human as an evolutionary category separate from animals.  
 Repurposing Darwin’s claims about evolution and heredity, his half-cousin, Francis 
Galton, argues that intelligence is particularly meaningful for populations interested in using the 
principles of evolutionary theory to protect themselves from decline. Galton’s first major work, 
Hereditary Genius (1869), makes a strong case for the biologization of intelligence. In Genius, 
Galton argues that intelligence is inherited “under exactly the same limitations as are the form 
and physical features of the whole organic world” (1). For Galton, intelligence is a heritable 
quality that operates according to the same evolutionary principles as the body; thus, 
intelligence, like other aspects of the human, is dynamic and malleable at the level of the 
population while remaining—like eye color or height—static at the level of the individual. 
Galton, and the many researchers he influenced, thus articulated a eugenic worldview based on 
the politicization of evolutionary theory; the importance of heredity; and the intersection of 
medicine, biology, and national health.10 This eugenic worldview centered intelligence as an 
object of scientific inquiry.  
																																								 																				
9 Gelb points out, “The claim that idiots sometimes walked on all fours is significant because Darwin 
believed that bi-pedalism was unique to humanity and, in developmental history, the point at which 
human development took a divergent path from animal evolution” (Gelb n.p.). 
10 In Cultural Locations of Disability, David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder provide a fuller account of the 
influence of Galton’s ideas, describing how eugenic ideologies and practices flowed through a “Eugenic 
Atlantic.” In this Eugenic Atlantic, race and disability became linked in modernity through a project of 
human exclusion based on systems of science and management. 
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 In these foundational works, Darwin and Galton reflect on the implications of 
understanding phylogeny as dynamic. While Darwin traces the effects of natural selection on 
species development and Galton considers the means by which a population might engineer itself 
to evolutionary advantage, both express anxieties about variations from human norms, which 
they fear could result in deleterious effects across generations. As a response to these anxieties, 
Darwin and Galton claim that intelligence is static at the level of ontogeny. They imagine, in 
other words, that intelligence is an empirically observable quality that remains constant 
throughout an individual’s lifetime. This theorization of intelligence allows both thinkers to 
stabilize the category of the human, which, as Elizabeth Grosz points out, was newly in flux in 
the late nineteenth century. Darwin’s theory of evolution “transformed the concept of life,” she 
argues, “from a static quality into a dynamic process” (7). The conceptualization of intelligence 
as observable, innate, and static provided a way to typologically pin down manifestations of life 
that were understood to be newly mutable. To the extent it could be imagined as a stable 
attribute, intelligence offered a meaningful intervention in the reconceptualization of human life 
as responsive to evolutionary forces. 
 By the twentieth century, this understanding of intelligence as phylogenetically 
changeable but ontogenetically stable informed a new conceptualization of intelligence as a 
matter of public concern. Drawing on the biologization of intelligence that emerged in the late 
nineteenth century, twentieth-century scientists and policy-makers increasingly framed 
intelligence as a quality requiring management, care, and enhancement from the state. In 1904, 
British psychologist Charles Spearman posited that all cognitive processes are informed by an 
individual’s general intelligence, which he understood as an ontogenetically innate and 
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inalterable quality.11 In 1905, French psychologists Alfred Binet and Theodore Simon published 
the first Intelligence Quotient (IQ) test, which provided an instrument for measuring intelligence 
and ranking individuals.12 In 1913, the British Parliament passed the Mental Deficiency Act, a 
law that “proposed an institutional separation so that mental defectives should be taken out of 
Poor Law institutions and prisons [and placed] into newly established colonies” (Digby 12). As a 
result, during the interwar years, colonies for intellectually disabled subjects sprung up across the 
United Kingdom, albeit unevenly and with inconsistent support from local authorities.13 In the 
1920s and 30s, anxieties about the supposed degradation of the population’s intelligence were 
part of what fueled the surges of eugenic rhetoric and policy-making that swept Europe, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom.14 In Britain, a joint committee of the Board of Education 
and the Board of Control convened for five years, from 1925 – 1929, to investigate instances of 
mental deficiency and propose policy solutions; in 1934, another joint committee recommended 
that parliament promote an agenda of “voluntary sterilisation” for people with intellectual 
disabilities (Wooldridge 232; 147). Together, these events reflect a trajectory in which 
intelligence emerged as a distinct object of scientific (and pseudo-scientific) research, the 
findings of which could then be applied to political decisions. 
 Attention to intelligence was not limited to public policy and the mind sciences. 
Intelligence also attracted increasing consideration in sociology, education, cybernetics, and 
defense. For example, beginning in 1909, a vast network of military intelligence units sprang up 
																																								 																				
11 See Spearman’s “‘General Intelligence: Objectively Determined and Measured.” 
12 See Nikolas Rose’s history of intelligence testing in The Psychological Complex: Psychology, Politics, 
and Society in England, 1869 – 1939, pp. 112-145. 
13 See Sharon Morris, Mark Jackson, and Mathew Thomson for overviews of the uneven implementation 
of the 1913 Mental Deficiency Act. 
14 In Genetic Politics: From Eugenics to Genome, Tom Shakespeare and Anne Kerr offer a helpful history 
of the ways in which eugenics entered into policy in various national contexts across the twentieth 
century. 
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in a time of “heightened and intensifying international rivalries when British strategic policy-
makers were becoming especially concerned about the challenge of an aggressive, ambitious, 
imperial Germany” (Jeffrey 3). Intelligence qua espionage can be understood as a way for the 
nation to gather and consolidate information for the purpose of maintaining its integrity as an 
imagined community.15 In 1946, Roland Berrill and Lancelot Lionel Ware—the latter of whom 
became fascinated with intelligence testing while working for the National Institute for Medical 
Research—founded Mensa, the first “high IQ society.”16 High IQ societies relied on new 
technologies for social ranking—namely, intelligence tests—to create exclusive, secretive 
communities that paralleled the private, class-based membership of gentleman’s clubs. In 1956, 
at the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence, artificial intelligence (AI) 
emerged as a formalized area of research. Conference attendees sought to consolidate research 
on “thinking machines” that had been conducted in the context of various Allied powers’ war 
efforts.17 By midcentury, both within and beyond the mind sciences, intelligence was a 
meaningful concept for negotiating the relationships among subject, society, and state. 
Understood together, these events suggest a dual process through which the state sought 
to enhance its biopolitical power by, on the one hand, guarding intelligence via the segregation 
and control of people with intellectual disabilities and, on the other hand, enhancing and 
																																								 																				
15 See Phyllis Lassner, Espionage and Exile: Fascism and Anti-Fascism in British Spy Fiction and Film. 
Lassner explains how middlebrow espionage fiction of the midcentury engages in a project of 
renegotiating Britain’s imperial and national identities.  
16 See Victor Serebriakoff, IQ: A Mensa Analysis and History for a full description of Mensa’s origins. 
Mensa’s first president was psychologist Cyril Burt, an educational psychologist and student of Charles 
Spearman. 
17 See Nils Nilsson, The Quest for Artificial Intelligence for a history of the Dartmouth Summer Project. 
In their proposal to the Rockefeller Foundation for project funding, John McCarthy, Nathaniel Rochester, 
Claude Shannon, and Marvin Minsky wrote, “We propose that a 2 month, 10 man study of artificial 
intelligence be carried out during the summer of 1956 at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire. 
The study is to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any other feature of 
intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it” (qtd. in 
Nilsson 51). 
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expanding intelligence via a wide range of apparatuses, including espionage, intelligence testing, 
and technology. Both disciplinary and generative, this dual biopolitical process sought to shape 
intelligence, in its various forms and guises, in ways that were beneficial to the goals of the 
nation. Not only a matter of public concern, intelligence at midcentury was also understood to be 
a national resource. 
We might describe this trajectory, following Bruno Latour, as one in which intelligence 
shifts from being a “matter of concern” to a “matter of fact.” Matters of concern are “disputable,” 
or open to conceptual renegotiation (Latour What Is the Style 39). Matters of fact, by contrast, 
are “indisputable, obstinate, simply there” (Latour What Is the Style 39). Yet this does not mean 
that matters of fact are ideologically neutral. In fact, Latour writes, “Matters of fact are only very 
partial […], very polemical, very political renderings of matters of concern” (“Why Has Critique 
Run Out of Steam?” 232). Through its emergence as a distinct object of study and its 
contemporaneous absorption into various apparatuses of the state, intelligence became hardened 
into a matter of fact that could be deployed for various ideological ends. At the end of the time 
period examined in this project, the questions taken up by psychologists, educators, policy 
makers, and military officials were no longer, What is intelligence? or Why does intelligence 
matter? but rather, Who is intelligent? and How might we enhance the overall intelligence of this 
particular individual or population? 
In the twenty-first century, intelligence remains a “matter of fact” in some discourses, but 
by the 1970s, the explanatory power of intelligence for the ways in which subjects relate to one 
another and to national communities was in decline. One notable exception to this trend—an 
example of the residual effects of earlier, midcentury understandings of intelligence as an 
important indicator of social position—is The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in 
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American Life (1994), in which psychologist Richard Hernstein and political scientist Charles 
Murray argue that intelligence is a better predictor of one’s social outcomes than is one’s 
socioeconomic status of origin. Hernstein and Murray claim, like many earlier mind scientists 
and public policy advisers, that intelligence is a distinct, inalterable cognitive quality that 
predicts an individual’s involvement in crime, job performance, financial income, and overall 
social position. Their argument affirms “the abstraction of intelligence as a single entity, its 
location within the brain, its quantification as one number for each individual and the use of 
these to rank people in a single series of worthiness, invariably to find that oppressed and 
disadvantaged groups […] are innately inferior and deserve their status” (Gould 24-25).18 In 
doing so, their research provides a rationale for justifying inequity on the basis of intelligence. In 
particular, the book makes the highly controversial claim that there is a genetic basis for the 
persistent correlation of low intelligence scores with non-white racial identity, implying that 
members of non-white racial groups are genetically predisposed to lower intelligence.19 In the 
afterword to the book’s 2010 second edition, Hernstein and Murray attenuate this inflammatory 
claim slightly by acknowledging that environment may play a role in IQ test differences, and yet 
they maintain, “IQ score is more important—in most cases, much more important—in explaining 
black-white wage differences than are education and socioeconomic background” (325). They 
argue that measurements of intelligence, a supposedly innate cognitive ability, are more valid for 
explaining inequity than are the social and environmental structures with which individuals 
interact. In 2017, students at Middlebury College protested a public talk by Murray, who was 
scheduled to speak from his new book, Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960 – 2010, 
																																								 																				
18 The revised and expanded second edition of Gould’s The Mismeasure of Man (1994) provides a 
scathing critique of Hernstein and Murray’s research. 
19 See Simon John Prideaux for an overview of Murray’s critics (297-299). Murray has argued in 
numerous papers that social welfare has supported the creation of a vast, immoral, predominantly 
minority “underclass,” which many respondents point out is fallacious to the point of absurdity. 
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on the topic of links between socioeconomic status, race, and intelligence. Protesters chanted, 
pulled fire alarms, and allegedly assaulted the moderator of the scheduled talk in order to 
interrupt its delivery.20 While some celebrated the protestors’ actions, claiming that Murray’s 
views on race and intelligence have no place in the contemporary academy, others argued that 
the protests were an anti-intellectual assault on freedom of speech in universities. This example 
indicates how debates about intelligence continue to animate some contemporary understandings 
of intelligence, including what counts as an intellectual sphere and who counts as an 
intellectual.21 
Despite exceptions such as Hernstein’s and Murray’s research, beginning in the 1970s, 
other explanations for cognition, which did not rely on the concept of intelligence, began to take 
hold. Neuroscientific research grew exponentially in the 1970s (Rose and Abi-Rached 5), 
beginning a cultural shift that Nikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached understand as one in 
which “psy” disciplines were joined by “neuro” disciplines in the project of explaining human 
behavior. Rose and Abi-Rached claim that “neuroscientific understandings of selfhood are 
unlikely to efface modern human beings’ understanding of themselves as persons equipped with 
a deep interior world of mental states that have a causal relation to our action,” but that “they are 
likely to add a neurobiological dimension to our self-understanding and our practices of self-
management” (223). They argue that self-care is increasingly “organized around the care of our 
																																								 																				
20 See Conor Friedersdorf’s account of the event. 
21 In an Atlantic article entitled “The New Intellectuals,” Walt Hunter, following Antonio Gramsci, 
describes contemporary protestors on campuses as “organic intellectuals.” He argues that although such 
protests are often framed as debates over free speech, they are instead about who is counted as an 
intellectual: “The vitriolic pushback against today’s students exposes the fear that the university will be 
seen as what it always was: a place like any other, where (to paraphrase the philosopher Walter Benjamin) 
the dead are never safe and the enemy continues to be victorious. It is hardly surprising that the students, 
faculty, and staff—the rioters, poets, athletes, strikers, and protesters—involved in those very struggles on 
campuses through the world are claiming, via their words and actions, the contested status of the new 
intellectuals” (n.p.). 
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corporeal selves,” including “care of the brain” (223). The concept of neuro self-care assumes 
that the brain and, consequently, the person is available to change and manipulation at the 
ontogenetic level. This emphasis on neural malleability reframes human cognition as potentially 
plastic rather than innate, as earlier theories of intelligence posited.  
The discipline of psychology also began to approach intelligence from other perspectives 
in the late twentieth century. For example, in 1983, developmental psychologist Howard Gardner 
published Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences, a book that delineated eight 
forms of intelligence.22 Gardner opens Frames of Mind by dismissing many claims about 
intelligence made earlier in the twentieth century: 
First of all, try to forget that you have ever heard of the concept of intelligence as 
a single property of the human mind, or of that instrument called the intelligence 
test, which purports to measure intelligence once and for all. Second of all, cast 
your mind widely about the world and think of all the roles or “end states”—
vocational and avocational—that have been prized by cultures during various 
eras. […] In my view, if we are to encompass adequately the realm of human 
cognition, it is necessary to include a far wider and more universal set of 
competences than we have ordinarily considered. And it is necessary to remain 
open to the possibility that many—if not most—of these competences do not lend 
themselves to measurement by standard verbal methods, which rely heavily on a 
blend of logical and linguistic abilities. (xxviii) 
Gardner’s theory, which has been widely embraced by educational theorists, rejects the premise 
that intelligence is a single quality attached to language and logic and instead proposes a 
																																								 																				
22 For Gardner, the modalities of intelligence include musical intelligence, visual-spatial intelligence, 
linguistic intelligence, logical-mathematical intelligence, kinesthetic intelligence, interpersonal 
intelligence, intrapersonal intelligence, and naturalistic intelligence. 
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multifaceted theory of intelligences that bears in mind a wider range of cognitive abilities than 
those typically considered in IQ testing.23 Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences marks a 
trajectory away from a unified theory of intelligence and toward a theory of cognition as 
multifaceted, distributed, and dynamic.  
Like Gardner, philosopher Jacques Rancière in The Ignorant Schoolmaster (1987) also 
resists the notion that intelligence is a single, fixed quality that can be measured in individuals 
and ranked across populations. Rancière points out that such an understanding of intelligence 
structures and maintains social hierarchies by promoting the fiction “that there is an inferior 
intelligence and a superior one” (7). In this framework: 
The former [inferior intelligence] registers perceptions by chance, retains them, 
interprets and repeats them empirically, within the closed circle of habit and need. 
This is the intelligence of the young child and the common man. The superior 
intelligence knows things by reason, proceeds by method, from the simple to the 
complex, from the part to the whole. It is the intelligence that allows the master to 
transmit his knowledge by adapting it to the intellectual capacities of the student 
and allows him to verify that the student has satisfactorily understood what he 
learned. (7) 
Here, Rancière highlights how assumptions about intelligence inform beliefs about social 
organization; in this paradigm, being recognized as having superior intelligence is a means for 
not only claiming authority but also claiming the expertise by which to evaluate and critique 
forms of authority. This is why Rancière argues that the abandonment of static conceptions of 
																																								 																				
23 Gardner’s theory was not the first to propose intelligence as pluralistic, but it “is perhaps the best 
known of these pluralistic theories. This notoriety is due, in part, to the sources of evidence on which 
Gardner drew, and, in part, to its enthusiastic embrace by the educational community,” members of which 
frequently conflate capacities in different forms of “intelligence” and learning styles (Davis, 
Christodoulou, Seider, and Gardner 486). 
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intelligence is necessary for liberation and, thus, equality. In place of intelligence, Rancière 
proposes understanding the human mind as a site that is constantly changing through processes 
of learning (20). In this model, cognition is a fluctuating process by which the mind acquires new 
knowledge and relates it to existing understandings. By approaching cognition as a process as 
opposed to an object, Rancière conceives of the mind as fundamentally relational and embedded 
in the world. 
 These approaches to the mind in in neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy signal a 
transitional moment in the 1970s and 80s when the explanatory power of intelligence was diluted 
through the emergence of competing conceptions of cognition. This project centers on the 
decades that immediately precede this transitional moment with the goal of understanding how 
and why intelligence gained this explanatory power in the first place. The literary texts I examine 
model the development of ideas about intelligence and the ways in which intelligence came to be 
tied to broader questions about nation, the mind, and what it means to be a person in the mid-
twentieth century. 
The chapters of this dissertation examine a significant cluster of literary texts that 
engages with dominant, residual, and emergent understandings of intelligence by simulating how 
the world might be if such understandings were accorded cultural authority.24 Literature is a 
particularly useful cultural technology for modeling possibilities and evaluating alternatives. It 
has the capacity to simulate social potentials by showing, with detail and specificity, how 
ideologies affect individuals over time. Literature, in other words, allows readers to imagine how 
ambient cultural circumstances might affect particular lives and how specific social 
arrangements might affect embodied subjects. Caroline Levine highlights the relationship 
																																								 																				
24 See Raymond Williams’s explanation of how dominant, residual, and emergent cultures coexist at any 
given moment. 
	 19	
between literary and social forms, reminding us that works of literature are particularly valuable 
for understanding the forms of social arrangements—and the work of forms more broadly—
“because they can set in motion multiple social forms and track them as they cooperate, come 
into conflict, and overlap, without positing an ultimate cause” (19).25 By modeling the relations 
among forms, works of literature act as prototypes for how social arrangements could work in 
reality.26  
Literature also models social arrangements by compressing their forms, scaling down the 
unfolding of temporality so that it can be absorbed at the pace of human life. A popular way of 
thinking about literature—and other forms of artistic production—is that it is a technology of 
representation. In this way of thinking, literature reflects what happens in the world, re-
presenting, or presenting in different ways, reality as it passes by. In this project, I approach 
literature both as a technology of representation and also as one of compression. Literature takes 
complex social questions and shrinks them into pieces of writing that can be consumed relatively 
quickly, in a few days, a few hours, or a few minutes. Through literature, debates that might 
unfold across generations are compressed into texts that can be absorbed quickly and multiply. 
Readers can encounter many different literary texts in their lifetimes, each of which shows what 
might happen if the world operated in a particular way. Literature shrinks different possible 
solutions to complex cultural problems, making these solutions temporally accessible. 
																																								 																				
25 Levine defines form expansively as “an arrangement of elements—an ordering, patterning or shaping” 
(3). Form, in her definition, is the work of, but is not limited to, literary forms; instead, it is “all shapes 
and configurations, all ordering principles, all patterns of repetition and difference,” which are 
consequently portable across social contexts (3). 
26 Susan Squier and Stacy Alaimo employ similar approaches to the function of literature. In Liminal 
Lives, Squier argues that literary narratives take part in “the biomedical imaginary”: “Whether they exist 
as fiction or nonfiction, the narratives spawned by or produced in relation to biomedicine can be 
categorized as working objects, research reservoirs, or biological resources for the reconfiguration and 
extension of the human life span” (16). In Undomesticated Ground: Recasting Nature as Feminist Space, 
Alaimo reads works of literature that she argues “stage a drama of agency” in terms of nature and race 
(116). For both of these scholars, literature models the outcomes of beliefs, decisions, and ideologies. 
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This understanding of the function of literature draws from Wolfgang Iser’s claim that 
literature acts on the world by simulating its potentialities. For Iser, “literature gives presence to 
what otherwise would be unavailable” by exhibiting the possible as well as the actual (xi). As it 
ventures into the possible origins, offshoots, and effects of specific cultural claims and 
formations, literature performs “an act of boundary-crossing which, nevertheless, keeps in view 
what has been overstepped […], simultaneously disrupt[ing] and doubl[ing] the referential 
world” (xiv-xv). In this way, literature  
stag[es] […] the human condition in a welter of unforeseeable patterns […] [and] 
makes conceivable the extraordinary plasticity of human beings who, precisely 
because they do not seem to have a determinable nature, can expand into an 
almost unlimited range of culture-bound patternings. The impossibility of being 
present to ourselves becomes our possibility to play out to the fullness that knows 
no bounds. […] [L]iterature becomes a panorama of what is possible, because it is 
not hedged in by either the limitations or the considerations that determine the 
institutionalized organizations within which human life otherwise takes its course. 
(xviii) 
Iser’s vocabulary, which draws on the language of drama, reminds us that literature not only 
reflects the world but also acts as a presence within the world, influencing the cultural ground 
from which it emerges. What is valuable about Iser’s understanding of literature is that it frames 
the literary as agential as well as reactive, generative as well as absorptive. This dissertation 
takes as one of its premises that in engaging with the concepts of intelligence and intellectual 
disability, literary texts test these concepts’ competing definitions and meanings for the purpose 
of dramatizing their possible effects for people and communities. Not merely responsive to other 
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disciplines, the body of literature examined in this project also participates in shaping cultural 
understandings of intelligence and intellectual disability at a moment when their meanings were 
contested. 
 
“Idiocy” at Midcentury 
This project joins an expansive body of work focused on twentieth-century literature’s 
attention to the mind in general and to non-normative minds in particular. Literary scholarship 
has paid particular attention to modernism’s fascination with mental illness as an aesthetic 
catalyst for innovation in the early decades of the twentieth century. Modernism is an 
indeterminate descriptor that refers both to a literary-historical period and an aesthetic culture. 
Whether approaching modernism historically or aesthetically, modernist studies critics tend to 
understand it as a moment saturated with feelings of disruption that called for novel aesthetic 
techniques. Ezra Pound’s provocative command, “Make it new,” still holds remarkable sway in 
current scholarly conversations. For example, Peter Gay argues that modernism can be identified 
through its commitment to “innovations in any domain”: “The one thing that all modernists had 
indisputably in common,” Gay writes, “was the conviction that the untried is markedly superior 
to the familiar, the rare to the ordinary, the experimental to the routine” (2). Defining modernism 
as an aesthetic movement opposed to the techniques of realism, Peter Childs makes a similar 
point when he argues that “One of the first aspects of Modernist writing to strike readers is the 
way in which such novels, stories, plays and poems immerse them in the an unfamiliar world 
with little of the orienting preambles and descriptions provided by most nineteenth-century 
realist writers” (6). More recently, Jean-Michel Rabaté writes, “If innovation varied from genre 
to genre, from medium to medium, from country to country, there remained a common curve: 
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each time, an old order was felt to be crumbling down, while new ethical and esthetic values 
were being promoted” (5). For this reason, he concludes, “modernism was traversed from the 
start by a sense of crisis” (15). Similarly, Vincent Sherry frames modernism as a “crisis time,” a 
form of time that “turn[s] the uncertainty of instantaneous time into not just a feeling but an idea, 
maybe even a faith or a belief in this condition of constantly disruptive change” (2). For these 
critics, modernism centers on crises of disruption in which authors participated by seeking 
innovative forms, techniques, and subjects. 
With this story of modernism-as-disruption as a backdrop, mental illness understandably 
emerges as an important area of inquiry in modernist studies. Mental illness’s association with 
eccentricity and invention allowed it to emerge as a significant resource for innovation in 
modernism. Unpredictable, original, and generative of new realities, mental illness has been 
imagined by some modernists and modernist critics as saturated with perverse creativity, 
prompting extensions of aesthetic techniques. Critical accounts describe how representing the 
consciousnesses of mentally ill characters offered modernist authors heuristics for imagining 
unexpected forms of thinking and narrative,27 and many modernists self-consciously invoke 
illness, including mental illness, as a facilitator of creativity. For example, in her essay “On 
Being Ill,” Virginia Woolf claims that experiences of illness and impairment are “fundamental to 
art’s creation and originality” (Coates 242). Marcel Proust’s narrator, T.S. Eliot’s J. Alfred 
Prufrock, Beckett’s Murphy, and the many versions of Stephen and Bloom that appear in Joyce’s 
“Circe” all point to the aesthetic force of cognitive difference in modernist literature. 
																																								 																				
27 For example, Louis Amorsson Sass compares the work of experimental modernists such as Franz 
Kafka, Samuel Beckett, and Marcel Duchamp to behaviors and cognitive qualities associated with 
schizophrenia. More recently, Andrew Gaedtke traces the relationships between the narratives of 
schizophrenic patients and modernist authors. 
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By the midcentury, this attention to innovation was joined by coextensive anxieties about 
the stability of categories. Literary critics have approached the midcentury through its self-
conscious echoing of modernism’s earlier priorities and aspirations.28 Shaped by the feeling of 
“having been here before” in the buildup, event, and aftermath of the Second World War—and 
therefore often weighed down with a peculiar sense of belatedness that at the same time 
anticipates future crises—midcentury modernist authors frequently return to modernist forms and 
themes less in celebration of aesthetic expansion than with an awareness of the limitations of 
language as a tool for charting and changing the organization of the world. Increasingly 
unmoored from traditional categories through which to explain experience, midcentury 
modernism is a moment in which crises of innovation were joined by crises of belonging.  
Belonging, according to Lauren Berlant, is “a specific genre of affect, history, and 
political mediation that cannot be presumed and is, indeed, a relation whose evidence and terms 
are always being contested” (395). Belonging, in other words, takes place through continual 
processes of negotiation by which individuals evaluate their relationships to other individuals 
and to groups. Feelings of belonging were particularly contested in Britain c. 1920 – 1970, when 
collectivities at the levels of identity, nation, and species were profoundly in flux. In these 
decades, Britain’s role on the world stage changed from that of a major imperial power to that of 
a minor nation. Two world wars devastated Britain’s economy, population, infrastructure, and 
ecology, and other superpowers overtook Britain’s international advantages. The British Empire 
shrank, and, at the end of this period, areas that had been important to Britain’s imperial 
																																								 																				
28 Claire Seiler argues for distinguishing the midcentury from modernism more broadly, noting, “The 
umbrella of modernism now opens widely enough to afford a kind of institutional cover, or disciplinary 
legibility, to important scholarly work on literature of the Second World War and its immediate 
aftermath. That much no longer seems to need stating. What does need stating, however, is that the 
consensus extension of the modernist timeline into and beyond the war risks consolidating modernism as 
the assumed grounds for thinking about literary and cultural forms across the entire twentieth century” 
(821). 
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project—notably Ireland, India, and the Suez Canal—were no longer British. Furthermore, 
following the Second World War, the state embarked on the large-scale project of refiguring its 
relationship to its citizens by deliberating new immigration policies and expanding a variety of 
infrastructures that became, gradually, the basis of a welfare state.29 The middle decades of the 
twentieth century were a transitional time that put new pressure on the question of how to 
recognize, evaluate, and react to categories of people; in Britain, these category confusions 
played out, in particular, in terms of how the nation imagined itself as a collectivity and in 
relation to other nations. Who belongs together? Who is excluded through these negotiations of 
connection? How can collectivities emerge that yet preserve the differences of individuals? 
Midcentury modernist literature addresses these questions, in doing so contributing and 
responding to the cultural feeling that previously coherent methods for identifying imagined 
communities were dissolving. For midcentury modernists, the concept of intellectual disability—
associated in the twentieth-century with social nullity and the margins of personhood—offered a 
contrast category through which it was possible to shore up the boundaries of imagined 
communities.30 This project shows that intellectual disability was an important object of inquiry 
in midcentury modernism, c. 1920 – 1970. Intellectual disability raised a distinct set of concerns 
about categories of personhood and non-personhood and their relations to one another. 
As Anne Digby observes, “Until the late nineteenth century there existed at best only a 
blunted perception of difference between the imbecilic and the harmless or chronic lunatic, or 
																																								 																				
29 One of the first instances of the phrase “welfare state” comes from William Temple’s Christianity and 
Social Order (1942). Some have argued that this book, which claims that the Church had a duty to 
intervene in economics when necessary and to support policies that help all members of the community, 
helped influence the rise of the Labour Party after the Second World War. See, for instance, Malcolm 
Brown, “Politics as the Church’s Business: William Temple’s Christianity and the Social Order 
Revisited.”  
30 In his cultural history of idiocy, Patrick McDonagh argues, “Idiocy is […] a term to designate other 
people, or other groups of people. In sum, the idea of idiocy takes shape as part of a historical process, 
and this process is also that which creates the contemporary individual” (3). 
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between the congenitally handicapped and the senile demented” (7). But beginning in the late 
nineteenth century, madness was increasingly defined in mind science and public policy as a 
state of cognitive and emotional confusion whereas intellectual disability was imagined as a state 
of cognitive absence. For example, the 1886 Idiots Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
distinguished “lunatics” (i.e., the mentally ill) from “idiots” and “imbeciles” (i.e., the 
intellectually disabled) for the purpose of delineating different forms of care (Morris 12). 
Whereas lunatics were to be remanded to asylums, the state determined that idiots belonged in 
training centers and schools.31 This law was one of the first to codify intensifying distinctions 
between the diagnostic categories of madness and idiocy, as well as to distinguish the distinct 
trajectories of state and medical care for these categories of people. The Idiots Act was replaced 
in 1913 by the Mental Deficiency Act, which delineated four legal categories of so-called mental 
deficiency: idiocy, imbecility, feeble-mindedness, and moral imbecility. The Mental Deficiency 
Act also revoked the Idiots Act’s integrationist approach by urging communities to 
institutionalize intellectually disabled subjects (Digby 12). Even though the Mental Deficiency 
Act was unevenly implemented in the United Kingdom, its taxonomy of intellectual disability 
provided a more granular account of a cognitive category that was increasingly understood as a 
social problem distinct from mental illness—one that required separate institutions, management 
strategies, and legal provisions. 
Around the same time, in psychiatry and psychology, intellectual disability was 
recognized as a cognitive pathology distinct from mental illness. IQ tests, which were first 
developed in 1905 and proliferated quickly throughout the United Kingdom and the United 
States, were the condition of possibility for intellectual disability—and, consequently, 
																																								 																				
31 A year after The Idiots Act’s passage, a notice in the British Journal of Psychiatry explained that the 
function of the law was to “simplif[y] the certificates and remov[e] restrictions affecting the admission of 
idiots and imbeciles into training institutions” (103). 
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intelligence—to emerge as objects of analysis in psychological inquiry.32 Psychologists such as 
Binet, a co-author of the first IQ test, disentangled mental illness and intellectual disability, 
approaching each as different, even unrelated, forms of pathology. In 1916, Binet—interpreting 
accounts by nineteenth-century French psychiatrist Jean-Etienne Dominique Esquirol—
remarked, “Insanity may be cured; one can conceive of the possibility of suspending the 
symptoms; there is a diminution or privation of the forces necessary to exercise the faculties, but 
the faculties still exist” (15). Idiocy, by contrast, is for Binet “not a malady, it is a state in which 
the faculties are never manifested, or have never developed sufficiently for the idiot to acquire 
the knowledge which other individuals of his age receive when placed in the same environment” 
(15). Binet concludes, “He [the insane person] is a rich man become poor; the idiot has always 
been in misery and want” (15). Here, Binet frames insanity as a state of cognitive abundance 
containing the possibility of endlessly erring “faculties”; idiocy, by contrast, is a state of 
cognitive absence. This approach marks a shift in understandings of intellectual disability. No 
longer approached as a state of cognitive difference requiring education and training, intellectual 
disability was instead constituted as a state of permanent deficiency, null of faculties altogether, 
requiring management and care.33 
This discursive distinction between madness and idiocy in law and medicine around the 
turn of the twentieth century helps to explain why literary modernists often turned to mental 
illness as a fascinating prompt for innovative exploration. Across multiple cultural spheres, 
mental illness became recognized as an experience of abundant error; intellectual disability, 
																																								 																				
32 For an overview of the first IQ test, see Adam Cohen (30-34). 
33 Licia Carlson claims that turn-of-the-century approaches to intellectual disability can be divided into 
three general trends: a moment of optimistic institutional expansion (1850 – 1880); a moment of 
increasing pessimism, which included a shift to custodialism of people with intellectual disabilities (1880 
– 1900); and a moment of cultural fear, when the desire to protect society from deviance began to 
overtake earlier approaches to intellectual disability (23). 
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meanwhile, was a state of lack or nullity. Michel Foucault reflects this point by observing that 
madness and idiocy were increasingly delineated across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; 
while madness was understood to involve imaginative substitutions for logic (reasoning in error), 
idiocy was not understood as reasoning at all. Interpreting diagnostic categories by French 
physician Philippe Pinel, Foucault writes, “the difference between imbecility and dementia is 
essentially the difference between immobility and movement. In idiocy, what was observed was 
a general paralysis […], with the mind frozen in a sort of stupor. In dementia, by contrast, the 
essential functions of the mind do think, but they think in a void, and consequently are extremely 
mercurial” (Madness: A History 262). Roy Porter further elucidates these discursive formations: 
“Madness continues to exercise its magic, but mindlessness holds no mystique” (qtd. in Carlson 
18). The “mystique” of madness is that of creative substitution, as Foucault observes elsewhere: 
“Madness is the purest, most total form of qui pro quo; it takes the false for the true, death for 
life, man for woman, the beloved for the Erinnys and the victim for Minos” (Madness and 
Civilization 30). For literary modernists, madness offered a heuristic for entering the mind from 
unusual vantage points; idiocy, by contrast, did not incite rich descriptions of consciousness but 
rather suggested the form of a human absent of a socially legible mind. 
For most midcentury modernist authors, intellectual disability—considered to be the 
absence of cognition—did not invite aesthetic explorations of individual characters’ 
consciousnesses. Instead, intellectual disability appears to be a form of cognition only 
conceivable through negation: a black box whose contents remain unintelligible or unknown. For 
many literary authors, intellectual disability, in other words, rarely existed as a peculiarly 
intriguing form of mind, but rather as non-mind. For this reason, it deflected modernism’s core 
aesthetic strategy: that of closely examining the contours of individual minds. Instead, 
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intellectual disability prompts the question, In the case of a subject who is unable to produce 
language or other legible forms of communication and signification, how can we know the 
nature of that subject’s mind? Furthermore, how do we know that this subject is a person at all?  
In midcentury modernist literature, rather than instigating aesthetic expansion into new 
forms of experience, intellectual disability raised questions about the criteria humans use to 
identify and assess interiority—and personhood—in others, thereby provoking crises about the 
ways in which we distinguish categories of personhood and non-personhood, which form the 
basis of imagined communities. Intellectual disability, in other words, inaugurates epistemic 
confusion about how we know the categories and qualities of humanness and, in turn, which 
categories and qualities belong together in legible collectivities. Since such crises of belonging 
were particularly urgent in the midcentury, it was during these decades that their staging in 
literature became most pervasive, both responding to and shaping the semantic relation between 
intellectual disability and imagined communities. 
Another important category of mental difference during this period is autism. In recent 
years, autism has become an important object of inquiry at the intersection of modernist studies 
and disability studies.34 Although some of the characters in this project might be recognizable 
through the rubric of autism, I do not limit the scope of my inquiry to autism; instead, for two 
primary reasons, I use the flexible, historically unbounded term intellectual disability. First, 
autism is a term with historical specificity and significance. Autism did not emerge as a medical 
diagnosis until the early 1940s, and it was not widely recognized as a diagnostic category until 
																																								 																				
34 See, for example, Joseph Valente, “The Accidental Autist: Neurosensory Disorder in The Secret 
Agent,” and Claire Barber-Stetson, “Slow Processing: A New Minor Literature by Autists and 
Modernists.” 
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several decades later.35 Since that time, what autism means—what qualities or experiences are 
associated with autism—has continued to change.36 Autism, in other words, is not a term that 
refers to a stable condition or set of experiences, but rather to a shifting coalition of cognitive 
styles and behaviors. This is Joseph Straus’s point when he writes that “autism” is not a clearly 
defined diagnosis but instead a reflection of extant cultural priorities. Straus claims that 
psychiatric disorders such as autism 
are often a pathologically excessive version of some trait that, in its cultural 
context, is considered socially desirable (anorexia is excessive thinness, 
neurasthenia is excessive female passivity, fugue is excessive travel, ADHD is 
excessive energy and activity, obsession is excessive focus and concentration). In 
this sense, autism might be understood as excessive individuality, autonomy, and 
self-reliance, normally understood as highly desirable traits. Autism might be 
understood to represent a pathological excess of what the Western world most 
prizes—autonomous individuality, with its promise of liberty and freedom—
reconfigured as what it fears—painful solitude, isolation, and loss of community. 
Autism has thus become an emblematic psychiatric condition of the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first centuries, simultaneously a medical diagnosis and a cultural 
force. (“Autism as Culture” 536) 
																																								 																				
35 The term “autism” was coined in a paper published in 1911 on schizophrenia. In this paper, Eugen 
Bleuler used the term to describe a mode of thinking evident in “dreams, pretend play and reveries, and in 
the fantasies and delusions of the schizophrenic” (Feinstein 5). In the 1940s, Hans Asperger and Leo 
Kanner both used the term “autistic” to describe children who were highly intelligent but preferred 
aloneness and sameness of routine (Feinstein 12).   
36 For example, Heather Thomas and Tom Bollstorff provide an overview of recent changes to “autism” 
as a diagnostic category, pointing out that while the DSM-IV (1994) “first explicitly recognized Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD),” significant changes were made in the DSM-V (2013), which “formalized the 
autism spectrum by abandoning the previously dominant rubric of five ‘pervasive developmental 
disorders’ and removed Rett Syndrome and Asperber Syndrome as diagnoses associated with ASD (n.p.).  
	 30	
For Straus, autism becomes more or less recognizable as a pathology as cultural priorities and 
values change; he suggests that at some point in the future, as personalized technology continues 
to reconfigure normative sociality, autism will no longer be recognizable as a psychiatric 
disorder to the same extent. In this project, I resist reifying autism as a transhistorical category or 
assuming that its manifestations and meanings remain stable across time. I take this to be what 
Ian Hacking means when he says of biolooping, “the dynamics of classification is where the 
action is” (124). Hacking writes that biolooping is the reiterative process by which a 
classification for people emerges, people identify with that classification of being, and then, 
because of those processes of identification, that way of classifying people becomes stronger. 
Social construction is, in other words, interactive; one’s sense of one’s identity, and the identities 
of others, takes place in relation to the methods of human classification available at a given time. 
 Second, the category of autism is often associated with particular kinds of socially 
recognizable brilliance, both in popular culture and in academic discourse. For example, in a 
review of recent books with autistic characters, Trisha Paul notes that people with autism are 
often figured as “‘detail-oriented’” and as having “‘busy brain[s]’” (n.p.). Straus goes further, 
framing most autists as people with “distinctive intelligence and creativity, as well as a 
predilection for special interests, pursued in an intense, focused way, that have come to be 
understood as central to the emerging culture of autism” (“Idiot Savants” n.p.). Temple Grandin, 
a frequent figure and interlocutor in disability studies research on autism, is more than 
commonly knowledgeable when it comes to relations between humans and non-human 
animals.37 Autism often signifies a form of cognition that is markedly different from normative 
																																								 																				
37 For example, in “Autism as Culture,” Joseph N. Straus describes Grandin’s cognitive style as one of 
“local coherence,” or “an unusual and distinctive ability to attend to details on their own terms, not 
subsumed into a larger totality—a propensity to perceive the world in parts rather than as a connected 
whole” (467). Here, Straus frames local coherence as a form of cognitive super-ability. 
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experience but that does not significantly challenge normative assessments about intelligence 
and the cognitive hierarchies it implies. Like mental illness, autism is a category that refers to 
cognitive variance or exaggeration; this is what Straus means when he writes that autism “might 
be understood as excessive individuality, autonomy, and self-reliance” (“Autism as Culture” 
536). 
By contrast, the cognitive styles I am interested in, which I group under the umbrella 
term intellectual disability, often bear little or no resemblance to forms of cognition that are 
typically valued. For this reason, intellectual disability challenges our most fundamental beliefs 
about the mind. Philosopher Eva Feder Kittay, describing her daughter, reflects on how 
intellectual disability has affected her own understanding of cognition. “Sesha,” writes Kittay, 
“has no measurable IQ because IQ tests depend on capabilities to express cognitive capacities 
and Sesha lacks these expressive capabilities” (127). For this reason, Kittay explains that the 
nature of her daughter’s mind is unknowable to her. This unknowability, in turn, exposes the 
limits of Kittay’s own comprehension. She writes, 
I don’t know if Sesha has formed a narrative of her life. That she has memories I 
doubt not at all. That she remembers people, places, music—even music she has 
not heard for years—and that she anticipates experiences that she loves, I also 
cannot doubt. But I do not know if this takes on a narrative structure, and I do 
agree that these narrative structures give our life a richness. I think it is possible 
that Sesha’s life lacks this richness. Sesha’s life lacks many things that make my 
life rich—including reading and writing philosophy. But does this mean that her 
time-relative interests are less strong than my own? Or that she lacks prudential 
unity relations? Or that she lacks a strong egoistic concern for her future? I don’t 
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know how to answer these questions, not only because my daughter does not 
speak but also because I am not sure I truly understand what these concepts mean 
or what their significance ultimately is. (128) 
Sesha’s mind is not only mysterious to Kittay, it also sparks epistemic confusion for her. Kittay 
cannot easily incorporate Sesha’s mind into a normative understandings of cognitive qualities 
that are supposedly socially valuable; instead, her daughter’s intellectual disability changes the 
terms by which she understands cognition and what she understands cognition to be. 
The amorphous category of intellectual disability allows me to talk about a range of 
cognitive styles that are difficult to recuperate as “intelligent” because they do not necessarily 
accord with the qualities, behaviors, and sense of respectability we have associated with 
intelligence for more than a century. Rather than approach intellectual disability as a way to 
expand the boundaries of intelligence, thereby diversifying its meanings and proliferating its 
power, I approach intellectual disability as a way to unravel our fascination with intelligence, 
which, even in its most inclusive forms, has been a method for distinguishing those who are 
“bright” from those who are “dim,” those who are socially valuable from those who are not. 
What is at stake in this latter approach is considering how forms of experience may upset and 
transform what we care about rather than testing the flexibility of our worldviews. This involves 
recognizing forms of debility as such rather than converting them into difference—recognizing, 
in other words, how debility may explode our worldviews rather than stretching them to include 
more exceptions. Because the field of disability studies is primarily invested in understanding 
disability not as deficit but rather as a form of experience that is socially and culturally important 
in its own right, some disability studies scholars have argued against approaching disability as 
dependency, pushing instead for changes to social environments that would allow disabled 
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subjects to be more independent.38 While these arguments are important, disability invites us to 
think about dependency as well as difference and also the ways in which our singular forms of 
embodiment mean that we have access to some forms of experience and lack others. Kittay 
observes that Sesha’s memories may not involve narrative structures; she writes that this fact 
may mean that Sesha lacks, to some degree: “I do agree that these narrative structures give our 
life a richness. I think it is possible that Sesha’s life lacks this richness” (128). Lack can be 
recognized as such without being articulated as negative. After all, lack is what makes us 
dependent on others. I take this to be Lennard Davis’s point when he imagines a future in which 
ways of relating are not premised on the fantasy of normate subjects, but rather “based on the 
partial, incomplete subject whose realization is not autonomy and independence but dependency 
and interdependence” (“End of Identity Politics” 30).39 In fact, as Judith Butler points out, 
acknowledgment of our partiality, our incompleteness, affords us social encounters, intimacies, 
and understandings of what it means to be human that would not otherwise be possible.40 
																																								 																				
38 The social model of disability, in particular, rejects disability as loss by defining disability as social 
oppression, not a form of impairment. The social model took off in the 1970s in response to the medical 
model of disability, which figured disability as tragedy. Arguing against any static model of disability on 
political grounds, Jonas-Sebastien Beaudry argues, “Although it is wise to remember that policies about 
health and medical discourses may conceal ideological content, it also seems quite radical to argue that 
disability is exclusively a social phenomenon to be dealt with by social measures” (211). His point is that 
both the medical model claim that disability is loss and also the social model claim that disability is social 
oppression are too extreme for explaining the complexity of disability experience. 
39 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson coins the term normate in Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical 
Disability in American Culture and Literature. The normate is the identity position of people unmarked 
by stigmatized identifiers, such as disability. 
40 In her conversation with Sunaura Taylor in the documentary Examined Life (2008), in reference to 
Taylor’s anecdote about asking for assistance in a coffee shop, Butler says, “My sense of what’s at stake 
here is rethinking the human as a site of interdependency. And I think when you walk into the coffee 
shop, if I can go back to that moment, and you ask for the coffee or you indeed ask for some assistance 
with the coffee, you’re basically asking the question, ‘Do we or do we not life in a world in which we 
assist each other? Do we or do we not help each other with basic needs? And are basic needs there to be 
decided on as a social issue and not just my personal, individual issue or your personal, individual issue?’ 
There is a challenge to individualism that happens at the moment when you ask for assistance with the 
coffee cup. And hopefully people will take it up and say, ‘Yes, I too live in that world and understand that 
we need each other in order to address our basic needs.” 
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Perhaps acknowledging lack without reframing it as difference is part of what is necessary to 
make more cooperative futures possible.  
 This project proceeds in four chapters. Chapter 1, “Interwar Imaginings of Intelligence,” 
analyzes a cluster of essays and psychological texts that advance the notion that collective 
intelligence is a transpersonal and material basis for communities. I argue that these texts—
H.D.’s Notes on Thoughts and Vision, Rebecca West’s The Strange Necessity, Olive Moore’s 
The Apple Is Bitten Again, H.G. Wells’s World Brain, psychometrician Charles Spearman’s 
“‘General Intelligence,’ Objectively Determined and Measured,” and psychometrician Raymond 
Cattell’s Our National Intelligence—point to the ways in which literary authors engaged with a 
variety of mind sciences, including those that emphasized quantification and measurement, to 
conceive of intelligence as a unitary essence both in need of communal care and capable of 
protecting humanity from violence, particularly future international war. These texts foreshadow 
nationalist and fascist investments in collective power while remaining hopeful about 
management as a strategy for societal improvement. 
Extending this investigation of the role of intelligence in the formation of communities, 
Chapter 2, “‘Contemplating the idiot’: Mental Privacy, Intellectual Disability, and the Possibility 
of Private Language in Virginia Woolf’s Between the Acts,” explores Woolf’s concept of mental 
privacy through the intellectually disabled figure in her last novel. I investigate how in Between 
the Acts, Woolf uses the figure of the “village idiot” to reframe the relationship between mental 
privacy and aesthetics. Whereas in her earlier writing mental privacy is figured as a catalyst for 
creativity, Woolf in her last novel points to the continuity between ancient Greek understandings 
of idiocy as an extreme form of mental privacy and contemporaneous notions of so-called 
“mental deficiency,” figuring idiocy as a subject position that forecloses socially meaningful 
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language and promotes epistemic confusion. Albert, the novel’s village idiot figure, is one of the 
only characters whose thoughts remain un-narrated. I argue that he represents the form of 
untranslatable thoughts that Woolf feared at the end of her life: those that cannot be shared for 
the purpose of forming discursive communities via aesthetics or language itself. 
While Between the Acts registers unease about the relationship between intellectual 
disability and imagined communities, in Chapter 3, “Information, Ignorance, and Ways of 
Reading in Samuel Beckett,” I argue that Beckett re-values the related experience of intellectual 
debility at the levels of theme and form in Watt and Molloy. Critical disability studies scholars 
including Jasbir Puar and Mel Chen have used the term “intellectual debility” to identify 
experiences of mental partiality including illness, inattention, tiredness, and intoxication.41 Watt 
and Molloy feature characters whose minds are inaccessible to their interlocutors (Mr. Knott in 
Watt and Moran’s son Jacques in Molloy); at the same time, these texts require unconventional 
reading practices that invite readers to become comfortable with experiences of ignorance. I 
position this thematic and formal investment in intellectual debility alongside the history 
information theory in the midcentury to posit that Beckett’s novels work against the cultural 
valorization of cognition as a process of information acquisition and instead propose ignorance 
as a potentially valuable position from which to relate to others.  
And in Chapter 4, “Cognitive Citizenship and the Welfare State in Harold Pinter and 
Peter Nichols,” I explore how postwar debates about Britain’s welfare state turned to intelligence 
and intellectual disability for their conceptual power in debates about who belongs. This chapter 
shows that in a moment when the political tensions between providing basic assurances to every 
citizen and fostering economic productivity were particularly strong, intellectual disability 
																																								 																				
41 See Puar, “Prognosis Time: Toward a Geopolitics of Affect, Debility and Capacity” and Chen, “Brain 
Fog: The Race for Cripistemology.” 
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continued to serve as a measure of community cohesion. Surveying the relationship between 
infrastructure and intellectual disability in two plays by Pinter, The Dumb Waiter and The 
Caretaker, and two plays by Nichols, A Day in the Death of Joe Egg and The National Health, 
this chapter argues that intellectually disabled subjects highlighted the potential tension between 
claims to universality and claims to efficiency in Britain’s welfare state in the 1960s.  
Together, the chapters in the project illustrate how literary discourse participated 
alongside contemporaneous sciences (and pseudo-sciences) in addressing questions of 
community via understandings of intelligence in the tumultuous decades of the midcentury. 
These literary re-mediations of scientific and political intelligence theories are experiments in 
what it might mean for communities if intelligence is proposed as a measure of belonging. This 
body of literature shows that midcentury literature played a vital role in re-assessing the 
relationships between subject and society, citizen and nation, and individuality and collectivity at 
a moment when these relationships were profoundly in flux.  
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Chapter 1: Interwar Imaginings of Collective Intelligence 
In order for intelligence to be understood as a national resource and a method for 
demarcating categories of personhood, it first needed to be imagined as a discrete cognitive 
quality that had meaning for populations. This chapter locates two discourses through which 
intelligence came to be understood as a distinct and collectively shared feature of cognition in 
the early decades of the twentieth century. In psychometrics, a branch of psychology concerned 
with developing instruments to quantify aspects of the mind, and in a range of experimental 
essays composed by literary authors during the interwar years, intelligence was posited as a 
coherent essence that could be manipulated for the benefit of a collective. This chapter shows 
how H.D., Rebecca West, Olive Moore, and H.G. Wells contributed to the increasingly popular 
notion that intelligence is scalable—that is, that intelligence is an aspect of cognition that works 
comparably at the level of the individual or the population. It also shows how, unlike many 
modernists, these interwar authors celebrated mass consciousness above individual subjectivity 
for what they perceived to be its egalitarian capacity. 
Literary modernism of the interwar period is often characterized by its fascination with 
the rich interiority of individual characters. Many modernist authors regarded collective 
intelligence—sometimes called common mind, herd mentality, or group thought—suspiciously, 
framing it as an erosion of individual consciousness. Melba Cuddy-Keane, Adam Hammond, and 
Alexandra Peat argue, for instance, that modernism registers “on the one hand, a pervasive fear 
that mass consciousness involves blind adherence to an undeviating faith and, on the other, a 
belief that massification can be resisted either by flexible group affiliations that preserve 
individualism or through multiple, overlapping groups within the mass” (43).42 They suggest that 
																																								 																				
42 Cuddy-Keane, Hammond, and Peat trace the discursive history of collective consciousness, which 
emerges across disciplines in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in texts such as Gustave Le 
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modernists invoke collective intelligence either to highlight its limitations, by imagining it 
results in “blind adherence to an undeviating faith,” or to resist its impulse to group cognition, by 
seeking to “preserve individualism” or “multiple, overlapping groups within the mass.” In both 
cases, the authors understand modernists as championing individual thought above mass 
consciousness and, by extension, the concerns of individual subjects above those of the 
collective.  
Here, I investigate a cluster of essays that invert this approach to individual and collective 
cognition: H.D.’s “Notes on Thought and Vision” (composed in 1919, published for the first 
time in 1982), West’s The Strange Necessity (1928), Moore’s The Apple Is Bitten Again (1934), 
and Wells’s World Brain (a collection of addresses delivered between 1936 – 37 and published 
as an edited collection in 1938).43 I argue that these texts point to a significant interwar counter-
discourse in which literary authors valued collective intelligence for its capacity to link 
communities instead of rejecting it as a perceived challenge to the integrity of the individual. In 
these essays, collective intelligence does not threaten to erode individual difference but instead is 
the basis for feelings of collectivity. For this reason, H.D., West, Moore, and Wells advance the 
notion that intelligence is a shared biopolitical resource that has the potential to improve 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
Bon’s The Crowd (1896), Wilfred Trotter’s Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War (1916), William 
McDougall’s The Group Mind (1920), and Sigmund Freud’s Group Psychology and the Analysis of the 
Ego (1922), as well as in literary texts by T.S. Eliot, James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, Katherine Mansfield, 
Samuel Beckett, and more.  
43 H.D., West, Moore, and Wells shared similar geographic and cultural contexts, but they were not the 
only thinkers interested in theorizing collective intelligence as a positive essence. Richard Maurice 
Bucke, a Canadian adventurer, physician, and eventually psychiatrist, published Cosmic Consciousness: 
A Study in the Evolution of the Human Mind in 1901. Cosmic Consciousness analyzes a dizzying array of 
texts, including religious works from the Christian, Buddhist, and Muslim traditions; the poetry of Dante 
and Robert Browning; and texts by Charles Darwin, Auguste Comte, and Havelock Ellis. Buck argues 
there are three stages of psychological development: simple consciousness (“possessed by man as by 
animals” [1]), self consciousness (“the sine qua non of human social life, of manners, of institutions, of 
industries of all kinds” [3]), and cosmic consciousness, a transpersonal form of thought that involves “a 
consciousness of the cosmos” and also “an intellectual enlightenment or illumination which alone would 
place the individual on a new plane of existence” (3). 
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humanity’s future, particularly if it is maintained and enhanced by experts. By examining 
positive appraisals of collective intelligence in H.D., West, Moore, and Wells, this chapter points 
to an under-explored strand in the literature of the 1920s and 30s: one in which the mass, the 
average, or the collective is prized above differences among individuals as a subject of discursive 
and aesthetic exploration. 
Highlighting this counter-discourse through the lens of psychometrics provides broader 
insight into the relationship between literature and the mind sciences of the 1920s and 30s. 
Modernism’s approaches to the mind have often been compared to those of psychoanalysis, 
allowing critics to conclude that modernism participates in an interdisciplinary cultural 
fascination with the minds of individuals in the early twentieth century, which manifests in 
qualitative explorations of individual characters’ interiorities.44 But during the interwar years, 
other strands of psychology—notably, psychometrics—prioritized quantitative approaches to the 
mind. Psychometrics focused on the mind’s general features as opposed to its unique 
manifestations in individuals; for this reason, psychometric researchers conduct inquiries into the 
mind’s functional capabilities rather than the internal states or qualitative experiences of specific 
people. Although still a relatively new field, by the late 1920s, psychometrics’ theories and 
methods had been employed in military organizations, mental health institutions, and public 
education.45 In the interwar years, its most influential practitioners, including Charles Spearman, 
Cyril Burt, and Raymond Cattell, were particularly concerned with the nature and measurement 
of intelligence, questions that helped to bolster their claims to scientific objectivity at a moment 
																																								 																				
44 For example, Mark S. Micale observes, “Both areas of human effort [the sciences and the arts during 
the modernist period, c. 1880 – 1940] were vitally concerned with the nature and structure of the 
individual personality, and both pioneered new techniques of narration to capture the inner workings of 
the human mind and the moment-by-moment experience of individual consciousness” (2). 
45 See Nikolas Rose’s account of the influence of psychometric approaches to intelligence on social 
institutions in The Psychological Complex: Psychology, Politics and Society in England, 1869-1939, pp. 
112-145. 
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when psychology’s disciplinary status was up for debate. While attention to the measurement of 
intelligence peaked in the 1920s and 30s in Britain, Stephen Jay Gould argues that psychometrics 
lastingly influenced modern and contemporary conceptions of intelligence, especially the notion 
that intelligence is “a single entity” that can be quantitatively measured and comparatively 
analyzed across populations (56).  
Although they do not explicitly engage with contemporaneous psychometric research, 
H.D., West, Wells, and Moore implicitly address the discipline’s core claims by proliferating the 
notion that intelligence is a self-evident and scalable aspect of cognition. In other words, these 
authors state that intelligence may be identified and analyzed with equivalent relevance to 
smaller units (individuals) and larger ones (collectives). In quantitative social sciences, such as 
psychometrics and sociology, the notion of scalability—or the idea that a concept remains stable 
across multiple scales—burgeoned in the interwar years, with some of the first uses of the term 
appearing the mid-1930s.46 Through discussions of intelligence as a scalable essence with 
meaning for populations, these authors participate in a cultural milieu that increasingly embraced 
quantitative explanations for the mind. 
This chapter charts how H.D., West, Wells, and Moore employ the concept of scalability 
in their explorations of collective intelligence for the purpose of rethinking the category of the 
human. Instead of identifying the interiorities of individual humans as starting points for 
aesthetic representation, H.D., West, Moore, and Wells position human collectives as their 
central objects of inquiry. These texts thereby counter the prioritization of individual subjectivity 
in contemporaneous interwar modernist literature by figuring groups as distinct units of analysis 
																																								 																				
46 According to the OED, the word “scalable” meant “able to be scaled or climbed” until roughly the 
1930s, when it began to be used in psychological and sociological discourse to mean “able to measured or 
graded according to scale.” 
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rather than as sums of individual thought and action. These texts prize collective intelligence 
precisely for its ability to obscure the granularity of individuals’ subjective experience.  
This chapter proceeds in five sections. First, I outline psychometrics’ approach to 
collective intelligence, taking British psychologist Charles Spearman’s theory of general 
intelligence as my primary example. Spearman, one of the most influential psychologists of the 
twentieth century, was the first to posit that intelligence is a single, unitary cognitive quality, 
which he argued could therefore be located and quantified.47 In this section, I claim that 
Spearman’s theory enables a way of thinking about intelligence as a transpersonal essence, or 
what Spearman termed both a “conceptual uniformity” and “mental energy” in his research. For 
this reason, I suggest that Spearman’s approach to intelligence displaces the centrality of the 
individual by focusing instead on an abstracted collective.  
 Next, I analyze essays by H.D., West, Moore, and Wells, which I argue posit collective 
intelligence as transpersonal essence that forms the basis of embodied collectivities. These 
essays, in other words, understand collective intelligence to be simultaneously material (i.e., of 
the body) and transpersonal (i.e., shared across individuals). Collective intelligence thereby 
allows for the imagination of a particular yet flexible biopolitical community. Writing in the 
anxious interwar context, each of these authors imagines that the coordination of collectively 
shared intelligence will sustain human life by reducing the probability of future international 
violence.48 For this reason, I argue that these authors participate in discursive deliberations about 
																																								 																				
47 Of Spearman’s reputation, Arthur Jensen writes: “Few would dispute the claim that Charles Spearman 
(1863 – 1945) is Britain’s premier psychologist and indeed one of the enduring figures in the history of 
behavioral science. Some twenty years ago I asked a number of psychologists to list the names of 
whomever they considered to be the five or six most important persons in the history of psychological 
testing. Among all the nominations, only three were common to everyone’s list: Galton, Binet, and 
Spearman” (1). 
48 See Paul Saint-Amour’s description of what he argues is the “anticipatory syndrome between the wars” 
in Tense Future: Modernism, Total War, Encyclopedic Form (8).  
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the nature of intelligence in order to understand, critique, and imagine various forms of 
community. This chapter’s final section proposes that both the disciplines of psychometrics and 
these literary authors’ essays exist within a broader twentieth-century cultural matrix in which 
the reification, examination, and manipulation of group thought was framed as increasingly 
important for creating order and maintaining communities.  
 
Spearman’s Conceptual Uniformities 
 Spearman’s theory of general intelligence was the first psychological theory to propose 
intelligence as a single cognitive quality that is available to empirical study. The first iteration of 
this theory appears in a 1904 paper, which Spearman boldly titled “‘General Intelligence’: 
Objectively Determined and Measured.” His ideas continued to activate approaches to 
intelligence during the interwar years—when he published several elaborations of his theory49—
and throughout the twentieth century. His work inspired decades of further psychological 
research on the nature of intelligence, as well as outright plagiarism by one of his mentees, Cyril 
Burt.50 And as recently as 1998, one of Spearman’s intellectual heirs, Arthur Jensen, asserted the 
durability of Spearman’s research by claiming, “after literally a century of exploration, the g 
model [Spearman’s theory of general intelligence] provides a simple, accurate summary of a 
massive number of studies of intelligence” (Hunt 91). Here, I propose that the publication 
Spearman’s theory of general intelligence helped to shape the trajectory of psychology as a 
discipline and also offered discursive clarification about the nature and biopolitical meaning of 
																																								 																				
49 Spearman defended and elaborated on his theory in two well-reviewed volumes in the 1920s: The 
Nature of ‘Intelligence’ and the Principles of Cognition (1923) and The Abilities of Man: Their Nature 
and Measurement (1927). 
50 See Gould’s detailed account of “the Burt Affair” (265-267). According to Gould, “Burt attempted to 
commit an act of intellectual parricide by declaring himself, rather than his predecessor and mentor 
Charles Spearman, as the father of a technique called ‘factor analysis’ in psychology” (267). 
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intelligence. This section first provides an overview of Spearman’s theory of general intelligence 
and then traces some of its afterlives in relation to the discipline of psychology and twentieth-
century discourses on intelligence.  
In 1904, Spearman was a student of Wilhelm Wundt—one of the first researchers to 
apply experimental methods to psychology—but his ideas were strongly informed by his reading 
of Francis Galton (Hunt 89). Galton had first published his foundational Hereditary Genius—in 
which Galton proposed that intelligence is a heritable feature that is advantageous for natural 
selection—in 1869, but the text remained popular throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century; in London, a second edition was published in 1892, which was then reprinted in 1914 
and 1925. Spearman’s theory of general intelligence is a response to implicit questions raised by 
Galton’s Hereditary Genius: If intelligence is a valuable quality, what exactly is intelligence, and 
how can it be measured? In his 1904 paper, Spearman sets out to develop a method for defining 
and quantifying intelligence.  
Spearman begins with the observation that an individual child is likely to earn similar 
scores on different mental tests. He assumes that this similarity amongst mental test scores 
indicated the presence of a previously unidentified cognitive quality—which he called 
intelligence—that guides individual cognition irrespective of task or context. His approach to 
intelligence relies, therefore, on the cum hoc fallacy that correlation implies causation: 
“[Spearman] reasoned that performances which correlate significantly like this are probably only 
attenuated expressions of a single underlying variable or factor” (Richardson 38). Consequently, 
Spearman hypothesized that every intellectual activity depends on two factors: a universal 
function, which informs all cognition, and a specific function, which informs the particular 
cognitive task the subject is performing. He proposed that by analyzing a child’s score on a 
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variety of specific functions—that is, the observed variables supplied by mental tests—he could 
then identify a latent, invisible variable: the universal function he termed “general intelligence,” 
which he believed supported all specific functions. Therefore, by examining the correlations 
among specific intellectual activities, Spearman claimed that he could uncover a previously 
unobserved factor, which he termed the “g factor” or “g.”51 As a whole, his paper provided a 
method for identifying and measuring intelligence as a distinct object of analysis.52  
In this 1904 paper, Spearman develops several implications of his theory. First, he 
recognizes that his theory enables intelligence to be imagined as a distinct entity, which he 
argues is invisible to the layperson but identifiable with the tools of the expert—in this case, the 
manipulations of psychometric factor analysis. Second, he recognizes that by accepting 
intelligence as a single quality that can be detected via statistical methods, the discipline of 
psychology might lay greater claim to an identity as a science as opposed to a branch of 
philosophy.53 Psychology, Spearman claimed, would have in intelligence its own object of study 
that could be empirically investigated. He hoped that the concept of intelligence would perform 
																																								 																				
51 For a fuller description of factor analysis, see Jensen’s The g Factor: The Science of Mental Ability. 
52 In their cultural history of scientific objectivity, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison discuss the problem 
of selecting an object of study. According to them, 
All sciences must deal with [the] problem of selecting and constituting “working objects,” as 
opposed to the too plentiful and too various natural objects […]. The problem of selection deals 
with which phenomena are key to the essence of things. Working objects can be atlas images, 
type specimens, or laboratory processes—any manageable, communal representatives of the 
sector of nature under investigation. No science can do without such standardized working 
objects, for unrefined natural objects are too quirkily particular to cooperate in generalizations 
and comparisons. (85) 
Identifying working objects, in other words, is a process of distinguishing objects of analysis from the 
complexity and peculiarity of the natural world; science, according to Daston and Galison, attempts to 
identify working objects in order to make claims about the structures that it posits undergird human 
features and experiences. 
53 In his 1904 paper, Spearman explains that “the proper topic of science” is functions or objects that have 
“like reactions under like conditions” (204). His point is that a necessary condition for scientific inquiry is 
a stable object of study. By constituting intelligence as a stable object of study, Spearman proffers it as 
the basis by which psychology could make its claim to being a “proper” science. According to Gould, 
“With g as a quantified, fundamental particle, psychology could take its rightful place among the real 
sciences” (293). 
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boundary-work by renegotiating the forms of knowledge recognized as science.54 
Almost since the moment of its publication, Spearman’s theory of general intelligence 
has been the subject of sustained critique. In the 1930s, one of Spearman’s most influential 
critics, psychologist L.L. Thurstone, argued that g was not a distinct essence but rather an artifact 
of the statistical methods used to study it (Gould 373). Thurstone proposed that intelligent 
behavior emerges from the interaction of several factors rather than from a single, reified 
factor.55 More recently, in his evaluation of Spearman’s work, Ken Richardson summarizes the 
most common contemporary critique of Spearman’s theory: “the correlation between two factors 
may be due to an intermediate variable. […] Or it may be entirely accidental, with no causal 
connection whatsoever” (38). Although he later modified his ideas in response to 
contemporaneous critiques, Spearman maintained that general intelligence is an observable 
factor that underlies all other cognitive operations (Jensen 18). In the 1920s, Spearman published 
multiple revisions to his theory of general intelligence, which acknowledged that factors beyond 
general intelligence—such as verbal, spatial, numerical, or mechanical abilities—might 
contribute to an individual’s performance on mental tests. He conceded that one’s ability to 
succeed on mental tests, in other words, might rely on more factors than only one’s “general 
intelligence” and one’s capacity in the specific cognitive task being measured. But the concept of 
“general intelligence” remained at the center of Spearman’s psychometric philosophy of the 
mind, which he promoted as a researcher at University College London and mentor to a future 
generation of psychologists. 
Both then and now, critics have pointed out that Spearman’s theory of general 
intelligence relies on forms of reasoning beyond the purview of empirical science. Empirical 
																																								 																				
54 See Thomas Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line, which considers the 
means by which boundary-work distinguishes science from non-science. 
55 See Thurstone, Primary Mental Abilities (1938). 
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science traditionally asserts that claims must be made on the basis of evidence, not logical leaps. 
For this reason, Spearman’s theory has become suspicious in some branches of contemporary 
psychology.56 But regardless of its success in addressing scientific questions about the 
conceptual delineation of intelligence, Spearman’s theory of general intelligence did successfully 
respond to a related discursive question: What is intelligence? His theory, in other words, 
intervened in a discursive problem as much as a scientific one. 
When he composed the initial version of his theory, Spearman was keenly aware of the 
fact that intelligence was an ambiguous concept in psychological research that imprecisely 
referred to various behaviors and forms of cognition. In his 1904 literature review of previous 
work on mental testing, for instance, he writes that his main goal is to resolve a “discordance” in 
the work of previous researchers (219). This discordance—namely, that the word “intelligence” 
was itself unstable, referring to multiple cognitive features—presents an enormous problem for 
psychology, Spearman observes, because it challenges the legitimacy of intelligence testing, one 
of the main technologies of psychology. Spearman was not alone in this assessment. Ellen Alice 
McAnulty, a statistician in the Department of Psychology and Educational Research at Yale 
University who published an early review of “General Intelligence: Objectively Determined and 
Measured,” succinctly summarizes the problem: 
Since we have succeeded in testing something that we are fond of labeling as 
“intelligence,” it is highly important that we understand what the nature of that 
something is. If all different types of tests in the field measured the same quantity 
[…] this problem would not have arisen. We could simply call the quantity which 
																																								 																				
56 See Hunt’s overview of contemporary critiques of Spearman’s theory (94-97). Hunt writes, “There is 
no argument about the existence of g as a statistical phenomenon. There is a great deal of argument over 
the reason that different evaluations of cognitive performance are virtually always positively correlated” 
(94). 
	 47	
we measured “intelligence,” and be done with it. (73-74) 
McAnulty observes that despite the proliferation of intelligence tests, the “nature” of intelligence 
remained open to interpretation by mental testers, who, as a result, could not affirm that they 
were analyzing the same “something.” This indeterminacy, in turn, negatively affected the 
perceived legitimacy of psychology’s methods. 
Spearman laments about the effects of this discursive ambiguity in a section of his 1904 
paper somewhat melodramatically titled “Signs of Weakness in Experimental Psychology.” 
According to Spearman, the main problem facing the emergent quantitative and experimental 
strand of psychology, with which he identified his research methods, is that  
while the simpler psychoses of the Laboratory have been investigated with great 
zeal and success, their identification with the more complex psychoses of Life has 
still continued to be almost exclusively ascertained by the older method of 
introspection. This pouring of new wine into old bottles has not been to the 
benefit of either, but rather has created a yawning gulf between the Science and 
the Reality. The results of all good experimental work will live, but as yet most of 
them are like hieroglyphics awaiting their deciphering Rosetta stone. (204) 
Here, Spearman makes a number of thinly veiled jabs at competing branches of psychology, 
including psychoanalysis, which he argues rely on “the older method of introspection.” Freud’s 
The Interpretation of Dreams (1899) had been published only a few years earlier, but Spearman 
already complains that the findings of psychoanalysis could only offer “hieroglyphics awaiting 
their deciphering Rosetta stone.” Spearman hoped that his attention to quantitative reasoning and 
experimental methods via the research object of intelligence would help to authenticate 
psychology as a true science. 
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Spearman’s 1904 paper figures what he understands to be the conflict between 
introspection and experimental methods as one between objectivity and linguistic manipulation, 
the latter of which, in his view, threatens to proliferate and expand meanings rather than to 
stabilize them. Instead of ascribing to the “older” model of philosophical introspection, 
Spearman argues that the discipline of psychology must align itself with the methodologies of 
the physical sciences, which he suggests will rescue psychology from the philosophical and 
hence—for Spearman—imprecise methods of introspection. According to him, what 
distinguishes the methods of the physical sciences is that they are concerned with identifying 
“uniformities”—specific features and functions that remain constant, regardless of context. 
Psychology, he avers, must imitate the physical sciences if it wants to close the “gulf between the 
Science and the Reality” (204). His central goal, therefore, is to redirect the methods of 
psychology; as such, he advocates for a 
“Correlational Psychology,” for the purpose of positively determining all 
psychical tendencies, and in particular those which connect together the so-called 
“mental tests” with psychical activities of greater generality and interest. These 
will usually belong to that important class of tendencies produced by community 
of organism [sic], whereby sufficiently similar acts are almost always performed 
by any one person in much the same manner […]. (205) 
The methods of this “correlational psychology,” in other words, will not be to craft case studies 
on unusual or exemplary individuals, but rather to locate and study the uniformities shared 
among the “community of organism[s]”—the entirety of a population. In uncovering what he 
perceives as the “uniformities” that undergird all human cognition, therefore, Spearman seeks to 
identify the basic structures of mental processes that remain stable across populations. 
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 Spearman’s approach to intelligence is conventionally understood as supporting the 
development of psychology as the science of individual differences. Adrian Wooldridge writes, 
for instance, “The science of individual differences was invented by Francis Galton, systematised 
by Karl Pearson, and applied to psychology by Charles Spearman” (74). Nikolas Rose argues 
similarly that through Spearman’s theory, “the measurement of intelligence had become a 
question of differentiating between individuals in terms of the position which they occupy in a 
linear series” (Psychological Complex 120). Furthermore, Rose’s argument that Spearman’s 
project is inherently “eugenicist” (82) is convincing in that Spearman’s statistical methods 
assume a “new ideal of ranked order [which] is powered by the imperative of the norm, and then 
is supplanted by the notion of progress, human perfectability, and the elimination of deviance” 
(Davis “Constructing Disability” 8).  
Yet Spearman is concerned less with ranking or identifying individual differences in 
intelligence, such as so-called “subnormality” or genius, and more with locating the 
“uniformities” that he claims undergird all of human cognition, the most significant of which, in 
his view, is “general intelligence.” Spearman’s students, particularly Burt and Cattell, were 
increasingly drawn to what they figure as the “problem” of individual differences, but 
Spearman’s eye is typically fixed on what he imagines to be the common cognitive structures 
that form the mental characteristics of all individuals.57 Spearman’s work, in other words, attends 
to differences only in order to establish the contours of what he argues are stable uniformities 
that are collectively shared.  
This is especially apparent in Spearman’s later iterations of his theory of general 
																																								 																				
57 See, for instance, Wooldridge’s chapter entitled “Cyril Burt and the psychology of individual 
differences.” According to Wooldridge, “Burt’s main interest lay in ‘the psychology of individual 
differences.’ He maintained that individuals differed significantly in their mental qualities; that these 
differences owed more to ‘nature’ than to ‘nurture,’; and that objective tests could be used to measure 
inborn capacity” (74). 
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intelligence, in which he describes g metaphorically as a kind of “mental energy” that is common 
to all people but that manifests according to greater or lesser degrees of intensity in different 
individuals. For instance, in 1923, Spearman responds to some of his critics—who argued that 
his theory did not adequately elucidate the nature of intelligence—by borrowing a metaphor 
from physiology: 
Such a general and quantitative factor [as general intelligence], it was said, might 
be conceived in an infinitude of different ways, including those which would 
assign to it the most subtle, abstract, or complex constitution. But a readily 
intelligible hypothesis was suggested to be derivable from physiology. The factor 
was taken, pending further information, to consist in something of the nature of an 
“energy” or “power” which serves in common the whole cortex (or possibly, 
even, the whole nervous system). (Nature 5) 
Spearman continues with a series of reflections on the possibility of embodied cognition, in 
which he speculates that the “physiological substrate” might “function as alternative ‘engines’ 
into which the common supply of ‘energy’ could be alternatively distributed” (Nature 5-6). 58,59 
Here and elsewhere, Spearman claims that the aim of his research is to name and characterize the 
general structures of cognition rather than to distinguish and examine differences among 
individuals. His focus, in other words, is to understand the features of what he imagines to be an 
abstracted, “general” human mind rather than to analyze or repair anomalous or “abnormal” 
																																								 																				
58 See Rosch, Thompson, and Varela’s definition of embodied cognition: “By using the term embodied 
we mean to highlight two points: first that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from 
having a body with various sensorimotor capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor 
capacities are themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological and cultural 
context” (172-173). 
59 Spearman was hopeful throughout his career that a physiological basis for intelligence might be 
discovered: “Although Spearman remained agnostic concerning the biochemical and physiological basis 
of this energy, it was his fervent hope that scientists would eventually discover a physical basis for g” 
(Jensen 19). 
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instances of cognition. 
 In arguing that Spearman’s primary object of inquiry is the “general” as opposed to the 
“abnormal,” I attempt to distinguish Spearman’s conceptual approach from that outlined by 
Georges Canguilhem, who argues that the normal only becomes imaginable in relation to the 
pathological. Canguilhem contends that the normal and the pathological are not binary 
oppositions; rather, “The pathological is not the absence of a biological norm; it is another norm 
but one which is, comparatively speaking, pushed aside by life” (82). In contrast to Canguilhem, 
Spearman’s approach overlooks the category of the pathological and instead seeks to 
depersonalize and generalize universal forms, which he posits undergird all of human cognition. 
Spearman figures the mind as a common system or a prototype that acts according to universal 
parameters even as it manifests differently in individuals. 
Spearman’s primary method—factor analysis, which he developed in order to locate 
general intelligence—is, after all, a far cry from the method of case studies typically practiced by 
psychoanalysts, neurologists, and other psychologists inclined to “introspection.” In the simplest 
terms, factor analysis is a procedure for identifying unobservable variables. It “is based on the 
fundamental assumption that some underlying variables, which are smaller in number than the 
number of observed variables, are responsible for the covariation among the observed variables” 
(Kim and Mueller 12). Factor analysis, in other words, is a method for extrapolating information 
about unobservable, secondary phenomena by analyzing observable, primary phenomena, the 
latter of which are assumed to affect the nature of the former. Rather than detailed explorations 
of the differences among pathologized individuals, therefore, factor analysis is a process of 
abstraction in which the implications of specific variables fade in comparison to the overall 
meaning of their collective coordination. Through factor analysis, Spearman displaces the 
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granular, narrative approaches often valued by practitioners of psychoanalysis and neurology in 
favor of a methodology that claims to be able to extrapolate information about a conceptual 
uniformity from a set of observable variables. 
Here, I have outlined Spearman’s theory of general intelligence in order to suggest that it 
provides a model for imagining intelligence as a transpersonal essence in the mind sciences. 
Spearman’s theory reifies intelligence as a single quality and affirms that it can be identified and 
measured by experts through mental testing and the procedures of factor analysis. This 
inarguably had the effect of drawing certain psychologists’ attention toward differences among 
individuals, but its primary purpose was to locate and describe general structures as opposed to 
instances of difference or abnormality. Instead of a “massive ‘turn inward’ and a thoroughgoing 
psychologization of their methods, subjects, and intentions” (Micale 2) or “an attempt to 
highlight how minds at once shape and are shaped by larger experimental environments, via the 
particular affordances or opportunities for action that those environments provide” (Herman 249-
250), Spearman and his followers invite a collective view of the mind, in which universal 
cognitive patterns are the subject of analysis. 
The sections that follow demonstrate how H.D.’s, West’s, Moore’s, and Wells’s interwar 
imaginings of collective intelligence resemble Spearman’s both conceptually and 
methodologically. These texts reject conventional formulations of human scale by exploring the 
concept of mind at the levels of population, species, and planet as opposed to the individual. In 
these texts, collective intelligence emerges as paradoxically material and transpersonal, 
unalterable and available to manipulation by experts. 
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H.D.’s Over-mind 
 In 1919, prior to beginning therapy with Sigmund Freud, H.D. penned Notes on Thought 
and Vision, an essay that theorizes the relationship between creativity and collective intelligence. 
The main claim of the essay is that all thinkers have access to an “over-mind,” which is H.D.’s 
term for a common psychic plane. Over-mind is a collectively shared intellectual resource that 
guides, in particular, creative thought. Both embodied and universally accessible, over-mind 
provides a way for H.D. to imagine a material substrate, which is neither impersonal nor 
incorporeal, for collectivity. This material substrate, H.D. suggests, provides individuals with a 
shared identity as human and a subsequent basis for humanity’s shared identity and ethical 
obligations to one another. 
 H.D. wrote Notes while traveling to Cornwall and the Scilly Islands during her second 
pregnancy. The experimental work, which Robin Pappas describes as a “prose-poem essay” 
(152) and H.D. herself termed “a bit of psychological data” (Tribute to Freud 129), describes a 
series of ecstatic revelations that she experienced during these travels. H.D. later shared the work 
with her friend and counselor Havelock Ellis, a sexologist whose research focused on non-
normative sexuality. Ellis discouraged H.D. from publishing Notes, an event that Susan Stanford 
Friedman in her foundational study of H.D. describes as one of “disapproval” (11). As a result, 
Notes was not published until 1982, when feminist scholars began revisiting H.D.’s place in the 
modernist canon. 
 Although there is no evidence that H.D. was acquainted with Spearman, her interlocutor 
Ellis would certainly have known Spearman’s work and likely knew him personally. Ellis was a 
president of the Eugenics Society, where Spearman was a fellow early in his career, and the two 
traveled in similar circles in London. Both innovators in psychology in a moment of transition 
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for the discipline, Ellis and Spearman shared an investment in researching normativity in 
populations but employed divergent methodologies in order to do so. While Spearman’s 
psychometric methods focused on conceptual uniformities, Ellis preferred ethnographic methods, 
including personal interviews and case studies of people whose sexual habits he framed as 
exemplary of various forms of difference. For instance, in Sexual Inversion (1897), which he co-
authored with John Addington Symonds, Ellis incorporated detailed observations about the 
practices, bodies, and gender presentations of individual homosexual subjects.60 
 In Notes, H.D., like Spearman, is most interested in the transpersonal as opposed to 
individual, unusual, or exemplary cases. H.D. writes that there are “Three states or 
manifestations of life: body, mind, and over-mind” (17). While body and mind are experienced 
only by individuals, over-mind exists as a collectively shared essence through which people can 
experience more complex forms of thought and creativity than they would be able to in isolation. 
H.D. describes how individuals gain access to over-mind through communion with others: 
We begin with sympathy of thought. 
The minds of the two lovers merge, interact in sympathy of thought. 
The brain, inflamed and excited by this interchange of ideas, takes on its 
character of over-mind, becomes (as I have visualised in my own case) a jelly-
fish, placed over and about the brain. 
The love-region is excited by the appearance or beauty of the loved one, 
its energy not dissipated in physical relation, takes on its character of mind, 
becomes this womb-brain or love-brain that I have visualised as a jelly-fish in the 
body. (22) 
																																								 																				
60 According to Rita Felski, Sexual Inversion seeks to “normalize male homosexuality” by “explicitly 
rejecting the vocabulary of degeneration, insisting that homosexuality should be seen as a harmless 
physiological variation rather than a neuropathic trait” (4). 
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Here, H.D. compares the experience of over-mind to experiences of physical and emotional 
depth shared by lovers. Both forms of experience originate in intense attention for another, which 
allows each to “interact in sympathy of thought.” The word “interact” suggests that such intense 
attention is not an end point to be achieved, but rather a process of embodied interconnection 
through which individuals experience heightened mental energy. Over-mind, in other words, is 
achieved not in isolation but through ongoing relations with others. 
During this process of embodied interconnection, individuals experience “character[s] of 
over-mind.” H.D. describes her own experience of over-mind as “a cap, like water, transparent, 
fluid yet with definite body, contained in a definite space. It is like a closed sea-plant, jelly-fish 
or anemone” (19). Over-mind, therefore, resists the Cartesian dualism that segments mind and 
body, insisting instead on the materiality of cognition. H.D. continues: 
Into that over-mind, thoughts pass and are visible like fishing swimming under 
clear water. […] I should say—to continue this jelly-fish metaphor—that long 
feelers reached down and through the body, that these stood in the same relation 
to the nervous system as the over-mind to the brain or intellect. The centre of 
consciousness is either the brain or the love-region of the body. (19-20) 
Here, H.D. explains how the materiality of over-mind extends throughout the body, activating “a 
set of super-feelings” (19). By predicting theories of embodied cognition, H.D. suggests that the 
particular materiality of the thinker—or the artist—does not disappear during creative thought.61 
As such, the thinker’s identity, including gender identity, is folded into the process of creativity. 
 H.D. thus resists the conception of creativity that T.S. Eliot outlines in his 
contemporaneous Tradition and The Individual Talent (1919), in which he argues that the artist 
becomes a depersonalized vessel for the transmission of poetry. Eliot writes, 
																																								 																				
61 For an overview of theories of embodied cognition, see Lawrence Shapiro. 
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What happens is a continual surrender of himself as he is at the moment to 
something which is more valuable. The progress of an artist is a continual self-
sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality. There remains to define this 
process of depersonalization and its relation to the sense of tradition. It is in this 
depersonalization that art may be said to approach the condition of science. I 
therefore invite you to consider, as a suggestive analogy, the action which takes 
place when a finely filiated platinum is introduced into a chamber containing 
oxygen and sulpher dioxide. (6-7) 
Whereas H.D.’s over-mind theorizes thought, including creative thought, as the result of 
interconnection and embodiment, Eliot views creative thought as the eradication of the 
specificity of the individual subject, “a continual extinction of personality.” In The Poetics of 
Impersonality, Maud Ellmann points out that Eliot links impersonality to an authoritative 
masculine aesthetics and formalism, implicitly sidelining the aesthetic projects of female 
modernists who are inescapably bound to corporeality via their alignment with the body and, 
specifically, reproductive processes. By contrast, H.D.’s over-mind explicitly critiques “the idea 
that artistic or intellectual activity involves the suppression of sexual activity” (Kibble 43). For 
H.D., the mind is firmly intertwined with the body to such a degree that the “centre of 
consciousness” is indeterminate: it is either in “the brain or the love-region of the body” (20). 
H.D.’s insistence on the material grounding of over-mind thus validates the aesthetic projects of 
women. She goes so far as to query, “Is it easier for a woman to attain this state of consciousness 
[over-mind] than a man?” (20), re-appraising women’s connection to corporeality as a positive 
attribute for creativity.  
 Several critics have proposed that H.D.’s over-mind thus counters Eliot’s theory of 
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artistic impersonality, proposing an alternate theory of impersonality in which women have a 
place—or perhaps even an upper hand. For instance, Matthew Kibble reads over-mind as not “a 
purely passive, female matrix” but instead as “bisexual, combining active and passive attributes 
irrespective of the biological sex of the artist”; for Kibble, over-mind is therefore “transcendent, 
impersonal and ungendered” (46; 54). Christina Walter, too, sees over-mind as an “impersonal 
subjectivity” that is “the basis for artistic production” (295). But H.D. describes over-mind not so 
much as impersonal—that is, not personal—as transpersonal—that is, shared amongst 
individuals. What is at stake in this distinction is whether the individual disappears—in the sense 
of im- as “not” or “the opposite of”—or traverses beyond itself without losing its material 
specificity—in the sense of trans- as “across,” “beyond,” or “on the other side.” In the former, 
the self dissolves; in the latter, the self expands. Rather than suggesting the suppression or 
“extinction” of the individual self, as does Eliot, H.D. argues for the energizing of the personal to 
the point that “The brain [of the individual], inflamed and excited by this interchange of ideas 
[with others], takes on its character of over-mind” (22). H.D.’s transpersonal theory of cognition 
thus takes place in a collective plane in which the individual is not divested of her or his 
specificity but rather enters into communion with others. 
 This distinction becomes more apparent through the metaphors that Eliot and H.D. use in 
their respective works. In Tradition, Eliot offers “a suggestive analogy” for “this process of 
depersonalization and its relation to the sense of tradition”: “the action which takes place when a 
bit of finely filiated platinum is introduced into a chamber containing oxygen and sulpher 
dioxide” (7). Eliot goes on to explain this chemical metaphor:  
When the two gases previously mentioned are mixed in the presence of a filament 
of platinum, they form sulphurous acid. This combination takes place only if the 
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platinum is present; nevertheless the newly formed acid contains no trace of 
platinum, and the platinum itself is apparently unaffected: has remained inert, 
neutral, and unchanged. The mind of the poet is the shred of platinum. It may 
partly or exclusively operate upon the experience of the man himself; but, the 
more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man who 
suffers and the mind which creates; the more perfectly will the mind digest and 
transmute the passions which are its material. (7-8) 
Here, Eliot describes the artistic process as one in which the mind of the artist—which is 
separate from the body, “the man who suffers”—works in isolation to mold the “passions” into 
works of art. By contrast, H.D.’s jellyfish metaphor for over-mind recalls the newly 
institutionalized discipline of oceanography:62 
If I could visualise or describe that over-mind in my own case, I should 
say this: it seems to me that a cap is over my head, a cap of consciousness over 
my head, my forehead, affecting a little my eyes. Sometimes when I am in that 
state of consciousness, things about me appear slightly blurred as if seen 
underwater. […] 
   Into that over-mind, thoughts pass and are visible like fish swimming  
   under clear water. (18-19) 
Envisioning the ocean both as a substance the materiality of which connects various points and 
as a medium of traversal, H.D. compares experiencing over-mind to experiencing submersion 
into water. In both, the body does not disappear but is experienced differently than on land; 
																																								 																				
62 See Susan Schlee, A History of Oceanography: The Edge of an Unfamiliar World. John Murray, a 
naturalist who participated in the Challenger expeditions, set up a marine laboratory in Edinburgh in the 
1890s. It remained a center of oceanic research for most of the twentieth century. In 1912, Murray 
coauthored The Depths of the Ocean, a compendium of his findings on deep-sea life forms. 
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simultaneously, new objections of perception and, consequently, new thoughts become possible.  
 Adalaide Morris argues that H.D.’s poetry connects three “interdependent realms”: “the 
printed page, recorded voice, and filmstrip of modernist aesthetic practice, the socioeconomic 
crises of the first half of the twentieth century, and the matrix of ideas through which thinkers in 
different fields have struggled to comprehend these crises” (1). Morris, in other words, argues 
that H.D.’s writing mediates debates across disciplines. Although H.D. does not reference 
psychometrics, her “psychological data” remediates some of the discipline’s core claims about 
the conceptual uniformities among and scalability of the human mind. H.D.’s concept of over-
mind posits a material, transpersonal intelligence, which is universally accessible and 
collectively meaningful. She theorizes that a form of mass consciousness might not so much 
dissolve individuals as recalibrate them, turning their attention toward the positive rather than 
deleterious effects of relationality. Notes thinks through cognition at the scale of species, offering 
a collective rather than an individual theory of mind. 
 
West’s Super-cortex    
 Like H.D., West in the interwar years used psychical and neural metaphors to imagine a 
basis for human collectivity. When it is studied, West’s extended essay The Strange Necessity is 
most often characterized as a work of literary criticism on James Joyce or, somewhat more 
generously, as an attempt to “withdraw the novel from the male modernist exegesis—based 
largely on the classic Greek and Latin tradition—and to reconduct it within a women’s 
modernity” (Frigerio 66). 63 It is certainly true that The Strange Necessity asserts the importance 
of embodiment in artistic creation and thereby defends women’s artistic capacities. West, like 
																																								 																				
63 For instance, Frigerio terms the essay “a mediation on Ulysses” (66) and Hefferman calls West’s 
speaker in the essay “a critic of Joyce” (310). 
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H.D., accomplishes this by rejecting the Eliotic notion of the impersonal artist, arguing instead 
for the influence of material conditions on the production and reception of art.64 Yet these 
characterizations of The Strange Necessity do not capture the circuitous and, frankly, strange 
paths by which the essay as a whole engages with its driving questions, which West poses at the 
end of the essay’s first section.65 These questions have to do with the nature and exigency of art-
marking: “What is the meaning of this mystery of mysteries? Why does art matter? And why 
does it matter so much? What is this strange necessity?” (53-54). 
 This section focuses on one particularly unusual aspect of The Strange Necessity: its 
proposition that the cultural productions of humanity, both artistic and scientific, can be regarded 
as a “collective and external super-cortex” (130). West imagines that the function of this super-
cortex is to provide shortcuts in the cognition of individuals. The super-cortex “works on the 
material created by the activities of the individual cortices,” thereby offering familiar and readily 
available cognitive resources that can help facilitate individuals’ navigation of personal 
experience (129). West uses the metaphor of a commonly shared cognitive structure, external to 
individuals but accessible by any member of the species who engages with forms of artistic 
creation, both in the present moment and across time. West’s concept of the super-cortex 
participates in a multidisciplinary cultural discourse in which collective intelligence is imagined 
as a material, transpersonal essence that binds together humanity.  
 The Strange Necessity is a two-hundred-page essay in multiple parts, which was 
published in a volume of the same title. The essay concerns the history and purpose of art. The 
																																								 																				
64 See Heffernan’s sensitive reading of West’s critique of Eliotic modernism. Heffernan’s article includes 
an analysis of a letter West wrote to Richard Ellman in which West discusses the relationship between 
The Strange Necessity and the mode of literary criticism championed by Eliot.   
65 Laura Cowan calls The Strange Necessity “the most unabashedly hybrid of West’s works,” noting that 
the essay’s sections “blend several genres in order to analyze and to explain the ‘strange necessity’ of art 
for a meaningful life and for a moral society” (87). 
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first section, which has received the most attention from modernist critics, begins with a series of 
reflections on a poem in James Joyce’s Pomes Penyeach, “Alone.” This section, which describes 
the experience of an individual reading and meditating on a poem while navigating a busy 
street—a startlingly accurate vision of what critics would later understand modernism to be—
invites Frigerio to suggest that “the very structure of the essay is in itself a tribute to the Joycean 
text: a work of criticism written like a stream-of-consciousness urban novel with the critic as 
protagonist” (68). Similarly, Douglas Mao argues that The Strange Necessity resembles and 
perhaps served as the inspiration for Virginia Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own (1929), observing 
that “Both essays give us witty, confident narrators who, in agile but stately sentences, assess 
other writers, meditate on the conditions under which literature is produced, and conclude that 
anxiety about praise or blame is fatal to art” (186).66 While these characterizations alert us to the 
significance of The Strange Necessity in relation to the modernist canon, they do not account for 
the essay’s remarkable disciplinary and historical breadth, which in later sections expands its 
scope beyond a critique of modernist literature to a wide range of texts composed over the span 
of centuries and from a range of disciplines. 
 Section two veers unexpectedly towards a review of recent research in the field of 
behaviorism, specifically, works by John Watson and I.P. Pavlov. West, seeking an answer to her 
driving question about the “strange necessity” of art, pays particular attention to Pavlov’s 
Conditioned Reflexes (1924), which she calls a “now famous book,” because, she writes, it “tells 
us, as physiology has not been able to tell us before, what use the cortex, which is to say the 
																																								 																				
66 Mao’s comparison of the two works, in which he suggests that Woolf was familiar with The Strange 
Necessity, would be more convincing if he considered the similarities between West’s 1928 essay and 
Woolf’s essay “Street-Haunting: A London Adventure,” in which Woolf’s speaker enters the street to 
consider aesthetics and the nature of the self. “Street-Haunting” was published in The Yale Review in 
1927, one year prior to The Strange Necessity; therefore, there is significant likelihood that West 
mimicked Woolf in The Strange Necessity, rather than the other way around. 
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brain, does for the body that contains it” (70). In this section, West provides a detailed reading of 
Pavlov’s theory, which leads her to the conclusion that art serves a similar function as science: 
“We have strong grounds for suspecting that art is at least in part a way of collecting information 
about the universe” (88). West, in other words, figures art pedagogically. She asserts that, like 
science, art is a research tool that humans use to understand their surroundings.  
The essay’s third section reviews a collection of novels, including works by Benjamin 
Constant, Marcel Proust, and Germaine de Stael, as well as works of non-literary art that, in 
West’s view, demonstrate and legitimate her hypothesis about the purpose of art as a method for 
understanding the world. She extends her implicit interest in the relation between embodiment 
and cognition by arguing that the aesthetic objects that she analyzes show how “We all have a 
certain body-consciousness that packs away a great deal of latent information about how we feel 
when we move, and also gives us a working knowledge of what we can do with our muscles and 
our nerves and all other physical possessions” (100). Section four considers the purposes of art in 
light of the claim that artistic creations act as tools for understanding the world. Here, West 
asserts that art presents a contained medium for processing the complexity of experience. Section 
five evaluates a variety of national arts on the extent to which, in West’s view, they successfully 
address the material conditions in which they were produced. Section six explores how art 
transfers information across time, making the knowledge of previous generations available in the 
present. And, finally, section seven expands the scope of West’s argument by suggesting that art 
perpetuates life itself. West compares “orgasm” to “artistic instinct,” “a proportionately powerful 
excitatory complex, which […] halts in front of some experience which if left in a crude state 
would probably make one feel that life was too difficult, and transforms it into something that 
helps one to go on living” (212). By the end of the essay, then, West concludes that “the strange 
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necessity” of art is that it sustains human life. 
In the essay as a whole, the super-cortex serves as a metaphor for an overarching 
structure that is accessible to the entire species and contains all human knowledge. This concept 
of the super-cortex identifies a process of collectively shared thought that West imagines might 
expedite and improve humanity’s ability to coexist in the world if it were attended to with greater 
seriousness. West begins this exploration of the super-cortex by observing a series of functional 
parallels between art and the brains of individuals. “So alike are art and the cortex,” she writes, 
“in their like effort to select out the whole complexity of the universe these units which are of 
significance to the organism, and to integrate those units into what excites to further living” 
(133). Here, West articulates a theory of cognition, which she suggests, can be defined as a 
process of identifying significant particularities relevant to the life of the individual from the 
plane of the universe. She then argues that, according to this definition, art and the brain function 
similarly, while at the same time acknowledging the differences between art and individual 
brains: 
Surely the main differences between them are that the cortex keeps its findings 
within its head and art stores them outside; that the cortex is an individual 
possession and that art, though the product of individual effort, is virtually the 
property of as many people as are aware of it; and that art deals with experience 
from the point where the cortex finishes with it. (133) 
Art, in other words, picks up where the brain leaves off. Art is external and, consequently, 
communally shared: “the property of as many people as are aware of it.” West’s thought 
experiment suggests that, while identical in purpose, art and an individual’s brain differ only in 
terms of scale. Art is shared by the species whereas an individual’s brain is accessible only to her 
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or himself. 
 The concept of scalability allows West to imagine art, as well as the other processes of 
cultural production invested in “collecting information about the universe,” as a collectively 
shared super-cortex that is “virtually the property of as many people as are aware of it” (133). 
This super-cortex, West asserts, is essential for humanity because it is a method for solving 
problems that are too complex for the cognitive capacities of a single individual:  
[Some] negotiations between its host and the external world the cortex can 
undertake. But later, which it finds that itself is acting like an alchemy on what is 
perceived, that its conditioned reflexes are making and recording a pattern, whose 
loops and whorls confuse it and by causing that confusion threaten it, then it must 
let this other super-cortex, of which art and science are a part, make itself too. 
(133) 
The super-cortex, in other words, allows humans to access cognitive resources beyond those 
housed in our own brains. Its function, West imagines, is to provide temporal shortcuts for 
individuals confronting “the more complicated forms of experience”: 
In the case of a super-cortex for the analysis and synthesis of the more 
complicated forms of experience, all these considerations, speed, economy, the 
evasion of death, and the need to avoid overcrowding, would be especially urgent. 
To install an organ in a man that made him individually able to undertake the 
problem would involve adaptations that would take thousands of years, while 
experience would not cease to press in upon him with more and more claims for 
elucidation. (135) 
By compressing the wisdom of “thousands of years” into an artistic representation, art allows 
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individuals to more successfully navigate their experiences and, therefore, to move on to other 
demands that require attention in everyday life. In this way, art acts as a form of collective 
intelligence that exceeds and expands the knowledge of the individual. 
 For West, the evolutionary advantages of such a super-cortex are profound. She writes:  
The need to detach such super-cortical activity from the individual so that it 
should not partake of his death would be felt acutely in view of the fact that in 
these higher functions man matures with a slowness that is maddening in view of 
the short span of his life; and the inadvisability of housing it in the individual is 
demonstrated by the trouble that the cortex constantly inflicts on its host by the 
delicacy of its organization. (135) 
The super-cortex accelerates an individual’s encounters with the world by holding forth the 
wisdom of the past, which would not otherwise be accessible at the level of ontogeny due to “the 
short span” of the individual’s life. The super-cortex exceeds the individual at the level of 
complexity as well as temporality, offering insight about difficult aspects of experience and 
providing a shortcut between the past and the future. At the same time, because it is external, 
West imagines that the super-cortex will not plague individuals with pathology, which she says 
threaten the brain of the individual because of “the delicacy of its organization.” West therefore 
idealizes the concept of the super-cortex, describing it as a tool by which humankind can both 
incorporate the lessons of the past and also resist the threat of collective dysfunction.  
 Despite this utopian vision, West imports the notion of intellectual hierarchy, suggesting 
that individuals unequally contribute to the information stored within the super-cortex. “[T]he 
brain hardly functions when an anaemic condition starves it of blood,” West writes; similarly, 
she asserts,  
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when a race is engaged in conflicts that absorb all its energies, whether these are 
wars, or attacks on the reluctance of earth to afford a man a living, or the practice 
of false religions dictated by political or economic opinionativeness. […] They 
have none of the more complicated forms of experience and consequently provide 
with super-cortex with no material to make into art. (140) 
This passage does not necessarily propagate racialized or eugenic ideologies because West does 
not imagine certain “race[s]” consistently contribute imperfectly or not at all to the information 
contained in super-cortex. However, she describes a world of individual intellectual variation by 
implying that certain groups contribute more than others to this shared superstructure. 
 The most important contributors to the super-cortex, West suggests, are artists, who 
create cognitive shortcuts in the form of cultural knowledge that others may access. In The 
Strange Necessity, then, drivers of collective intelligence are artists: those who encode 
experience into representations that may be accessed by others in order to help them navigate 
their lives. This theory of artists as guardians of collective intelligence is consonant with West’s 
reviews of Joyce and other modernist artists elsewhere in The Strange Necessity. In the first 
section, she discusses how the iconicity of artists helps to guide the reception and meaning of 
their art for the reader or viewer. As Laura Heffernan has argued, contra Eliot, West asserts “that 
literary value does not arise from a work’s internal form, but rather is manufactured within a 
social field” (310). West, in other words, “draws attention to the connections between seemingly 
closed aesthetic forms and the wide social field within which they are distributed, circulated, 
reviewed, displayed, and canonized” (Heffernan 310). West demonstrates this in The Strange 
Necessity in her discussion of Joyce’s poem “Alone,” which she assesses as a “bad poem” while 
simultaneously confessing, “I was pleased by a poem that I had just read” (1). West resolves this 
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apparent paradox by discussing the the external and social factors that shape our appreciation of 
art, including the status of the artist him or herself—in this case, the knowledge of Joyce’s 
literary significance: 
Nevertheless this poem gave me great pleasure, because I had considered it in the 
light of its authorship. For it is not the words to a song, it is not by Mr. Fred E. 
Weatherley. It is not by Miss Helen Wills, whose sole poetical production 
(published, I think, in Vanity Fair) it very closely resembles. It is, on the contrary, 
as one might say, by Mr. James Joyce. (2) 
Readers’ perceptions of artists, in other words, shape and deepen their encounters with works of 
art; in this sense, the artist serves as a guide insofar as her or his identity or iconicity shapes 
artistic understanding. This explicit proposition that an artist’s reputation affects a reader’s 
reception coheres with West’s implicit suggestion that artists guide and deepen the functionality 
of the super-cortex through their contributions to collective intelligence. 
 For West, the super-cortex is a commonly shared resource that offers evolutionary 
workarounds, which in turn allow individuals to circumvent the limitations of their individual 
intellectual capacities. The super-cortex is both a supra-structure and also a collectively shared 
domain for the “intense exaltation” that West imagines comes from “our knowledge of the 
greatest works of art” (211). In this sense, West’s concept of the super-cortex posits collective 
intelligence as a transpersonal force, maintained through the efforts of experts and the 
improvement of which is advantageous to the species as a whole. Like H.D., West imagines that 
this transpersonal force does not negate materiality; instead, it provides a way to connect with the 
knowledge of others across time. 
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Moore’s Psychosphere 
Moore, too, engages with the image of a neural superstructure in The Apple Is Bitten 
Again, her collection of essay-like “notebooks.” Unlike H.D. and West, however, Moore expands 
her focus beyond the category of the human, suggesting that collective intelligence’s salvific 
capacity extends to both non-human forms of life as well as the forms of organic matter of which 
the human is made. Moore, still a relatively new face within modernist studies, published three 
well-reviewed and semi-autobiographical novels in the late 1920s and early 1930s: Celestial 
Seraglio (1929), Spleen (1930), and Fugue (1932). In the late 1920s, while living in New York, 
the manuscript of Spleen was lost in a hotel fire, which prompted Moore to painstakingly rewrite 
it from memory (Moore 421). This experience activated what she later described as her “passion 
for simplifying,” a stylistic practice in which she “reduc[ed] 500 words to 50” in the published 
version of Spleen and her later works (Moore 421). The result, visible in Apple in particular, is 
dense, muscular, and often contradictory sentences. Jane Garrity describes Moore’s style as an 
invitation to “cognitive and affective confusion in the reader” through its intense concision and 
lack of contextual signals (292).  
In Apple, this confusion takes place through tendentious yet inconsistent aphorisms, often 
“simplified” to such an extent that they seem designed to shock rather than to advance 
arguments. Apple contains sixteen loosely assembled and highly fragmented notebooks. Each 
notebook muses on a broad range of subjects, including, for example, pregnancy as a metaphor 
for artistic creation, the role of gender in art-making, and the literary legacy of the recently 
deceased D.H. Lawrence. The volume as a whole coheres around the speaker’s interest in the 
production of writing, both as recursive process that involves thought, drafting, and revision and 
also as a cultural practice that is inequitably available to people on the basis of identity and other 
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material conditions. Many of the scenes in Apple invoke the production of writing, which the 
speaker often mocks and critiques: 
The Writer consoles Herself on not getting a Thought. Even a hen does not lay an 
egg a day. And if she can manage to lay three hundred in a year (helped by patent 
foods and artificial daylight) she wins a prize. We with three thousand thoughts in 
a year are never likely to win a prize, both because thought is not considered 
prizeworthy, and because in our case the hens are busy judging the literary laying. 
So let us take the day off and play! (374) 
Here, Moore compares the practices of writing and egg-laying, sarcastically suggesting that the 
former will never achieve the copiousness or use-value of the latter. The description of Apple as 
a collection of “notebooks” itself signals how writing is a process. The text’s form, in other 
words, reinforces its thematic fascination with writing as a recursive activity that is undertaken 
within material constraints. 
Apple’s most direct engagement with collective intelligence takes place in the titular 
notebook, the fifteenth in the volume, which proposes the concept of a psychosphere, an 
overarching and collectively shared essence that is the collective sum of all “brain power”—not 
only that of humans but also all other living organisms. This notebook invokes the biblical story 
of Adam and Eve gaining knowledge of good and evil in the Garden of Eden. Its title, “The 
Apple Is Bitten Again,” indicates that the speaker will propose a revision to the biblical story of 
Eve biting the fruit from tree of knowledge and offering it to Adam. The notebook’s first scene 
imagines a writer contemplating the nature of cognition: 
Drowsing in an orchard the writer cuts her finger on a blade of grass, watches 
apples growing, and discovers that a Brain as fine, as reasoning, has been given 
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to the smallest sentient thing. Man loves to give to trees and natural phenomena in 
general an Outside Directing Intelligence: god, providence, nature. So proud, so 
limited, that we call man the reasoning being. For him a vegetable, flower, tree, 
has neither brain nor feeling. […] Yet this tree, fruit, plant, has in common with 
us that it is born, it feeds, it breathes, wakes, sleeps, reproduces, dies, is born 
again. (403)  
Here, Moore undercuts her biblical intertext by sardonically suggesting that it falsely avers 
intelligence as uniquely human. She critiques the assumption that “reason” belongs only to 
humankind by mocking the notion of “man” as “the reasoning being.” She also rejects the belief 
that non-human life forms are non-agential, arguing that no “Outside Directing Intelligence” 
manipulates them, but rather that they control their own activities. Moore describes this capacity 
of a human or non-human organism to direct its life as a form of “brain power”: 
This little blade which bore its sharpness through the soil sees a stone and goes 
round it, directed by its own brain power. Then in the small root of this plant must 
live a directive spirit. It need not be a full brain (he may decide not to work but to 
climb up the leaf and enjoy the air and sunshine), but there is a brain cell, an 
infinitesimal part of a brain, that knows only one task: to find its way round 
pebbles, obstacles, earth. Then are there brains clumsy and large as those of man 
and subtle and small as those of the mosquito and subtler and smaller as those of a 
bacille. (403) 
Moore’s theory of universal brain power in living organisms establishes differences in 
intellectual capacity, as evidenced through her references to humankind’s “large” brains as 
opposed to a grass blade’s “infinitesimal part of a brain.” But these differences do not necessarily 
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suggest a hierarchy. The brains of humans are described as “clumsy,” and their understandings of 
the subtleties of experience are figured as both limited and contingent: “it is not given to 
[humankind] yet to see the ultra-violent of the rainbow, nor to fathom the infinitesimal range of 
both sides” (409). Human brain power, in other words, differs from that of other organisms, but 
it is also susceptible to limitations. Consequently, “man, though the most interesting, is not 
necessarily the highest form of life on our planet” (406). Moore, therefore, frames human 
understanding as only one form of knowing within an ecosystem of knowledges. Pointing to the 
contingency of human intelligence allows her to argue that human cognition constitutes only one 
aspect of a larger cognitive superstructure in which all organisms take part.  
In Moore’s formulation, this larger cognitive superstructure is a psychosphere, an essence 
that is the sum of all the cognitive activities of individual organisms. Exceeding this global 
cognitive substance is a still vaster, super-planetary mental structure that she terms the “ultra-
psychosphere.” Moore writes: 
The present theory that after the stratosphere there is only ether spread over the 
universe, is too simple. The stratosphere is not the last wrapping of a planet and in 
time we shall prove it. This layer, this psychosphere being finer than rarefied air 
should extend many times further; but even this layer must rarefy its soul element 
and give place to a new and finer envelope which I shall call the ultra-
psychosphere. This expansion must be so vast as to intersect similar ultra-
psychospheres belonging to other planets and so form an interplanetary contact. 
(408) 
The psychosphere, in other words, is the total of individual organisms’ cognition, which Moore 
terms “Local Brain.” “By Local Brain,” she writes, “is not meant an actual miniature copy of that 
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under the skull. But that Brain which inhabits vegetables and is as yet undetected to science or 
microscope, and which might be a few atoms concerned in the direction of one single activity” 
(406). The combined brain power of all Local Brains constitutes the psychosphere. With the 
concept of the psychosphere, therefore, Moore imagines the entire globe as a large organic 
organism encased in a substance that is the composite of all organisms’ “Local Brains.” 
Some aspects of this notebook’s engagement with collective intelligence resemble a 
theory of vitalism.67 In particular, by imagining intelligence as a form of cognitive energy 
accessible to all life, this notebook implicitly invokes Henri Bergson’s concept of élan vital. 
Bergson in Creative Evolution (1907) argues that all organic matter contains “an original 
impulse of life” that “pass[es] from one generation of germs to the following generation of germs 
through the developed organisms which bridge the interval between the generations” (57). 
Similarly, Moore imagines that each body contains “a certain number of soul-molecules which 
impregnate every part of the body, animating our brains, our brains animating our organs, our 
organs animating our actions” (408). Furthermore, Apple engages with Bergson’s distinction 
between intellect and instinct. For Bergson, consciousness consists of those two tendencies. 
According to him, intellect is “an appendage” that “is incapable of presenting the true nature of 
life” (xxxv); conversely, instinct acts rather than represents its knowledge. In Apple, Moore 
explores this theory only to dismiss Bergson’s division of consciousness. In particular, she 
argues that the concept of instinct implies an exterior force—in this case, the force of 
evolution—that directs or controls the capacities of the individual. Under the subheading 
“Instinct, that mythical beast of burden,” she writes: “We are so lazy and so vain that we accept 
that all things are done for us and gods and providence protect our simplicity (we, the especial 
																																								 																				
67 See Omri Moses’s Out of Character: Modernism, Vitalism, Psychic Life for a discussion of the 
relationship between modernism and vitalism. 
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favourites) by sending us out of nowhere: Instinct” (410). Elsewhere, she writes, “as there is no 
thing the Brain does not know, ninety-nine percent of what is miscalled Instinct must be 
attributed to Local Brain” (412). Moore, in other words, rejects the notion of instinct because she 
claims it implies an exterior, evolutionary force guiding organisms’ activities. For Moore, all 
cognitive activity belongs within a single category—brain power—which is directed through the 
will of the organism. Her theory, in other words, insists that organisms independently and 
agentially contribute to the psychosphere.  
At the same time, this notebook’s speculations about collective intelligence question the 
supposed unity of the individual organism, and the individual human in particular, imagining 
instead that each organism is itself a collective of multiple competing parts. Rejecting the idea 
that “all things [are] harmonious and interdependent,” Moore argues: “Each piece of man and 
vegetation is independent. A tree, it seems to me, has several different and separate lives. So we. 
There is neither harmony in Nature nor in ourselves” (405). For Moore, the individual is a 
collection of irresolvable divisions. Her discussion of the human body, for example, predicts 
posthuman arguments about the disunity of the humanist subject: 
Man’s very body which he is wont to praise as proof, miracle, and embodiment of 
all harmony (when it works) is at perpetual war with itself. It is in no sense a 
charitable organisation. […] So much are we independent that our hearts will 
beat, removed, cared for, artificially supplanted with blood and oxygen. A lump 
of flesh or skin will grow in cultures. Teeth form either in the mouth or stomach. 
The stomach does not care from which end it gets its food; the veins from whence 
the blood that fills them; the heart will have no sentimental regrets that it is not 
feeding our particular brain or nerves. (405) 
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Here, Moore figures the body as a collection of disinterested elements, which may just as easily 
interfere with the human form as contribute to its overall functionality. The individual, in other 
words, is an assemblage of competing systems, each of which acts according to the logic of its 
own “Local Brain.” These sub-personal entities constitute the often-contradictory biological and 
cognitive aspects of each individual human. 
Moore’s approach to intelligence is paradoxical, then. On the one hand, the theory she 
proposes is radically inclusive in that it positions all organic matter as participating within a 
planetary psychosphere, to which each organism contributes. At the same time, she asserts that 
these contributions are chaotic because there is no single organizing principle guiding the 
direction of these different forms of brain power. “Intelligence is localised, not universal,” she 
writes. “Up to now, whether mystically, religiously, philosophically, scientifically, the verdict 
has always been: There is One who Knows all. Or, Nature provides. Rubbish” (406). According 
to Moore, brain power is both inherent to organic life and also unsystematic, opening up the 
potential for disarray. 
 The psychosphere, which is the sum of the planet’s brain power, is, then, open to 
potential disorder. Yet the notebook closes with a salvific image of a female thinker guiding 
human thought: 
It seems not for nothing that the apple comes always to the rescue of humanity. 
One woman, meaning well, bit an apple. Circumstances were against her (she 
was ahead of her times) and it turned to superstition. Another woman bites an 
apple. Circumstances are against her and she still may be ahead of her times, and 
gives back Reason through the medium of Common Sense. (412) 
The implicit identity of this second woman, herself a revision of the biblical Eve, appears to be 
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the speaker of Moore’s notebook, the writer who, at the notebook’s beginning, “discovers that a 
Brain as fine, as reasoning, has been given to the smallest sentient thing” (403). In this closing 
passage, Moore suggests that recognizing the contingency and partiality of human intelligence is 
a necessary lesson in order to ensure harmony within the psychosphere. The notebook promotes 
radical interconnection, which Moore suggests will come about through a humble recognition of 
the universality of life, regardless of its scale in relation to the individual: 
Therefore watching our own activity, invention, organisation, we find them but a 
copy of such inventions in the vegetal world. From which we may deduct that all 
plants and all the microscopic world and the ultra-microscopic world, as the 
telescopic and ultra-telescopic world, is ruled by the same means and laws. All 
experience leading to same conclusions; all life a repetition on various scales of 
the same principles. (406) 
However, ironically, this exaltation of interconnectedness comes about through the instruction 
the reader receives from Moore’s figure of the writer, who implicitly invokes Moore, the author 
of the notebooks. Although brain power is universal, and although the psychosphere is the 
product of all organisms’ cognitive activities, Moore still relies on the author as expert to teach 
this “Common Sense” lesson of humanity’s interconnectedness.  
 Moore’s concept of the psychosphere is premised on the notion that organisms are 
themselves both assemblages and also sub-components of a larger organic structure: the planet. 
She posits that “brain power” animates all organisms and enables them to independently direct 
their activities. Although this independence tends toward disorder, Moore ends with a 
redemptive image of a writer guiding humankind toward a more perfect knowledge of its relation 
to other organisms. Collective intelligence in Apple thus emerges as a fragile yet harmonizing 
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essence in need of revised appraisal and appreciation.  
 
Wells’s World Brain 
Like Moore, Wells in World Brain imagines the planet itself as a seat of cognition. 
Wells’s argument throughout this edited volume of essays, addresses, and radio broadcasts is that 
humankind must embark on a worldwide project of efficiently organizing, and thereby 
enhancing, human intelligence. He envisions that developing a centralized clearinghouse for all 
human knowledge would be the most effectual method for improving intelligence because it 
would enable its efficient distribution across the species. And, according to Wells, amplifying 
human intelligence is imperative because doing so would stave off the looming threat of a 
second world war. 
Throughout World Brain, Wells explicitly positions human intelligence as an endangered 
biopolitical resource in need of management. Failing to attend to intelligence, Wells writes, 
would have potentially dire consequences. He claims, for instance, that the lure of fascist rhetoric 
can be attributed to what he terms the “insufficient mental equipment” of individuals (7). This 
insufficiency of “mental equipment” emerges, in Wells’s view, from the fact that human 
intelligence is too dispersed. We each have access to “unco-ordinated bits of quite good 
knowledge,” he writes, but “no common understanding whatever of the processes in which [we] 
are obliged to mingle and interfere” (7). Wells’s metaphor of an overarching superstructure and 
focus on collective intelligence strongly resembles H.D.’s, West’s, and Moore’s, but he employs 
this line of inquiry to make foreign policy recommendations rather than to establish a platform 
for aesthetic or ontological inquiry. For example, he writes explicitly about what he perceives the 
be the negative political ramifications of this dispersal, which include the inability of the Peace 
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Conference of Versailles to prevent another global conflict: “[the people in attendance] did not 
use anything but a very small fraction of the political and economic wisdom that already existed 
in human brains at that time” (8). Wells insists that human intelligence is already adequately 
sophisticated to address global problems and to end international conflict; from his perspective, 
all that is needed is a system of organization that would enable this collective intelligence to 
become available to everyone. 
Wells, therefore, places a great deal of faith in managed collective intelligence to solve 
the problems of the future, including impending global conflict. He argues, for example, that 
managed collective intelligence will counteract what he perceives as the danger of another, more 
insidious form of crowd mentality, which he writes he has observed in “certain political 
gatherings”: the “faces of altogether inferior type, leather-lunged adventures bawling and 
gesticulating, raucous little men screaming implausible nonsense to ignorant crowds, supporters 
herded like sheep and saluting like trained monkeys […]” (63). This passage uses common 
tropes for intellectual disability—including references to inferiority, uncontrolled gesticulations 
and emotions, physical smallness, and animalism68—in a thinly veiled description of fascist 
rallies. Wells equates ignorance, in other words, with the potential for violence, and he locates 
ignorance in crowds that have been entranced by convincing dictators. 
Wells’s solution to this problem is to create a centrally controlled information network, 
which he imagines would systematize, and thus improve, knowledge across the entire species. 
He argues that in an age of mass media and partisan political rhetoric, existing systems for 
improving and organizing intelligence have proven insufficient, particularly in warding off the 
threat of fascism: “all these universities, all these nice refined people in their lovely gowns, all 
																																								 																				
68 All of these tropes of intellectual disability are present, for instance, in Charles Darwin’s Descent of 
Man. 
	 78	
this visible body of human knowledge and wisdom, has far less influence upon the conduct of 
human affairs than, let us say, an intractable newspaper proprietor, an unscrupulous group of 
financiers or the leader of a recalcitrant minority” (63). What is needed is an organization for 
joining together the “general intelligence services of the world” (xv): 
[S]uch an Enclyclopaedic organization could spread like a nervous network, a 
system of mental control about the globe, knitting all the intellectual workers of 
the world through a common interest and a common medium of expression into a 
more and more conscious co-operating unity and a growing sense of their own 
dignity, informing without pressure or propaganda, directing without tyranny. 
(33) 
Here and elsewhere, Wells imagines the world itself as a platform for cognitive activity, and he 
urges his audiences to help nurture this platform in order to enhance collective intelligence. In 
one of World Brain’s essays, which was originally delivered in the United States in late 1937, for 
example, Wells urges: “Our world is changing and it is changing with an ever-increasing 
violence. And the old world dies about us. A new world struggles into existence. But it is not 
developing the brain and the sensitiveness and delicacy necessary for its new life” (40). He posits 
that contemporary problems have outpaced the development of the world’s “brain,” which needs 
guidance in order to solve modern political problems. Pooling the world’s intelligence has 
become, Wells writes, because the scale of global problems has expanded: “we are beginning to 
apprehend something of the full complexity and vastness of the situation that faces all of 
mankind, that is to say all of us, as a living species […]. That change of scale, that enhancement 
of power has altered the fundamental conditions of human life—all our lives” (47). Here, Wells 
suggests that the vast scale of another world war can only be combated with a comparably vast 
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power: the collective intelligence of the world, which, if curated, would exceed the cumulative 
power of individuals’ intelligence. Like H.D., West, and Moore, Wells employs psychical and 
neural metaphors to describe a vast superstructure with the potential to guide humans’ 
advancement into the future. 
In fact, Wells imagines that this power, if harnessed and organized, would rival “the 
power and influence of the churches and religions of the past” (23). This comparison between 
organized knowledge and religious authority positions intelligence as a semi-mystical power that 
exceeds individual human understanding. Wells also dismisses the capacities of the individual by 
contrasting his idea for a World Brain with the mind of the exceptional individual: “the Hero 
emerges, a poor single, silly, little human cranium held high and adorned usually with something 
preposterous in the way of hats” (xiv). Prone to pride and absurdity, individual genius, Wells 
implies, is no match for collective intelligence, which, in Wells’s utopian vision, would avoid 
fault through collective management. 
At the same time, Wells calls for a small group of authorities to implement this 
management. His plan for the creation of a World Brain is bureaucratic in that it requires experts 
in particular areas of knowledge to join administrative groups such as a “Promotion 
Organization” and an “Encyclopedia Society.” These experts, Wells envisions, would decide 
what pieces of information belong in the World Brain and would oversee the distribution of 
human knowledge from this shared resource. Connecting World Brain to some of Wells’s earlier 
utopian visions, particularly Anticipations (1901), W. Boyd Rayward characterizes Wells’s 
preference for a system of management conducted by a group of experts in World Brain as 
inherently totalitarian:  
These “officials” will carry out their duties and sustain their repressive regimes 
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administratively on the basis of knowledge derived from a huge database in which 
is integrated information about all aspects of the lives of the citizens under their 
care. They are to manage broader socio-biological matters relating to the 
immediate welfare and evolutionary development of the human race, including 
weeding out the unfit for detention or destruction. (571) 
The equitability of Wells’s call for global access to worldwide knowledge is undercut, in other 
words, by his insistence on the involvement of experts to direct such a project. 
Wells’s concept of the World Brain is premised on the idea that differences in 
intelligence are not fixed; rather, Wells insists that these differences can be overcome through 
collective effort and access to information. Therefore, World Brain’s utopian vision of 
evolutionary advancement through the manipulation of the species’ intelligence includes 
resonances of the logic of positive eugenics in that it argues humanity will be improved through 
social engineering. For example, Wells argues explicitly that the contents of the World Brain 
should become a template for educating future generations by offering “the standard source of 
material for the instructional side of school and college work, for the verification of facts and the 
testing of statements—everywhere in the world” (20-21). This statement coheres with Wells’s 
celebrations of artificial manipulation throughout his career. Martin A. Danahay points out that 
throughout his life, “Wells has faith both in the artificial and plastic as against the natural, which 
united his belief in science and technology and his optimism that humans at the level of the mind 
and body could be moulded and shaped by science and technology” (477); this faith is certainly 
evident in World Brain. World Brain also advances certain aspects of Marxist rhetoric in its 
explicit calls for the uprising and organization of “intellectual workers,” which Wells suggests 
could vault humanity to a better future. “We want the intellectual worker,” he writes, “to become 
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a more definitely organized factor in the human scheme” (13). Within both of these 
frameworks—eugenic and Marxist—the individual human becomes a small and even 
insignificant participant in a larger collective. In World Brain, the form of this collective is a 
neural superstructure, which Wells’s writes would “hold the world together mentally,” “play[ing] 
the role of an undogmatic Bible to a world culture” by “informing, suggesting, directing, and 
unifying” all of human intelligence (21). By arguing for a global system in which to store the 
knowledge of individuals, Wells transfers the question of intelligence away from differences 
among individuals and toward the collective mental power of the species.  
Wells’s concept of the world brain has had a long afterlife. It has often served as a 
metaphor for futuristic visions of information science and also for systems of storing information 
that have since come into being since the late 1930s, most significantly the internet.69 In fact, as 
early as 1937—before Wells published World Brain as an edited volume but after he had 
delivered some of his initial talks on the subject—the Science News-Letter, the publication of the 
Society for Science and the Public, an American organization, published an article entitled 
“Documentation Congress Step Toward Making ‘World Brain.’” This article discusses 
microfilm, the subject of a recent meeting of the World Congress of Universal Documentation. 
Microfilm, the authors imagine, would allow “Librarians, scientists, editors, and others who 
marshal and create the written record of civilization” to “weld the intellectual resources of this 
planet into a unified system” (228). This article directly references Wells’s argument about what 
he frames as the urgent need for a world brain.70 It also echoes Wells’s belief that salvation from 
violence is already extant in the sum of human intelligence by asserting that “The nuclei of this 
																																								 																				
69 See, for instance, Eugene Garfield, who connects Wells’s concept of the world brain to the “World 
Wide Web.” 
70 The following article in the publication is, in fact, the printed version of an address Wells delivered to 
the World Congress of Universal Documentation. 
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world brain exist in the various great intellectual centers—the libraries, journals and indices of 
recorded knowledge—and the task considered is how to exchange and distribute more effectively 
the past, current and future accumulations in all fields of human endeavor” (228). The purpose of 
this chapter as a whole has been to demonstrate the influence of interwar authors on discourses 
concerning collective intelligence, and this is especially evident in the case of Wells, whose 
writings on the concept of the world brain had almost immediate and long-lasting effects on the 
cultural imaginary. 
Given the lively afterlife of Wells’s concept of the world brain, it is worth explicitly 
noting the similarities between Wells’s world brain and West’s super-cortex in particular. There 
are significant confluences among all the essays examined in this chapter, each of which frames 
collective intelligence as a transpersonal essence with biopolitical meaning, but Wells would 
almost certainly have been acquainted with The Strange Necessity. West and Wells, of course, 
had an intimate relationship; their son, Anthony West, was born in 1914. One of the essays in the 
volume in which The Strange Necessity was published presents a tongue-in-cheek portrait of 
Wells, describing him—along with George Bernard Shaw, John Galsworthy, and Arnold 
Bennett—as one of the “visiting uncles” of literary art: “Uncle Wells arrived always a little out 
of breath, with his arms full of parcels, sometimes rather carelessly tied, but always bursting with 
all manner of attractive gifts that ranged from the little pot of sweet jelly that is ‘Mr. Polly,’ to 
the complete meccano set for the mind that is The First Men in the Moon” (215). The 
confluences between West’s concept of the super-cortex and Wells’s concept of the world brain 
suggest that West’s essay may be an unacknowledged source text for Wells. 
Like all of the authors examined in this chapter, Wells imagines intelligence as a 
transpersonal essence that is seated not only in the individual but also as a superstructure that the 
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species as a whole may access. World Brain urges its readers to confront the enormity of global 
conflict by expanding the scale of the human intelligence. Rather than attending to individual 
variation, Wells, like H.D., West, and Moore, attends to the cognition of the collective on the 
basis of its perceived capacity to harmonize and improve human existence. For all of these 
authors, collective intelligence is necessary for the transcendence of relational (H.D.), 
evolutionary (West), ontological (Moore), and political (Wells) challenges. 
 
From Collective to National Intelligence 
H.D.’s, West’s, Moore’s, and Wells’s approaches to collective intelligence point, 
perhaps, to a moment peculiar to the later interwar years: one just after ideas about intelligence 
were elevated in the public imaginary through the increasing prevalence of intelligence quotient 
(IQ) testing and cultural influence of psychometrics, but one just before dispassionate logic and 
reason were exposed as dubious cultural ideals in the Second World War and its aftermath. In 
their essays, these authors claim that augmented and organized collective intelligence is 
potentially salvific, casting it as an essential ingredient for world harmony. Only a few years 
later, the unsavory political consequences of quantifying and managing group cognition became 
abundantly clear not only in fascist states, but also in the postwar Anglo world, which 
increasingly turned to quantifiable cognitive measures to explain collective intelligence in terms 
of national identity. While elsewhere in their oeuvres H.D., West, Moore, and West each 
disavow nationalist discourses to different degrees, this final section suggests that the faith these 
interwar essays place in the perceived power of collective intelligence resembles the logic that 
undergirded the concept of national intelligences in the postwar years.  
The research trajectory of the influential British and American psychologist Raymond 
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Cattell, who employed psychometric methods to research intelligence and personality in the mid-
twentieth century, provides an illustration of this relationship between theories of collective 
intelligence and nationalist rhetoric. In 1937, Cattell—a former student of Charles Spearman—
published a strident defense of “our national intelligence,” which he defines in terms that 
resemble those of H.D., West, Moore, and Wells. For Cattell, an individual’s intelligence in both 
heritable and innate: it is “largely inborn and constitutional, like the colour of the person’s eyes 
or the shape of his skull” (24). This lack of manipulability makes its excellence necessary for 
what Cattell sees as the health and success of the national population. Cattell addresses 
differences in individual intelligence (and reflects enduring eugenic logic) by noting “the 
continual rapid replacement of the constitutionally bright by the innately dull and limited types” 
(5), but his focus remains on “the pervasive average” (54)—the ordinary mind that resides at the 
center of the bell curve.  
From Cattell’s perspective, it is average intelligence, or the sum of the collective’s 
intelligence, that shapes the future. While some other practitioners in other mind sciences are 
captivated by exceptional individuals whose experiences are thought to illustrate broader 
psychological trends, Cattell, like many other psychometricians, attends to patterns in groups. He 
justifies this attention to average or collective intelligence by warning that the average 
intelligence of a collective shapes the course of its cultural productions: “[a]n undue 
preponderance of low intelligence can swamp a minority and set a tone in our newspapers, films, 
novels and social recreations” (54). Like H.D., West, Moore, and Wells, then, Cattell’s primary 
object of inquiry is collective intelligence, which he figures as a shared yet endangered resource 
in need of attention by experts within the discipline of psychology.  
By placing collective intelligence at the center of his analysis, Cattell paradoxically 
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pathologizes average or collective intelligence, suggesting that it is in need of care and cure. 
Cattell’s focus on what he perceives to be the decline of average intelligence suggests that in this 
case, the normal does not become apparent in relation to the pathological; rather, the normal 
itself becomes a pathological category. The consequences of this approach to collective 
intelligence emerge in Cattell’s later research agenda, which sought to investigate the 
psychological characteristics of nations. In the early 1950s, Cattell extended his fascination with 
national intelligence to the arena of international conflict. By then a research professor of 
psychology at the University of Illinois, Cattell argued that theories of collective cognition and 
group personality could explain the “culture pattern,” or intrinsic traits, of nations. A study 
published by the American Sociological Review in 1952 uses the principle of scalability to 
identify the “characteristics of the group when acting as a group, e.g. its aggressiveness; its 
support of artistic production; its censorship of the individual” (“An Attempt” 408). Cattell notes 
that these qualities “are inferred from group behavior [….] just as ‘personality’ is an inferred 
structure from an individual’s total behavior” (“An Attempt” 408); he notes that variances in 
nations’ “perceived mental capacity averages (i.e. ‘intelligence’) [are] more promising than 
either wealth or education as an explanation of the pattern observed” (“An Attempt” 415). 
Cattell, in other words, uses his assumptions about the nature of collective intelligence to 
describe what he perceives to be consistent national traits, which in turn are used to explain and 
validate contemporaneous international conflicts. For example, Cattell’s research makes a thinly 
veiled reference to what he figures as Soviet Russia’s warlike tendencies by claiming that his 
methods allow him to “estimate the performances of a country on some cultural variable for 
which data are not available—e.g., the war morale or arms production of a country behind a 
‘curtain’” (“An Attempt” 410). Unlike H.D., West, Moore, and Wells, whose attention to 
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collectives through the concept of scalability invites them to imagine peaceful futures, Cattell’s 
theory of collective intelligence is employed to support nationalist ideology and justify hostile 
foreign policy. 
Cattell’s research demonstrates how attention to collective intelligence invites a rhetoric 
of national comparisons as much as a platform for imagining, as do H.D., West, Moore, and 
Wells, species advancement and world peace. The confluences between Cattell’s research and 
the essays examined in this chapter show how theories of collective intelligence could be 
wielded rhetorically and politically by authors and mind scientists in radically different ways. It 
also suggests an originary closeness between idealistic and xenophobic conceptions of collective 
intelligence. 
This chapter, then, has addressed an open moment within discourses on collective 
intelligence, in which its significance as an object of inquiry, as well as its management by 
experts, registers both utopian and intolerant impulses. Some scholars of modernism have 
suggested that interwar authors are wary of collective intelligence because on the basis that it 
suppresses individuality in favor of group allegiances or coercive agendas. In the 1920s and 30s, 
however, the concept of collective intelligence still emitted a powerfully hopeful potential for a 
significant cluster of authors, who used it to imagine non-violent and mutual futures. 
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Chapter 2: “Contemplating the idiot”: Mental Privacy, Intellectual Disability,  
and the Possibility of Private Language in Virginia Woolf’s Between the Acts 
 If, in the interwar years, intelligence was increasingly figured as a unified essence with 
biopolitical meaning that has the potential to bind communities together, what did this mean for 
subjects characterized by their lack of intelligence, such as intellectually disabled subjects? What 
processes and criteria for inclusion and exclusion emerge in an imagined community shaped by 
an investment in normative cognition? To address these questions, literary texts modeled 
tensions between communities and intellectually disabled figures. In and around the Second 
World War, intellectually disabled characters appeared in literary works as disruptive figures 
whose absent or unimaginable forms of cognition threaten the cohesion of communities.71 The 
thoughts of intellectually disabled characters, in other words, were imagined as unreachable via 
language and therefore indeterminately nonexistent or inaccessible to others. For this reason, 
intellectually disabled figures entered into literature of this moment as characters whose minds 
challenged a core aspect of modernist aesthetics: the exploration of interiority.  
We see this function of the intellectually disabled figure clearly in Virginia Woolf’s final 
novel, Between the Acts (1941). Modernism often invites us into the minds of characters whose 
subjectivities had not received serious or extended treatment in earlier periods of literature: 
adulterers, children, lesbians, and members of the working class, to name a few.72 Woolf’s 
oeuvre exemplifies this fascination with overlooked subjectivities while at the same time 
suggesting that characters’ minds are never fully accessible. In fact, the mystery of others’ minds 
animates most of Woolf’s aesthetic projects. Jacob’s Room (1922), for instance, comments on 
																																								 																				
71 Other British examples from the period in which idiot figures were similarly constituted include Olive 
Moore’s Spleen (1930) and George Bernard Shaw’s The Simpleton of the Unexpected Isles (1935). 
American examples include John Steinbeck’s Of Mice and Men (1937). 
72 James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922), Elizabeth Bowen’s The House in Paris (1926), Radclyffe Hall’s The 
Well of Loneliness (1928), and Dorothy Richardson’s Pointed Roofs (1915). 
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the partiality of its impressions of Jacob Flanders, around which the novel is organized, by 
noting that a true picture of him “can never be conveyed to a second person save by Jacob 
himself”; at the same time, this partiality animates the narrative because it “always impel[s] one 
to hum vibrating, like the hawk moth, at the mouth of the cavern of mystery, endowing Jacob 
Flanders with all sorts of qualities he had not at all” (72; 73). As Jacob recedes from view, the 
narrative invents indirect methods for exploring his subjectivity.73  
This process of attempting to access minds that are never fully knowable to others is 
repeated at the level of form or theme in nearly all of Woolf’s novels. We might think of Clarissa 
Dalloway protecting the “privacy of the soul” from the invasive Peter Walsh (Mrs. Dalloway 
192); Lily Briscoe fantasizing about an “art” by which she might enter “into those secret 
chambers” of Mrs. Ramsay’s heart (To the Lighthouse 58); or Percival’s inaccessible 
subjectivity, around which The Waves coheres. In each of these texts, the boundaries of others’ 
minds can never be fully traversed, but attempting and imagining such traversals emerge as the 
main objects of language.  
This chapter examines how Woolf’s fascination with others’ minds breaks down in the 
case of intellectual disability—or, to use her term, “idiocy.” I argue that in Between the Acts, 
idiocy represents a socially illegible form of mental privacy that resists incorporation into shared 
systems of meaning. Through the figure of the idiot, Between the Acts registers a degree of 
exhaustion with what arguably is Woolf’s, and also the modernist novel’s, primary aesthetic 
catalyst: interiority. When it is imagined as a form of peculiarly absent or inaccessible cognition, 
																																								 																				
73 These methods, which obscure the reader’s access to Jacob even as they reveal impressionistic glimpses 
of him, constitute the experimental fabric of the novel, as many of Woolf’s contemporary reviewers 
noted. One anonymous critic wrote in 1922, “The method [of Jacob’s Room] is snapshot photography 
[…]. The result is a crowded album of little pictures” (Majumdar and McLarin 105). Less admiringly, 
reviewer Lewis Bettany complained, “Mrs. Woolf’s new story […] is so full of parentheses and 
suppositions […] that I found great difficulty in discovering what it was all about” (Majumdar and 
McLarin 95). 
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idiocy halts exploration of the mind and registers private thoughts as potentially isolating rather 
than narratively instigating.  
Idiocy, as Woolf, an aficionado of Greek literature and culture, would have known, 
derives from the Greek idios, which refers to a “private person” or a “person without 
professional knowledge” (OED). This association between idiocy and privacy persists in English 
meanings of the word: seventeenth-century definitions of idiocy include “a private (as opposed 
to a public) person” and “an inward-looking person” (OED). The privacy of idiocy is linked 
etymologically to the privacy of “idiom,” a term denoting a form of language that is sealed 
within the self insofar as it does not (necessarily) communicate meaning to others. As Isabelle 
Stengers points out, “[i]n the ancient Greek sense, an idiot was someone who did not speak the 
Greek language and was therefore cut off from the civilized community. The same meaning is 
found in the word ‘idiom,’ a semi-private language that excludes from a form of communication 
characterized by an ideal of transparency and anonymity (interchangeability of the speakers)” 
(994). In the mid-twentieth century, idiocy is an etymologically and culturally ambiguous term 
that signals intrinsic privacy and also to what was increasingly understood in the mind sciences 
as innate cognitive limitation: “people whose minds were developed below the level of a normal 
three-year-old’s” (Cohen 31). 
During Woolf’s lifetime, the conceptual ambiguity of the term idiocy intensified as 
intellectually disabled people were increasingly cordoned off from society through processes of 
compulsory and often permanent institutionalization.74 Sharon Morris reports, for example, that 
the institutionalization of intellectually disabled subjects increased rapidly but unevenly in 
																																								 																				
74 See Janet Lyon’s account of the effects of the Mental Deficiency Act (1913) on mentally “deficient” 
subjects in terms of institutionalization and, as Lyon argues, civil death. 
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England during the interwar years.75 Woolf was personally acquainted with this cultural shift 
toward the segregation of people with intellectual disabilities. In May 1940, as she drafted 
Between the Acts, Woolf recorded in her diary Leonard’s involvement in helping a neighbor send 
her “mentally defective” son to an asylum. The neighbor, Woolf writes,  
cant stand the strain now the boys are gone, alone with the chattering idiot […]. 
Mrs West [the mother] had made up her mind to become a nurse & let him go. So 
whats to become of father, Louie [Mrs. West’s daughter] asks, whose nerves are 
bad? This is a pinch of Hitler in the cottages of Rodmell too. (Diary V 289-290). 
Here, Woolf’s mention of Hitler references the West family’s dissolution, which is comes about 
via the strains and traumas of wartime, but, in the context of the child’s institutionalization, her 
acknowledgement of the family’s “pinch of Hitler” also points ironically—if unwittingly—to 
synchronous Nazi practices of institutionalizing, sterilizing, and euthanizing people with 
disabilities, especially people with intellectual, mental, and psychiatric disabilities. In fact, of the 
same child, Woolf wrote elsewhere in her diary, “The idiot boy has pneumonia, should die but of 
course, wont” (Diary V 257). 
While these diary entries hint that she harbored eugenic views about intellectually 
disabled subjects as she wrote Between the Acts, this chapter shows how Woolf’s last novel turns 
to intellectual disability for a way to envisage the existence of a mind the thoughts of which 
																																								 																				
75 Morris writes, “The culture and politics in Britain from the 1920s and 1930s were conducive to 
segregation and sterilization. However, economic conditions and the devolution of responsibility from 
state to local authority delayed concerted practical efforts until the Second World War, by which time 
eugenics had inherited a more sinister legacy” (146). Although England was ideologically primed to 
segregate its intellectually disabled subjects to permanent asylums, in practice, this happened most often 
in London and other urban areas: “In the more rural areas, a feebleminded relative could be found simple 
work to do, and even in more urban areas there might be repetitive work to do. Indeed, such free labor 
was frequently necessary to farmers and small family businesses” (Morris 149). 
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cannot be narrated via shared language or, perhaps, even imagined by others.76 For Woolf, idiocy 
represents not a complete recession of being, but rather a completely inaccessible form of being 
that resists the generative exploration of other minds. The figure of the idiot represents a form of 
thought that is either absent or ungraspable with the resources of language. By conceiving of 
idiots to be the bearers of socially illegible minds that nonetheless are minds, Woolf turns away 
from her earlier narrative strategies for peering partially or fleetingly behind the veil that 
conceals the thoughts of others. In a narrative that brushes up against what she frames as the 
black box of intellectually disabled subjectivity, Woolf proposes a boundary that language 
cannot traverse. 
Between the Acts examines this understanding of idiocy through its treatment of Albert 
the “village idiot.” The novel concerns the planning, performance, and aftermath of a pageant 
play in a small English village just before the outbreak of the Second World War. The pageant 
chronicles England’s history, and, as a whole, Between the Acts describes the audience’s 
ambivalent responses to its displays of patriotic nostalgia. Albert the “village idiot” exists on the 
periphery of this community, participating diegetically and extradiegetically in the pageant even 
as his subjectivity remains sealed from narrative exploration. The sections of this chapter show 
that the concept of idiocy challenges Woolf’s earlier approaches to her characters’ mental worlds 
and, ultimately, the resources of modernist aesthetics. I begin by examining how Woolf’s 
engagement with idiocy puts pressure on the genre of the novel, foreclosing its capacity to 
imagine and explore subjectivity. I then demonstrate how the text associates idiocy with 
community dispersion and the inability of other characters to access language for speech or 
thought. Next, I consider how Woolf’s last novel intersects with the contemporaneous 
																																								 																				
76 For readings of eugenic rhetoric elsewhere in Woolf’s writing, see Janet Lyon, “On the Asylum Road 
with Woolf and Mew” and Donald Childs, Modernism and Eugenics: Woolf, Eliot, Yeats, and the Culture 
of Degeneration, pp. 22-74. 
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philosophical question of the possibility of private language—a form of language that does not 
signify beyond the subject. I conclude by considering Woolf’s treatment of idiocy in Between the 
Acts in relation to her fear of fascism at the end of her life. As a whole, this chapter claims that 
attending to the concept of idiocy tests Woolf’s, and modernism’s, approach to interiority as 
narratively instigating. 
 
Making the Novel the Drama 
In Between the Acts, Woolf peels away the genre that is arguably most concerned with 
exploring private thoughts: the novel. If the modernist novel is energized by imagining the minds 
of others, albeit incompletely and fleetingly, Between the Acts is a modernist novel that tests and 
ultimately rejects its own limitations. From its opening sequence, the text drifts toward the 
linguistic patterns of drama, such as direct discourse and reported action, as opposed to mediated 
narration; once the pageant begins, the text becomes increasingly saturated by dramatic dialogue 
and reportage of the audience’s collective responses to the pageant. Sam See—in an essay from 
which this section gets its title—argues that in Between the Acts, Woolf pushes toward the 
dramatic by “Stripping her novel of a mediating ‘I’ (or any consistent narratological voice)” 
(642). Here, I consider how the novel’s constant pull between “I” and “We”—or individuality 
and collectivity—is represented at the level of form. The text shifts from rich description of 
individual characters to direct discourse spoken both by audience members and pageant 
performers, gradually moving, in other words, from the novelistic to the dramatic.77 Although it 
investigates many characters’ impressions and thoughts, by the end, Between the Acts settles on 
																																								 																				
77 Critics including Jed Esty and Ben Harker have articulately discussed the political implications of the 
pageant play as a particular dramatic form. They demonstrate how in the 1930s, as Britain hovered on the 
brink of war, the pageant form experienced a revival in part because it registered an ambivalent nostalgia 
for ideas of the nation in the decade before the Second World War.  
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the exterior view of a community that is most easily captured by the dramatic mode.  
Woolf, of course, was fascinated by drama and performance throughout her life.78 Yet 
before Between the Acts, mental privacy, not performance, was primarily propagative of 
narrative exploration for Woolf. I claim that Between the Acts marks a shift in Woolf’s aesthetic 
focus in which she moves away from mental privacy as the animating center of her novels. To 
set up this claim, I first trace the role of privacy in Woolf’s earlier literary production.  
Privacy is constant theme in Woolf’s earlier fiction, essays, and personal writing: Mrs. 
Dalloway’s narrative climax arguably centers around a woman going to sleep in a room alone; 
“Street-Haunting: A London Adventure” (1930) chronicles a writer observing the oddities of the 
city as she perambulates by herself; and Woolf’s own diaries frequently record her experiences 
of writing in solitude as well as her private observations. Woolf’s focus on mental privacy 
permeates both critical and popular conceptions of her work. In a recent issue of The New 
Yorker, Joshua Rothman writes,  
Woolf often conceives of life this way: as a gift that you’ve been given, which 
you must hold onto and treasure but never open. Opening it would dispel the 
atmosphere, ruin the radiance—the radiance of life is what makes it worth living. 
[…] It has to do, in other words, with a kind of inner privacy, by means of which 
you shield yourself not just from others’ prying eyes, but from your own. Call it 
an artist’s sense of privacy.” (n.p.)  
For Rothman, Woolf is invested in a form of privacy that is both concealing and compelling; 
privacy, in fact, is the necessary structure for the sense of mystery and meaning that Woolf finds 
																																								 																				
78 See, for instance, Steven D. Putzel’s Virginia Woolf and the Theater. 
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in the quotidian details of everyday life.79 
Of course, critical attention has not always framed Woolfian privacy positively. Quentin 
Bell’s 1972 biography, part of Woolf’s elevation into the literary canon, enfranchised critical 
focus on privacy by offering a portrait of the author as pathologically private, “terrified of the 
world, terrified of exposing herself”—a state of being that he suggests fueled, and is fueled by, 
her “madness” (qtd. in Snaith 2). According to Brenda Silver, many of the representations of 
Woolf that have emerged in popular culture since the 1970s have drawn from this image, 
“lock[ing] [her] squarely into the private, feminine world of emotions, sensibility, and 
aesthetics” and thereby overlooking or denying her awareness of audience, her interdisciplinary 
engagements, and her political convictions (2). By contrast, in and around the 1970s, feminist 
literary critics turned to Woolf’s fascination with privacy as evidence of the complexities of what 
have traditionally been the domains of women: the home and the family. For these critics, 
Woolf’s focus on privacy revalues the private sphere, confirming the feminist assertion that the 
personal is political.80 
Both of these approaches to privacy in Woolf—exemplified by Rothman’s celebratory 
and Bell’s pathologizing accounts—have understood Woolf’s thoughts on privacy in relation to 
the public sphere.81 That is, critics have tended to understand privacy in Woolf as either a retreat 
																																								 																				
79 For a close reading of Woolf’s engagement with everyday experience as an impetus for aesthetics, see 
Lorraine Sim, Virginia Woolf: The Patterns of Ordinary Experience. 
80 Drawing on this critical tradition, more recent modernist studies scholars have emphasized Woolf’s 
close attention to her reading public and her detailed knowledge of the social and political conditions that 
shaped her time while simultaneously recuperating the ways in which the private points toward the 
political in Woolf’s work. For instance, Anna Snaith argues, “[t]he danger […] found so often in cycles of 
debate is that she becomes entrapped within the public realm. This is to ignore Woolf’s personal need for 
privacy—marked so clearly in her travels between Sussex and London. Furthermore, it is to overlook the 
philosophical and political advantages she saw represented by privacy itself” (3). The intensity of these 
debates lends weight to Hermione Lee’s claim that “the conflict between public and private […] will be 
one of the main subjects of Woolf’s writing life” (19). s 
81 According to Habermas, the public sphere is a discursive space that is open to all and is coextensive 
with public authority; conversely, the private sphere is located in the institutions of the family and home 
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from the public sphere or as a heuristic for mediating and commenting upon public life. 
Examples of this latter approach include Jessica Berman’s argument that “Woolf’s focus on the 
private sphere, family life, and matters of intimate relationship in her work gestures insistently 
and irrevocably back towards the public sphere and especially towards matters of ethics and 
politics” (267); Anna Snaith’s attention to the oscillation between the public and private spheres 
throughout Woolf’s essays and fiction; and Marianne DeKoven’s argument that “the public is 
[…] recontained and transformed as the private” in Woolf’s essays and fiction (235). Here, I 
understand privacy not as the dialectical counterpart to public life, but as a phenomenological 
condition characterized by the experience of cognitive distance from others. This sense of 
privacy does not extend beyond the individual; moreover, it is not necessarily formed through 
particular social institutions, such as the family or the home. Instead, it is the feeling of solitude 
with which Woolfian subjects cloak themselves when they think, particularly when their 
thoughts are not (or cannot be) verbalized to other characters or to themselves.82 This 
understanding of privacy, in other words, is located in the world of thoughts that the narrative 
resists communicating between subjects. The focus of this chapter is therefore mental privacy, 
which is just as likely to be experienced in moments of social isolation as in the bustling streets 
of London. 
Mental privacy, as Woolf makes clear in A Room of One’s Own, may be extended and 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
and affords the individual a greater degree of authority. Habermasian privacy, therefore, is social life on a 
smaller, more intimate, and more restricted scale. 
82 Woolf often describes the experience of private thinking in haptic terms, comparing it to the experience 
of being covered in fabric. For instance, Mr. Ramsay “wrap[s] himelf” in privacy (To the Lighthouse 34); 
Neville thinks, “I shall always push through curtains to privacy, and want some whispered words alone” 
(The Waves 60); and Clarissa Dalloway “hides her dress, like a virgin protecting her chastity, respecting 
privacy” (Mrs. Dalloway 59). In this last passage, Clarissa’s dress symbolizes both female sexuality (“a 
virgin protecting her chastity”) and also the experience of privacy (“respecting privacy”). In this sense, 
when Clarissa hides the dress from Peter, she is withholding both the sexual/romantic intimacy that Peter 
desires from her as well as the “privacy of the soul” that she sought to maintain when she rejected Peter 
initially. 
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enhanced through access to material resources, especially space in which to find physical privacy 
from others. But in her earlier writing, Woolf suggests that physical privacy matters because it 
facilitates mental privacy; in other words, mental privacy holds the more honored position in that 
it makes aesthetic expression possible. For instance, in a well-known passage from A Room of 
One’s Own, Virginia Woolf considers possible objections to her emphasis on the importance of 
“material things” (118). Quoting Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch, she writes: 
Nobody could put the point more plainly. “The poor poet has not in these days, 
nor has had for two hundred years, a dog’s chance […]. [A] poor child in England 
has little more hope than had the son of an Athenian slave to be emancipated into 
that intellectual freedom of which great writings are born.” That is it. Intellectual 
freedom depends upon material things. Poetry depends upon intellectual freedom. 
And women have always been poor, not for two hundred years merely, but from 
the beginning of time. Women have had less intellectual freedom than the sons of 
Athenian slaves. That is why I have laid so much stress on money and a room of 
one’s own. (118-119) 
Intellectual freedom, as Woolf demonstrates throughout A Room of One’s Own, is the profit of 
having time to think; it represents the ability to engage in private thoughts, which promise “the 
possibility that in the course of time the mind will be free to write what it likes” (69). What 
matters about “material things,” therefore, is that they afford intellectual freedom, which, 
according to Woolf, in turn creates the conditions for art. Throughout A Room of One’s Own, 
Woolf argues that material conditions and intellectual freedom are interconnected, but she 
ultimately privileges mental privacy as the necessary condition for aesthetic expression.   
In fact, this idea that mental privacy is a necessary condition for the creation of art is one 
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of Woolf’s most consistent claims in her earlier work. The formulation of mental privacy as an 
incubator for aesthetic expression is so naturalized in Woolf’s oeuvre that it appears in almost all 
of her essays and fiction, either as the subject of inquiry (as in A Room of One’s Own) or as the 
occasion for narrative exploration. In “Modern Fiction,” she argues famously, “the moderns” are 
interested “very likely in the dark places of psychology” (152); in Granite and Rainbow, she 
writes admiringly about Katherine Mansfield’s diary, “We feel that we are watching a mind 
which is alone with itself; a mind which has so little thought of an audience that it will make use 
of a shorthand of its own now and then, or, as the mind in its loneliness tends to do, divide into 
two and talk to itself” (73). In Woolf’s earlier fiction and nonfiction, mental privacy is a constant 
situation, and it provides the circumstances for investigations of thoughts that otherwise would 
not, or could not, be translated into acts of speech. 
At the same time, Woolf makes clear that mental privacy is only one of the mind’s 
possible modes. For this reason, I argue that Woolf’s model of the mind exceeds David 
Herman’s enactivist account of the mind in modernist narrative. Herman argues that Woolf does 
not necessarily constitute the mind as an interior space, as Erich Kahler claims in his influential 
framing of modernist narrative as an “inward turn.” According to Kahler, modernist texts trace 
“an increasing displacement of outer space by what Rilke has called inner space, a stretching of 
consciousness” (5). Herman critiques Kahler’s formulation of the mind on the basis of its 
Cartesian dualism, which presupposes mind/matter duality—the mind as an “inner” space that is 
distinct from the “outer” world. In contrast, Herman contends that “modernist narratives figure a 
different geography of mind; in place of Cartesian mappings of the mental as a bracketed-off 
interior space, these texts allow the mind to be imagined as a kind of distributional flow, 
interwoven with rather than separated from situations, events, and processes in the world” (255). 
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In short, Herman posits the presence of enactivist theories of cognition—or theories that posit the 
inseparability of mind, brain, and environment—in modernist narratives.83 
But Herman’s reading of modernist narratives swings too far in the other direction, 
overlooking the extent to which retreats into private thoughts—thoughts that are experienced as 
distinct from, or only vaguely connected to material events—animate modernist narratives. It is 
telling that while Mrs. Dalloway forms one of Herman’s primary examples of modernist 
narrative, he chooses passages that feature mental processes immediately following moments of 
dialogue, such as Ellie Henderson’s excited reaction to the announcement of the Prime Minister 
(Herman 260) and Elizabeth’s apprehensive reaction to Miss Kilman’s angry departure (Herman 
262), overlooking the extended swaths of text uninterrupted by dialogue that constitute the 
majority of the novel. While Herman’s account of the mind opens important avenues for 
exploring extended cognition in modernist narratives, it does not acknowledge the extent to 
which these narratives are also structured around feelings of semi-separation and semi-enclosure, 
which they suggest accompanies private thinking. Woolf and other modernists attend to multiple 
forms of thinking, among them thinking in response to events in the world, thinking as an 
unspoken response to dialogue, and thinking as a private experience that is accompanied by 
feelings of partial separation from others.  
Given Woolf’s career-long fascination with mental privacy as a mode of experience that 
activates narrative exploration, it is striking that Between the Acts moves hesitantly but 
increasingly away from the minds of individual characters via the techniques of direct discourse 
and dramatic dialogue. Between the Acts plays more extensively with the dramatic than Woolf’s 
																																								 																				
83 Herman connects enactivist models of the mind to the cognitive theories of Francisco Varela, Evan 
Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch. These authors define enactivism as “the growing conviction that 
cognition is not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is rather the enactment of a 
world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs” 
(qtd. in Herman 256). 
	 99	
earlier writing, and not only because the text centers on a pageant production. Woolf herself 
recognized the distinctiveness of her approach in Between the Acts, which she described in her 
diary as “a more direct method of summarising relations” (Diary V 200). This phrasing suggests 
an aesthetic style predicated on revealing—directly—core information about characters as 
opposed to hovering “at the mouth of the cavern of mystery”—the mind (Jacob’s Room 73). In 
fact, in early notes about her last novel, Woolf considered instead composing a drama. Between 
the Acts gradually shifts from the narrative to the dramatic, showcasing the affordances and 
limitations of each aesthetic mode. 
This shift crystallizes as the pageant commences. The pageant’s beginning is marked by 
long sections of unmediated dramatic discourse spoken by the pageant’s performers and 
audience members. For example, in the pageant’s first moments, “a small girl, like a rosebud in 
pink” welcomes the audience to the pageant: “Gentles and simples, I address you all…” (76). 
These dramatic lines, marked in italics, call forth the audience as a unified collectivity, which 
both bears witness to the performance and responds in kind: “‘She’s England,’ they whispered. 
‘It’s begun.’ ‘The prologue,’ they added, looking down at the programme” (77). The “they” here 
is not any particular set of characters but rather the audience as a whole, which the novel 
represents as speaking and acting in unison (“looking down at the programme”). The start of the 
pageant turns the audience into a receptive and responsive unity as opposed to a collection of 
distinct figures.  
Later, when the pageant reaches the Restoration drama, titled “Where there’s a Will 
there’s a Way,” the novel is completely overtaken by dialogue and stage directions. The audience 
silences itself (“‘Hush, hush, hush,’ someone protested”), and the text transforms fully into the 
genre of a script (126). The audience’s reactions fall out of the narrative for pages at a time; the 
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novel is overtaken with dramatic dialogue and stage directions, displacing the reader from the 
form of a novel. This transformation is gradually undone by nature, the gramophone, and 
individuated members of the audience, which, as Michele Pridmore-Brown notes, oscillate in 
and out of the collective human consciousness, but the novel curtails these slips with 
increasingly extended passages of dramatic discourse.84  
Between the Acts explores what can be written in a novel that does not consistently have 
access to the interior worlds of individual characters. One possibility, it suggests, is that the 
novel can shift its focus to collective consciousness. Several instances of indirect discourse 
during the pageant are unattributed to any individual speaker or mind. For example, as the play 
begins, the narrative wonders, “So it was the play then. Or was it the prologue?” (76). This 
passage registers as the thought or comment of an audience member rather than an omniscient 
narrator, but it is not associated with a particular character; it can best be read as an unvocalized 
collective thought of the entire audience. Later, at the end of the play, a similar collective 
consciousness wonders in response to the faltering gramophone, “Was that voice ourselves? 
Scraps, orts and fragments, are we, also, that?” (189). The novel shows drama’s capacity to 
conjure up an audience’s shared mind; the narrative then dips into this mind, giving language to 
thoughts that traverse the audience’s collective consciousness. 
When Between the Acts does register individuation in the audience members, it often 
does so in the style of drama. After witnessing a dance in the pageant, Mrs. Manresa “applauded 
																																								 																				
84 Pridmore-Brown argues that these interruptions are important to what she understands to be Between 
the Acts’ anti-fascist project: “she [Woolf] uses a gramophone to demonstrate how patriotic messages, 
inscribed on bodies through rhythm and rhyme, can transform individuals into a herd that can be 
controlled by a charismatic leader. She aims in the novel to warp sound waves and so to short-circuit the 
herd impulse by privileging the receiver’s interpretive act: the act of listening” (408). By “exploiting the 
noise or static inherent in communications technology […] and by exploiting the physicist’s notion that 
multiple subjective worlds lurk beneath the surface sequence of events,” Woolf, for Pridmore-Brown, 
offers a conceptual toolkit for fighting fascism (408-409). 
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loudly. Somehow she was the Queen; and he (Giles) was the surly hero. ‘Bravo! Bravo!’ she 
cried, and her enthusiasm made the surly hero squirm on his seat” (93). Here, Mrs. Manresa not 
only responds to the pageant, she also acts as a director of her life, casting herself and others as 
characters in the drama. She recognizes people, in other words, not for their distinctive 
individuality but for their degree of similarity to familiar roles. Elsewhere, after watching a 
procession fade from the stage as the gramophone plays “Home, Sweet Home,” Mrs. Lynn Jones 
expresses a feeling of admiration: “‘Oh but it was beautiful’” (173). The text reveals that it is not 
the present action that captivates her, but the scene she has been thrown into: “Home she meant; 
the lamplit room; the ruby curtains; and Papa reading aloud” (173). This brief list of the qualities 
that Mrs. Lynn Jones associates with “home” resembles the text of a stage note, which provides a 
linguistic outline for a set that has yet to be staged. The narrative resists entering the scene 
conjured up by Mrs. Lynn Jones’s imagination and instead offers a sparse list of the materials 
that would be necessary to dramatize her nostalgic memories. In both of these examples, the text 
does not linger in a character’s thoughts to extrapolate meaning from them; instead, it turns to 
the resources of drama to briefly signal variation among character types.  
Mrs. Manresa’s and Mrs. Lynn Jones’s reactions to the pageant register one of Between 
the Acts’ primary concerns: how a text (or author) can control an audience’s interpretation if not 
via narrative mediation. Mrs. Manresa, after all, is swept into an improbably stylized fantasy in 
which the violent Giles becomes merely, and appealingly, a “surly hero.” But even as the text 
points to the interpretive ambivalence and even falseness that may arise in the absence of 
narrative mediation, it accomplishes this in the mode of dramatic discourse, closing off Mrs. 
Manresa’s subjectivity and figuring her as a character who, like the pageant’s players, is viewed 
from the outside by a distant audience: the reader. 
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To a certain extent, the novelistic mode appears to return in the text’s final pages, as “The 
little company” returns to Pointz Hall after the pageant’s conclusion (201). But See convincingly 
argues that these final passages read as “stage directions for a new play” (649): 
     The old people had gone up to bed. Giles crumpled the newspaper and turned 
out the light. Left alone together for the first time that day, they were silent. 
Alone, enmity was bared; also love. Before they slept, they must fight; after they 
had fought, they would embrace. From that embrace another life might be born. 
But first they must fight, as the dog fox fights with the vixen, in the heart of 
darkness, in the fields of night.  
     Isa let her sewing drop. The great hooded chairs had become enormous. And 
Giles too. And Isa too against the window. The window was all sky without 
colour. The house had lost its shelter. It was night before roads were made, or 
houses. It was the night that dwellers in caves had watched from some high place 
among rocks. 
          Then the curtain rose. They spoke. (218-219) 
This passage begins in a style resembling the objective, external reportage of newspapers.85 It 
then morphs into a series of instructions, like those a director might give to her actors: “Before 
they slept; they must fight; after they had fought, they would embrace.” As these instructions 
become increasingly schematic, the narrative sheds itself of any remaining novelistic traces. The 
final line, “Then the curtain rose. They spoke,” marks the shift of print into speech, a 
transformation that only the dramatic mode can perform.  
																																								 																				
85 Karin E. Westman discusses the significance of newspapers in Woolf’s last novel, arguing that the 
stripping away of mediation in Between the Acts creates conditions in which “the reader of Woolf’s free 
indirect discourse can engage in a critical evaluation of the ways in which a newspaper’s and a novel’s 
seeming transparency can naturalize ideology” (2). 
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In abandoning its partial investigations of characters’ mental privacy and turning toward 
the exterior perspective of the dramatic mode, Between the Acts explores an ethics of 
epistemology. It raises questions about not what we should know, but how we should know—
specifically, how and how much we can and should know the minds of others. In other words, in 
the shift from the novelistic to the dramatic, Woolf explores the closeness between being 
captivated by others’ minds and desiring to capture others. Between the Acts uncovers how both 
of these forms of apprehension are premised on shattering the borders that protect others’ privacy 
and distinguish the self from the other. What Woolf’s last novel calls for is a narrative form that 
remains distanced, at least to some extent, from its objects of aesthetic inquiry.  
In this sense, Between the Acts performs and champions the form of epistemological 
resistance that some critical disability studies scholars term cripistemology. The term 
cripistemology, which emerges at the intersection of queer theory and disability studies, helps us 
understand why, for Woolf, suspending her inquiry into her characters’ inner worlds in her last 
novel may have seemed more ethical than attempting to traverse the epistemological gap 
between knowing and not knowing about the minds of others.86 Jasbir Puar describes 
cripistemology as the following: 
[C]ripistemology [has the] potential to swerve from a grounding in a knowledge 
production project that seeks to counter other forms of epistemic violence by 
producing its own known objects. That is to say, cripistemology does not have to 
reproduce the violence of the mandate of Western knowledge as able to know its 
																																								 																				
86 Merri Lisa Johnson and Robert McRuer provide a genealogy of the term “cripistemology” in their 
introduction to a 2014 Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies special issue on the subject. 
Departing from Eve Sedgwick’s argument in Epistemology of the Closet that “the major nodes of thought 
and knowledge in twentieth-century Western cultue as a whole are structured—indeed, fractured—by a 
chronic, now endemic crisis of homo/heterosexual definition” (1), Johnson and McRuer offer 
cripistemology as a conceptual standpoint that involves “thinking from the critical, social, and personal 
position of disability” (“Cripistemologies” 134). 
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object. Nor does it need to presume, through infinite redress or what I have called 
the “epistemological corrective” of intersectionality, that if we have perfect 
knowledge we will have justice. Instead I read the “crip” in cripistemology as a 
critique of the notion of epistemology itself, a displacement not only of 
conventional ways of knowing and organizing knowledge, but also of the mandate 
of knowing itself, of the consolidation of knowledge […]. [C]ripistemology [is] a 
matter of debilitating contemporary forms of knowing with other forms of 
unknowing, sensing, refusing to know […] and, further, of challenging the status 
of knowledge itself. (McRuer and Johnson “Proliferating” 163-164)  
Cripistemology, in other words, is concerned with standing before the unknowable instead of 
knowing or even knowing otherwise. It seeks to preserve the borders of objects of knowledge by 
admitting constraints, questions the profits of knowledge production as an end in themselves, and 
rejects the notion that knowledge acquisition is the ultimate aim of engaging with the world. At 
stake in the concept of cripistemology is the acknowledgment that processes of gathering 
knowledge are always partial and incomplete. Between the Acts presents a cripistemology 
through its gradual withdrawal from narrative, or the territory of private thoughts, and toward the 
dramatic, or the territory of external expression. In doing so, it questions the modernist novel’s 
narrative interest in the pursuit of knowledge about others’ interiority, even when this knowledge 
remains necessarily incomplete. 
This cripistemological approach to others’ minds invites us to connect Between the Acts’ 
resistance to the aesthetic principles of modernist narrative to Woolf’s fear of fascism, which she 
describes in her diaries as an ideology based on total unification and complete erosion of private 
	 105	
thought.87 Natania Rosenfeld demonstrates how both Virginia and Leonard in the 1930s were 
motivated to find alternatives to fascist discourse. Their writing registers their urgent belief that 
“Authorship needed to be reinvented along democratic lines; a new, more egalitarian relationship 
between author and audience had to be discovered” (Rosenfeld 123). For Woolf, this quest for 
new forms of discourse required a reappraisal of many modernist novels’ fascination with mental 
privacy. Between the Acts shows that one alternative may be the dramatic, which, through its 
reliance on direct discourse, maintains distance between the minds of audience and actor, 
without attempting to intrude on the mental privacy of its characters. Refusing fascism means 
foregoing the impulse to access essential truths about another through knowledge of what should 
be mentally private, in Woolf’s case, as much as through knowledge of the body, in the case of 
the fascists and eugenicists who coextensively built national policy around the social meanings 
they believed were contained in genetic “types.” Between the Acts enacts this refusal by 
performing an undoing of the modernist novel, which points to the structural similarities between 
the desire for knowledge of others’ minds and the desire for power over others.  
Existing as a mind that the narrative refuses to probe—a mind that is conceived of as 
inaccessible and yet, still, a mind—Albert the “village idiot” provides the clearest example of the 
border between the narrative and the dramatic. By standing apart from Pointz Hall’s interpretive 
community and frustrating the interpretive processes that other characters undertake, Albert 
personifies the cripistemological pose to which the text itself ultimately arrives. For this reason, 
Albert might be read as an embodiment of Deleuze’s conceptual persona of the “idiot,” the figure 
who resides outside of a discursive community or disciplinary training and who is therefore able 
to most clearly reflect the logical truths that discursive conventions shield. Stengers claims in her 
																																								 																				
87 For context on Woolf’s responses to fascism, see the edited collection Virginia Woolf and Fascism: 
Resisting the Dictator’s Seduction, especially Merry Pawlowski’s introduction, “Virginia Woolf at the 
Crossroads of Feminism, Fascism, and Art.” 
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discussion of the Deleuzean idiot that he “is the one who always slows the others down, who 
resists the consensual way in which the situation is presented and in which emergencies mobilize 
thought or action” (994). For Deleuze, in other words, the idiot is the conceptual persona through 
which thinkers may renounce totalizing modes of thought, not through similarly totalizing 
rejections, but through a gradual slowing and undoing of assumptions. The Deleuzean idiot does 
not possess discursive or communal knowledge, but this fact is socially productive rather than 
tragic; his status as an outsider disrupts accepted truths and puts pressure on conventional modes 
of knowing.  
Albert’s gradual but persistent interruptions of the pageant slow and undo the collective 
processes of knowledge production and acquisition in which the pageant audience, or Pointz 
Hall’s community, are engaged. He exists as both a model of cripistemological aesthetics and 
also as a thought experiment about the kind of responses such an aesthetics might engender. The 
next section proposes that Albert the “village idiot” invites as well as performs Between the Acts’ 
cripistemological aesthetics. 
 
“Idiocy” in Between the Acts  
We might expect Woolf to have written extensively on the subject of idiocy given her 
interest in other forms of non-normative cognition, her own experience of mental difference, and 
the fact that her half-sister, Laura Stephen, was institutionalized in 1893 in the Earlswood 
Asylum for Idiots and Imbeciles, one of the earliest psychiatric hospitals in England.88 But, with 
the exception of Between the Acts, Woolf rarely touches on the subject of idiocy in her fiction, 
																																								 																				
88 See Hermione Lee, who provides the most extensive discussion to date of Laura’s role in the Stephen 
family in her biography of Woolf. More recently, Stuart Murray argues, “It seems clear that she [Laura] 
had some form of autism” (242). Murray also notes that while most biographies and critical accounts of 
Woolf skip over Laura, “Virginia lived in the same house as Laura for roughly the first ten years of her 
life, a fact that must have had consequences for her development during her childhood” (242). 
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essays, or personal writing. One important exception is an infamous 1915 diary entry, of which 
Janet Lyon provides a rich reading.89 In the diary entry, Woolf recollects a “long line of 
imbeciles” she encountered on a towpath near Kingston (Diary I 13).90 Woolf writes, “It was 
perfectly horrible. They should certainly be killed” (Diary I 13). This diary entry is heavy with 
eugenic rhetoric and strongly suggests that Woolf imagines idiocy to be a state of cognitive 
nullity. Lyon offers a convincing account of Woolf’s virtual silence on this subject elsewhere in 
her writing, arguing that for Woolf and other modernists, “mental deficiency” is coextensive 
with a state of “civil death” that “ought to have remained secret and private” (Lyon 553; 568).  
Apart from this 1915 diary entry, Woolf mentions idiocy only a handful of times, often in 
reference to her own feelings of social exclusion following various faux pas. Yet in these rare 
references to idiocy, Woolf associates the concept with total social isolation. In a 1940 diary 
entry, after meeting with an aging Ethel Smyth, a musical composer and suffragist, Woolf writes: 
She is now shut up quite alone in her old age—talks to herself, about herself. I felt 
this pathetic: also somehow ugly, humiliating; watching the old baby sucking its 
corals; compliments; the old story of her genius & its non-recognition. How 
hideous to be reduced to that kind of feeblemindedness—at 84. Something 
pitiable, unvenerable; not imbecile, but near it. (Diary V 249). 
There is no sympathy in this passage. Even in a year when Woolf was anxiously considering the 
implications of her own aging in other letters and diary entries, she finds the consequences of 
																																								 																				
89 Lyon observes that Woolf’s shock parallels Maisie Johnson’s when she notices Septimus Smith and 
other disabled figures in Mrs. Dalloway (Lyon 567-569). The shock of seeing or imagining idiocy in 
public, Lyon argues, “appears to produce for her [Woolf] an especially potent brand of trauma that must 
be managed through narrative emplotment, impersonal tone, and contextualization” (567). For this reason, 
following Mitchell and Snyder in Narrative Prosthesis, Lyon argues that intellectual disability is 
narratively instigating for Woolf. 
90 Childs also discusses this diary entry in terms of eugenics, arguing that Woolf and other modernists 
imported eugenic language through metaphor into their representations of non-biological cultural projects, 
thereby proliferating eugenic rhetoric and “wittingly or unwittingly” acting as agents of biopower (14). 
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Smyth’s aging to be “pathetic,” “ugly,” and “humiliating.” And here, alongside the language of 
mental deficiency (i.e., “feebleminded” and “imbecile”), Woolf describes Smyth as a 
fundamentally private, completely enclosed subject: she is above all else a being who is “shut up 
quite alone.”  
The “feebleminded” figure in this passage contrasts a persistent figure who appears 
elsewhere in Woolf’s writing: the private thinker gazing from a window, who appears, most 
notably, in To the Lighthouse (1927). At the end of the first section of To the Lighthouse, which 
is itself titled “The Window,” Mrs. Ramsay observes her husband as he observes her. They stand 
on opposite sides of a window: “And as she looked at him she began to smile, for though she had 
not said a word, he knew, of course he knew, that she loved him. He could not deny it. […] She 
had not said it: yet he knew” (141). The window serves as a metaphor for the processes by which 
connection between two physically distant subjects can still take place, which yield 
understanding and knowledge.91 But in Woolf’s 1940 diary entry, the “feebleminded” subject is 
“shut up” and “quite alone,” with no possibility of connection, even partial or temporary, with 
others. For Woolf, in other words, the window is absent in the case of idiocy.92  
Woolf’s tone in her 1940 diary entries indicates that her personal beliefs about 
intellectual disability had not changed significantly since the 1915 entry; instead, she continues 
to figure intellectual disability as a state of extreme enclosure, non-sociality, and non-
communication. If partial knowledge of others’ minds comes about via glimpses through the 
metaphoric window that simultaneously protects the private thinker from others’ intrusions and 
invites momentary connection, Woolf repeatedly implies that this possibility is absent in the case 
																																								 																				
91 Margaret Nussbaum argues that in this passage, “knowledge of another mind is attained” (732). 
92 Lyon discusses the poetry of Charlotte Mew, particularly a poem entitled “On the Asylum Road” 
(1916), which describes intellectually disabled subjects as people “whose windows—every pane— / Are 
made of darkly stained or clouded glass” (qtd. in Lyon 555). 
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of idiocy. 
 For Woolf, then, the figure of the idiot provides the occasion for thinking through 
language’s capacities. It allows her to imagine a form of being who experiences sensations and 
may translate those sensations into forms of self-signification, yet whose mind remains 
completely inaccessible to others. It is this form of being that Woolf dramatizes in her last novel 
by staging what happens to a community’s collective consciousness, and what happens to the 
modernist novel, when idiocy enters the scene.  
Although he is threaded throughout Between the Acts, almost no scholarship mentions the 
figure of the village idiot.93 Yet the fact that he bookends the pageant, performs within it, and 
serves as a subject of contemplation for several audience members suggests that Albert is 
integral to the novel’s structure and thematic material. Woolf contemplated writing a literary 
history as she composed Between the Acts.94 In one sense, Albert is an amalgamation of several 
figures in literary history: the Greek chorus, which bookends dramatic action; the jester or wise 
fool of Renaissance drama, who speaks difficult truths about a community to itself; and the 
modern idiot, who, in Woolf’s representation, is alternately negligible and threatening to 
community cohesion.95 By embedding each of these functions in Albert, Woolf establishes 
																																								 																				
93 One exception is Vicki Tromanhauser’s brief discussion of Albert in an article focused on the 
representation of animals in Between the Acts. Tromanhauser writes: “Giles targets the homosexual with 
the same sense of outraged humanity that causes one of the spectators, Mrs. Parker, to shrink from the 
leering and grimacing spectacle of Albert the ‘village idiot’ and to observe to Giles [more civilized]. In 
Mrs. Parker’s calculations, Albert the ‘idiot’ becomes the obscure background against which she 
measures her own humanity, the figure through whom she supports her claim to be ‘more civilized.’ […] 
In La Trobe’s pageant Albert takes his rightful place among the other actors, since, as William Dodge 
points out, “He’s in the tradition” of village life and cannot be repressed. […] The eugenical valence of 
Mrs. Parker’s ‘we’ is not lost upon Giles, who wishes to restrict her category still further according to a 
sacrificial balance in which the value of his own life is intensified to the degree that that of another is 
correspondingly reduced” (76). 
94 See John Whittier-Ferguson’s discussion of Woolf’s last projects (“Burden” 289). 
95 Foucault writes that the position of “the character of the Fool, Idiot, or Simpleton” in modern literature 
is, like the Greek chorus, fundamentally exterior to dramatic action: “[This character is] exterior to the 
action, and took centre stage as the harbinger of truth” (History of Madness 13). According to Jonathan 
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continuity among them, suggesting that modern understandings of idiocy draw from both literary 
and eugenic understandings of mental difference. But Albert does not serve the typical function 
of the wise fool: instead of commenting on the community as a collective entity so that it can 
understand itself, he fragments the community, making it less legible to itself. Whether he is 
tearing down the pageant placard; uttering words that withhold sense and meaning from the 
audience; displacing the audience’s attention from the performance; or disturbing activities of 
other performers, his presence upsets the continuity of the pageant’s performance.  
Through these actions, Albert embodies and inaugurates one of the gramophone’s weary 
pronouncements, “Dispersed are we,” which echoes throughout the text. It is important to note 
that for Woolf, this dispersal is not necessarily negative. While she advocated for a collective 
response to the threat of fascism in other writings, she also feared that a tightly unified 
community might replicate the oppressive totalitarianism she saw in fascism. If La Trobe 
“unites” the audience both physically and affectively through her staging of the pageant, Albert 
“disperses” the effects of this union, reasserting the distance between minds that Woolf explores 
in her earlier fiction.  
Albert first appears before the pageant begins, as Mrs. Swithin replaces the placard 
announcing the pageant performance: “The first had been blown down, or the village idiot, who 
always tore down what had been nailed up, had done it, and was chuckling over the placard 
under the shade of some hedge” (27). By removing the sign that invites neighboring villagers to 
Pointz Hall, Albert dismantles the rituals surrounding the Olivers’ annual pageant. Shortly after 
the pageant begins, Albert performs what amounts to his own scene, a monologue that consists 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
Bate, the early modern fool functions as an outside perspective on the social conventions of a particular 
community, providing unregulated commentary about its traditions and values. Bate writes that the fool 
“speaks the truth, whereas wise rhetoricians invert the truth. Only the fool is allowed to speak the truth 
without incurring displeasure” (27). 
	 111	
of a collection of gibberish, sexual innuendos, and references to children’s nursery rhymes:  
I know where the tit nests, he began 
In the hedgerow. I know, I know— 
What don’t I know?  
All your secrets, ladies, 
And yours too, gentleman…  
 
Hoppety, jiggety, Albert resumed.  
In at the window, out at the door, 
What does the little bird hear? (he whistled on his fingers.) 
And see! There’s a mouse…  
(he made as if chasing it through the grass) 
Now the clock strikes!  
(he stood erect, puffing out his cheeks as if he were blowing a dandelion clock) 
One, two, three, four… (85-86) 
Unlike the other players in the pageant, who transform into figures from history through colorful 
costumes that attract the attention of butterflies (62), Albert performs as himself during his 
monologue. “There was no need to dress him up,” the narrative voice notes. “There he came, 
acting his part to perfection” (86). The statement that he is not dressed up, suggesting that he is 
an accidental performer in the pageant, contradicts the statement that he is “acting his part to 
perfection.” This contradiction suggests that he is paradoxically performing and not performing, 
which points to Albert’s inscrutability for the audience.  
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When Albert is costumed, he appears as an animal.96 He beats “energetically” with a 
“wooden spoon a tray” to represent the sound of horses’ hooves and plays the “hindquarters of a 
donkey,” which grow startlingly “active” as the procession departs the stage (142; 171). 
“Intentional was it, or accidental?” the narrative voice wonders, before Albert-as-donkey is 
ultimately “captured” and escorted off stage (171). Shortly before the Interval, Albert 
“scamper[s] in and out” as the “Elizabethan age pass[es] from the scene” (94). These 
associations between Albert and animals connect him to the natural as opposed to the human 
world; indeed, obsolete definitions of the word “natural” refer to intellectual disability (OED). It 
also links, as does Charles Darwin in Descent of Man (1871), intellectual disability to animal 
life—a disruption of conventional understandings of species hierarchy, which Vicki 
Tromanhouser establishes is ambivalently coded in Between the Acts.97 
Albert’s presence in the pageant disturbs several audience members. Mrs. Elmhurst 
thinks of his performance, “It wasn’t nice. Suppose he suddenly did something dreadful? There 
he was pinching the Queen’s skirts. She half covered her eyes, in case he did do—something 
dreadful” (87). Mrs. Parker registers that she is disturbed by Albert’s presence, “deplor[ing] to 
Isa in a low voice the village idiot” (110). Mrs. Parker voices eugenic approaches to intellectual 
disability by invoking “civilization” to describe her discomfort at Albert’s presence: “‘But 
surely,’ said Mrs. Parker, and told Giles how creepy the idiot—‘We have one in our village’—
had made her feel. ‘Surely, Mr. Oliver, we’re more civilized?’” (111). This comment registers 
her belief that a properly civilized community would not accept intellectual disability into the 
public sphere but would instead institutionalize or separate intellectually disabled subjects from 
																																								 																				
96 For an exploration of the conceptual relations between animality and disability, see Sunaura Taylor’s 
Beasts of Burden: Animal and Disability Liberation. 
97 See also Steven A. Gelb’s expert reading of the links between intellectual disability and animal life in 
The Descent of Man. 
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public life. But William Dodge reads Albert as a stock character who is both innocuous and 
necessary for the structure of the pageant: “‘The idiot?’ William answered Mrs. Parker for [Isa]. 
‘He’s in the tradition’” (111). This brief exchange highlights how Albert floats between the 
discourse of the (modern) idiot and the (traditional) fool, signifying at once a threat to the 
community and the continuity of familiar tropes. 
 Similarly, as pageant attendees drift away from Pointz Hall and reflect on the meaning of 
the performance they have just witnessed, some mention Albert. “‘O my dear,’” one comments, 
“‘I thought it utter bosh. Did you understand the meaning? Well, [Reverend Streatfield] said she 
meant we all act our parts… He said, too, if I caught his meaning, Nature takes part… Then there 
was the idiot…’” (197). Another reflects, “‘No, I thought it much too scrappy. Take the idiot. 
Did she mean, so to speak, something hidden, the unconscious as they call it?’” (199). Here, 
idiocy is loosely linked to the “unconscious,” “something hidden,” or, in other words, the part of 
the mind that cannot be known to us. 
The text associates Albert with dispersion in two key ways. First, the provocative image 
of the “dandelion clock” during his monologue invokes reproduction and non-linear time” (86). 
A “dandelion clock” refers to a children’s game in which counting the number of puffs required 
to disperse a dandelion’s seeds from its stalk reveals what time it is.98 In the game, blowing loose 
the seeds of a dandelion becomes a measure for diurnal time. This image, like his monologue as 
a whole, rebuffs the “Outline of History” that the pageant purports to present. Rather than 
recounting history, or “telling time,” in a linear fashion, Albert’s dandelion clock points to role 
of chance in the unfolding of time. The image of a cloud of scattering dandelion seeds also 
suggests the chaotic diffusion of related parts. Like Pointz Hall’s visitors, who briefly cohere as 
																																								 																				
98 See, for instance, Juliana Horatio Ewing’s story “Dandelion Clocks,” published in 1887: “Every child 
knows how to tell the time by a dandelion clock. You blow till the seed is all blown away, and you count 
each of the puffs—an hour to a puff” (7). 
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an audience before “retreating, withdrawing and dispersing” as individuals at the end of the 
play” (201), Albert’s dandelion seeds trace a trajectory away from one another, hinting at 
separate futures after a moment of fleeting interconnection. 
At the same time, Albert’s monologue disperses the connections between language and 
meaning by withholding signification in his monologue. The monologue breaks down into a 
series of nonsense words (“Hoppety, jiggety”) and unrelated images. It is a form of sealed 
signification, the meaning of which exceeds the resources of language. For instance, when Albert 
interrupts his monologue with the exclamation, “Ah see! There’s a mouse,” the reader lacks the 
narrative mediation necessary to know what, if anything, these words index in the scene being 
described. There is no narrative mediation to guide the reader to knowledge about what is 
happening in the scene being represented. Albert appears to draw meaning from his monologue; 
he responds physically as he speaks, “whistl[ing] on his fingers” and “puffing out his cheeks.” 
But these phrases hint at a form of language imbued with only personal, or private, significance. 
The monologue is the closest Woolf comes to imagining Albert’s mind, which appears, through a 
cloud of direct discourse, to withhold meaning from the rest of the pageant community and from 
the reader. 
 Albert is also associated with dispersion insofar as he disconnects others from language 
at crucial points of communal meaning-making. At the end of the performance, The Reverend 
Streatfield stands before the bewildered audience to hesitantly offer his perspective on the 
pageant’s meaning: “‘I have been asking myself,’” he asks, “‘what meaning, or message, this 
pageant was meant to convey?’” (191). His question attempts the authority of summative power, 
but instead of explaining the pageant, he asks a series of questions that culminate in a tepid call 
to action: 
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“We act different parts; but are the same. That I leave to you. Then again, as the 
play or pageant proceeded, my attention was distracted. Perhaps that too was part 
of the producer’s intention? I thought I perceived that nature takes her part. Dare 
we, I asked myself, limit life to ourselves? May we not hold that there is a spirit 
that inspires, pervades…” (The swallows were sweeping round him. They seemed 
cognizant of his meaning. Then they swept out of sight.) “I leave that to you. I am 
not here to explain. That role has not been assigned me. I speak only as one of the 
audience, one of ourselves. I caught myself too reflected, as it happened in my 
own mirror…” (Laugher) “Scraps, orts and fragments! Surely, we should unite?” 
(192)  
The surrounding environment contributes to Streatfield’s tentativeness: the breeze interrupts him, 
and, later, the ominous overhead tones of “Twelve aeroplanes in perfect formation”—signaling 
impending military violence—cause him to hesitate (193). And his speech itself glitches, 
recapitulating, at the end, phrases Streatfield heard during the pageant. The explicative process in 
which Streatfield engages drifts into a rich sound collage, collectively produced by both human 
and non-human actors. Yet catching sight of Albert, who appears to pass around the collection 
box, halts these ruminations. Streatfield is overtaken by silence:  
Contemplating the idiot, Mr. Streatfield had lost the thread of his discourse. His 
command over words seemed gone. He twiddled the cross on his watchchain. 
Then his hand sought his trouser pocket. Surreptitiously he extracted a small 
silver box. It was plain to all that the natural desire of the natural man was 
overcoming him. He had no further use for words. (194) 
Seeing Albert temporarily disintegrates the sonic tapestry in which Streatfield participated. 
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Streatfield, with whom words rarely sit well anyway, does not seem to regret the end of his 
utterance—he has “no further use” for language. This passage questions the ability of language 
to index, express, or even imagine the most humdrum of human experiences: the “natural desire” 
for tobacco. It also registers an experience beyond the powers of language, one that does not call 
for, and in fact rejects, linguistic explanation. It invokes, and refuses to cross, a border between 
narratable and un-narratable experiences. This passage both thematically and formally decouples 
meaning from words. At the level of theme, Streatfield struggles to express “‘what meaning, or 
message, this pageant was meant to convey’”; at the level of form, his attempt is mocked by his 
awkward inarticulacy and the fact that he loses “the thread of his discourse.” As the impetus for 
this disconnection, Albert ends Streatfield’s search for a comprehensive claim about the 
pageant’s meaning.  
In a parallel passage, Giles’s persistent interior monologue dissolves just as Albert begins 
his pageant monologue: 
“I fear I am not in my perfect mind,” Giles muttered to the same tune. Words 
came to the surface—he remembered “a stricken deer in whose lean flank the 
world’s harsh scorn has struck its thorn […]. Exiled from its festival, the music 
turned ironical […]. A churchyard haunter at whom the owl hoots and the ivy 
mocks tap-tap-tapping on the pane […]. For they are dead, and I… I… I,” he 
repeated, forgetting the words, and glaring at his Aunt Lucy who sat craned 
forward, her mouth gaping, and her bony little hands clapping. What were they 
laughing at? At Albert, the village idiot, apparently. (85-86) 
Giles, like Streatfield, wrestles with the emptiness of words, which churn mechanically and 
inexpressively—almost obsessively—
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his discourse, “forgetting his words” when he notices, through Lucy’s shock, the start of Albert’s 
monologue. Giles’s repeated “I… I… I” suggests not only the emptying out of his linguistic 
resources, but also the state of isolation that this absence produces. Giles’s involuntary inner 
monologue tenuously connects him to others via the shared traditions of language; without it, 
“I”—the name of the self—is narratively and visually dissociated from people and words. Again, 
Albert is the impetus for this linguistic disintegration, startling Giles into a lack of language. 
 John Whittier-Ferguson and Julie Vandivere have argued that a fascination with the 
distance between meaning and language is threaded throughout Between the Acts and—more 
broadly—throughout Woolf’s late fiction. Woolf sums up this distrust of words to communicate 
in a 1940 diary entry, in which she wonders, “Has everything been said?” (Diary V 307). The 
fact that Between the Acts’ “village idiot” inaugurates this decoupling between language and 
meaning suggests that Woolf’s exhaustion with language coincides with an exhaustion with 
mental privacy as a subject of narrative language. Albert’s idiocy is figured as a subjectivity that 
pageant-goers, and the text itself, cannot imagine. This fully sealed subjectivity disallows the 
generative mystery of others’ thoughts that motivates Woolf’s earlier fiction. Woolf used idiocy 
to consider the barren aspects of mental privacy, which, without access to the expressivity of 
language to communicate to others, denies the formation of an audience and resists shared 
signification.  
 As a symbol of dispersion as well as of unsignifying language, Albert appears as the 
conceptual antithesis of La Trobe. As director, La Trobe desires collective participation in and 
reception of the pageant. La Trobe shapes her pageant so that the members of the audience learn 
to recognize themselves as a community with a collective history. She also attempts to create 
aesthetic situations that prompt a collective response. For example, as the national history of the 
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pageant unfolds into “‘Present time. Ourselves’” (177), La Trobe imagines the audience as 
“them,” a single entity that she might transfix through her art: “She wanted to expose them, as it 
were, to douche them, with present-time reality” (179). La Trobe’s mirror, despite its cracks, 
seeks to transform the audience into a transpersonal whole, which receives and then ironically 
rejects this shared vision through a fragmented collective consciousness: “Here a nose… There a 
skirt… Then trousers only… Now perhaps a face… Ourselves? But that’s cruel. To snap us as 
we are, before we’ve had to time assume…” (184). The audience, uniting in its assessment of La 
Trobe’s disconcerting scene, participates, as it does so, in a shared body that is recognizable via 
the distorted perspective offered by the mirror. Even if in the end La Trobe dubs the pageant a 
“failure,” the mirror represents the cohesion of understanding, even if it is temporary and 
imprecise, that she seeks (209). 
Several critics have argued that Between the Acts remains ambivalent about La Trobe’s 
attempts to orchestra a cohesive community, of which Woolf grew increasingly skeptical during 
fascism’s rise in Europe.99 At the same time, Between the Acts responds ironically to fascist 
ideology by imagining a cohesive and vulnerable national community. As an agent of dispersion, 
Albert balances La Trobe’s desire for control over her aesthetic production by dissolving 
Streatfield’s and Giles’s acts of interpretation. In this sense, Albert functions as a positive force 
by interrupting the possibility that the pageant might be collectively and uniformly 
comprehended.  
 It is difficult to read this continual distance from collective comprehension as entirely or 
																																								 																				
99 Esty argues, “the novel represents a group’s wish to avoid collective identity as a positive feature of its 
collective identity,” but he points out that “in the end [Woolf] wanted to find palatable ways to express 
her affinity for England and to assert the value of English traditions” (98; 86). Similarly, Marina MacKay 
argues that unlike the strongly pacifistic Three Guineas, Between the Acts demonstrates a “complicated 
patriotism” (18). This patriotism, as MacKay notes, is constantly undercut; even as the pageant performs a 
national and literary history, it exposes its own inadequacy as a performance and as a national narrative.  
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only positive, however. Melba Cuddy-Keane points out that while the pageant’s representation of 
English history is, in part, “threatening” because it “break[s] down the barriers of self-
protection,” it also “breaks down the barriers of isolation, creating what we might call a 
participatory community” (lxi). Albert is not incorporated fully into this participatory 
community: even as he “act[s] his part to perfection” (86), his thoughts and actions do not join in 
the narrative structure, reflections, questions, and interpretations from the audience that the 
performance is designed to invite. In Between the Acts, there is a different inflection on the 
purpose and significance of private thinking here than in Woolf’s earlier novels, in which private 
thinking invites and renews language. Here, rather than inspiring words, private thought 
withdraws from them. Mental privacy emerges as a state of social disconnection that isolates the 
thinker from a community. In Between the Acts, mental privacy threatens to divide minds from 
one another, interfering with access to shared language and meaning at a moment when feelings 
of community were desperately needed. 
 
Woolf and Private Language 
 So far, I have argued that Between the Acts figures idiocy as a cognitive state that both 
avoids social legibility and also threatens to disrupt the linguistic patterns by which people 
attempt to make their thoughts legible to others. The mind of Albert the “village idiot” short-
circuits Woolf’s typical narrative strategy of watching outside the minds of characters for partial 
glimpses of consciousness, acting instead as an example of a mind that fully resists and therefore 
undoes this focus on interiority. Here, I consider how Albert’s inaccessible interiority and 
deleterious effects on others’ linguistic capabilities recall the philosophical problem of private 
language, which concerned several contemporaneous philosophers, including Ludwig 
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Wittgenstein and Woolf’s friend Bertrand Russell. By exploring the relationship between idiocy 
and language, Between the Acts explores the possibility of an unsignifying language that cannot 
be reconnected to social meanings because it originates from a mind that is imagined to be itself 
indecipherable to others. 
Could Woolf have had in mind the possibility of private language as she traced the role of 
an idiot figure in the pageant play at Pointz Hall? If, for Woolf, idiocy represents unknowable 
cognition, it is a category of experience that puts pressure on the ability of language to imagine 
the minds of others. This understanding of idiocy as the experience of complete cognitive 
enclosure suggests that others cannot access, or even erroneously imagine, the cognitive 
experience of idiocy via participation in language; if this is the case, idiocy provokes a 
disjuncture between language and its ability to describe other minds. It is possible that for Woolf, 
the figure of the idiot provides the occasion for a thought experiment about the nature of 
language by allowing her to imagine a mind that experiences sensations and may translate those 
sensations into forms of self-contained signification, yet whose language remains detached from 
communal meaning-making. The illegibility of the mind from which this form of language 
originates makes that mind’s language likewise idiomatic and private. 
The concept of private language is usually attributed to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations (1953), in which Wittgenstein claims that private language “refer[s] 
to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So 
another person cannot understand this language” (89). Private language, in other words, is not 
simply “a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner 
experiences—his feelings, moods, and the rest—for his private use” (88); rather, is a form of 
peculiarly idiomatic symbols, the meanings of which do not extend beyond the individual. In 
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Philosophical Investigations, after proposing the concept of private language, Wittgenstein 
claims that such a language is impossible. This so-called language, according to Wittgenstein, 
would also be incomprehensible to its inventor because the inventor would be unable to ascertain 
meanings for the language’s signs (89-95). This is because words derive their meanings from 
public criteria; thus, the meanings of language are produced relationally, both through 
communities of individuals and through patterns of grammar. Disconnected from social 
meanings, private language does not function as language.100 In arguing against the possibility of 
private language, Wittgenstein refutes a common philosophical premise, which is that “there is 
only a contingent and not an essential connection between a sensation and its outward 
expression—an idea that appeals to us all” (Malcolm 531). In other words, Wittgenstein argues 
against other philosophers, notably Descartes, who claim that we guess at the contents of others’ 
minds while knowing with certainty only our own. For Wittgenstein, language emerges from 
shared biological and cultural histories: “Words are connected with the primitive, the natural 
expressions of the sensation and used in their place” (89). Rather than looking inward to explain 
one’s experiences, Wittgenstein claims that subjects learn how to recognize and explain their 
experiences from preexisting structures of language. 
Although Wittgenstein did not publish Philosophical Investigations until after Woolf’s 
death, Jan Dejnozka points out that Wittgenstein’s ideas on private language may have been 
inspired by Bertrand Russell, who considered the possibility of private language in seventeen 
separate arguments over the course of fifty-seven years (11).101 In these arguments, Russell takes 
																																								 																				
100 Wittgenstein’s statements on private language are notoriously opaque. This reading draws from 
Norman Malcolm’s review of Philosophical Investigations. 
101 Notable examples of scholarship on Woolf’s friendship with Russell include Ann Banfield’s argument 
that Woolf tests and contributes to the philosophical and aesthetic theories of Russell, G.E. Moore, and 
Roger Fry; Joanne A. Wood’s argument that Woolf demonstrates the neural monism of William James 
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a slightly different approach to private language than Wittgenstein by considering matters of 
degree. This is because, for Russell, while language has a “private ontology,” it is also “language 
itself which precisely enables us to go beyond private experience” (Green 100). Although Woolf 
and Wittgenstein both lived in England in the 1930s and had a number of mutual friends, notably 
John Maynard Keynes, it is more likely that Woolf’s point of departure for debates about private 
language was the arguments of Russell, given his integral involvement in Bloomsbury. 
Since the publication of Philosophical Investigations, philosophers considering the 
possibility of private language have imagined the existence of a “Robinson Crusoe” figure, who, 
fully isolated from society, still developed a form of language that transmits meaning only to 
himself.102 This Crusoe figure emerged in some of the earliest philosophical studies of 
intellectual disability, which often approached complete social isolation and intellectual 
disability as related experiences. For example, at the turn of the nineteenth century, the French 
physician Jean Marc Gaspard Itard began studying a so-called “feral child,” Victor of Aveyron, 
and attempted to teach him language. Victor was “discovered in southern France, and scholars in 
Paris were anxious to examine him in the belief that the boy approximated ‘man in the state of 
nature’. Thus, basic philosophical questions about human learning and development prominent 
in French Englightenment thinking of the day could be systematically studied” (Braddock and 
Parish 29). Itard’s largely unsuccessful attempts to teach Victor prompted his successor, Édourd 
Séguin, to “invent a pedagogy designed for mentally retarded children,” the first of its kind 
(Braddock and Parish 30).103 This example shows that questions of disconnection from society, 
emblematized in the figure of Crusoe, manifested in studies of intellectual disability since it 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
and Russell; and Timothy Mackin’s argument that To the Lighthouse critiques Russell’s epistemology 
through a version of realism that emphasizes emotion, experience, and subjectivity. 
102 In particular, Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. 
103 In fact, Victor of Aveyron may not have been intellectually disabled but rather deaf, as Braddock and 
Parish report. 
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emerged as a philosophical concern. Idiocy, when it is imagined as a state of cognitive 
disconnection from others, exists as an unknowable mind and a state of ontological separation 
from others.104 
Disability theorist and artist Mel Baggs advocates for a different understanding of private 
language. In her video piece “In My Language,” she argues for the possibility of a form that is 
private yet still meaningful to its inventor. In the video, after a series of shots in which Baggs 
interacts with various objects in what appears to be her home, Baggs states, 
The previous part of this video was in my native language. Many people have 
assumed that when I talk about this being my language that means that each part 
of the video must have a particular symbolic message within it designed for the 
human mind to interpret. But my language is not about designing words or even 
visual symbols for people to interpret. It is about being in a constant conversation 
with every aspect of my environment. Reacting physically to all parts of my 
surroundings. […] I find it very interesting by the way that failure to learn your 
language is seen as a deficit but failure to learn my language is seen as so natural 
that people like me are officially described as mysterious and puzzling rather than 
anyone admitting that it is themselves who are confused, not autistic people or 
other cognitive disabled people who are inherently confusing. (n.p.) 
Baggs explains her theory of language as one not based on networks of symbols but rather a way 
of interacting with her environment. As Baggs states elsewhere in the video, this form of 
language, although sometimes interpreted as antisocial, is in fact radically relational in that 
provides a method for attending to objects that might otherwise be overlooked. Baggs suggests 
																																								 																				
104 See also Licia Carlson’s overview of the function of intellectually disabled figures in contemporary 
philosophy, The Faces of Intellectual Disability. 
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here that it is not only the responsibility of the individual to interact with public forms of 
language but also the responsibility of a community to expand the public meanings of language 
to include non-normative experiences, including experiences of disability.  
Between the Acts, a novel concerned with breakdowns of language, wonders what 
language does: if it serves the same functions to us as to others, or if the words we have to 
explain our experiences are meaningless, unsignifying to the people who encounter them. For 
Whittier-Ferguson, “Woolf’s late fiction […] brings us often to this point where we see her 
working with the minima of language, all that was discarded or spectacularly repurposed by high 
modernism […]. The miracles of this work of Woolf’s occur […] at points where she forces us to 
consider the ordinary and the unredeemed, the repetitive, the banal, the common bits and pieces 
of the languaged world” (“Repetition” 248). It is in these hesitations about language’s capacity to 
produce new meanings, or perhaps meaning that extends beyond the self at all, that Between the 
Acts reflects the potential loneliness of throwing language out into the world. Woolf also 
considers this loneliness in “Thoughts on Peace in an Air Raid”: 
At last all the guns have stopped firing. All the searchlights have been 
extinguished. The natural darkness of a summer’s night returns. The innocent 
sounds of the country are heard again. An apple thuds to the ground. An owl 
hoots, winging its way from tree to tree. And some half-forgotten words of an old 
English writer come to mind: “The huntsmen are up in America…” Let us send 
these fragmentary notes to the huntsmen who are up in America, to the men and 
women whose sleep has not yet been broken by machine-gun fire, in the belief 
that they will rethink them generously and charitably, perhaps shape them into 
something serviceable. And now, in the shadowed half of the world, to sleep. 
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(148) 
In this passage, Woolf calls for American troops to join in the war. The appeal comes to mind in 
the form of “some half-forgotten words,” which allude to but do not specify Woolf’s implied 
desire. This scrap of language dissolves in hesitant ellipses and the subjunctive possibility of 
“belief.” Woolf did not know if these words, which she recycles from “an old English writer,” 
were successful in their purpose; she died before the U.S. military entered the Second World 
War. What forms of language are necessary for persuasion or for more nuanced meanings, if in 
fact any exist, are open questions here and, perhaps, also in Between the Acts. 
 If Woolf’s last novel plays with the possibility of private language, language that does 
not signify outwards to others, the concept of idiocy accentuates these questions. Idiocy 
represents to Woolf a mind that is sealed from the capacity of language to make personal 
meanings, even partially and fleetingly, public. From this perspective, idiocy raises questions 
about the possibility of beings who experience sensations, execute cognition, and participate in 
history without articulating what they experience in language that bears meaning for others. 
 
Conclusion 
In Between the Acts, thinking through idiocy challenges Woolf’s earlier fascination with 
individual characters’ interiorities. Exploring the limits of mental privacy as the impetus for 
narrative representation, which Woolf undertakes through the concept of idiocy, puts pressure on 
the aesthetic principles that energize her earlier fiction. Moreover, in Between the Acts, idiocy 
provokes an alternative aesthetics, which is cripistemological and non-totalizing because it 
bounds its desire for knowledge of others. This aesthetics is premised on distance from the 
subjects of representation rather than the incursion of mental privacy. This shift in Woolf’s 
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aesthetics in her last novel suggests that the figure of the idiot offers a conceptual figure through 
which to explore and question some of modernism’s core aesthetic values, including attention to 
the richness of individual consciousness, the relationship between privacy and sociality, and the 
enigmatic territory of others’ minds as narrative stimuli.  
 Idiocy complicates the aesthetic project of representing the minds of others, which 
animates Woolf’s earlier fiction and modernist fiction more broadly. Because idiocy is imagined 
to be an extreme form of mental privacy to which narratives can rarely gain access, it forecloses 
the possibility of attempting to perforate or even imagine the private experiences of others 
through narrative strategies. I have also argued that for Woolf, the threat of fascism necessitates 
a reevaluation of modernist aesthetics. Between the Acts examines the aesthetic premises of 
modernism in order to expose and reject the ways in which they resemble fascism, and it 
concludes by pulling away from attempts at access to the concealed recesses of individuals’ 
mental privacy. The modernist novel’s interest in accessing a truth about the other through the 
mind, Woolf suggests, recalls fascism’s interest in seeking a truth about the other through the 
body. By contrast, an anti-fascist discourse would preserve the mystery of the self by retreating 
from interrogations of mental privacy. 
At the same time, through its figuration and treatment of idiocy, Between the Acts 
performs a “subconscious Hitlerism” (Woolf “Thoughts” 147). Woolf assumes, as her diary 
entries confirm, that idiocy is the absence of mind. This assumption makes the figure of the idiot 
a productive conceptual device for imagining an aesthetics that fully denies access to the minds 
of characters. At the same time, this approach to idiocy reproduces eugenic assumptions by 
positing the mind of the intellectually disabled subject as a state of cognitive nullity. The figure 
of the idiot is never an ethically neutral conceptual figure, particularly in the late 1930s, when 
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Nazi officials began ordering the mass extermination of all mentally ill and “feebleminded” 
subjects. While Woolf’s “village idiot” functions in many ways as a flat character—as the most 
extreme form of mental privacy, as the literary descendent of the Shakespearean fool, or as the 
interruption of collective and totalizing responses and desires—the assumptions that undergird 
his representation can also be read as proliferating and perpetuating eugenic logic.  
 One of the ironies of Between the Acts, then, is that its method of resisting fascism by 
reassessing mental privacy through the figure of the idiot necessitates incorporating fascism’s 
conviction that idiocy is cognitive absence. Woolf addresses the close relationship between 
violence and incorporation in one of the most frequently cited images in Between the Acts. 
During the Interval, Giles encounters a “monstrous inversion”—a snake “choked with a toad in 
its mouth” (99). Noticing how “The snake was unable to swallow, the toad was unable to die,” 
Giles smashes both creatures with his shoe (99). While this image is often read as evidence of 
Giles’s latent cruelty, or as a symbol of the dangers of unity, it also demonstrates how any act of 
resistance involves a degree of intimacy with the enemy. Such acts may, in turn, blur the line 
between self and other to such an extent that the two combine and become indistinguishable. 
Woolf shows that to fight against something always means to risk incorporating aspects of the 
enemy. The blood stains that mark Giles’s violence—crushing the snake and toad beneath his 
foot—further attest to the impossibility of resisting without altering one’s self (107; 111). In 
fighting the logic of fascism, Between the Acts paradoxically extends some aspects of this same 
logic through its figuration of idiocy. 
 While the figure of the idiot calls for an aesthetics that diverges from modernism’s 
fascination with the territory of private thoughts, it also echoes the eugenic construction of 
feeblemindedness as a form of cognitive privation that threatens the continuity of the 
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community. Between the Acts explores both aspects of idiocy, and, in doing so, it imagines new 
futures for the modernist novel. As a conceptual device and as a confirmation of Britain’s 
complex relationship to eugenics and fascism, idiocy challenges the ingredients of modernism. 
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Chapter 3: Information, Ignorance, and Ways of Reading Samuel Beckett 
In the previous chapter, I traced how Virginia Woolf’s Between the Acts points 
ambiguously to structures of exclusion that might emerge when collective intelligence is 
imagined to be a binding agent for imagined communities. This chapter explores a related 
question: what is lost when a culture selects intelligence as a core determinant of social worth? In 
other words, if intelligence is championed above other cognitive features, what forms of 
neurodiversity are inhibited? I approach these questions by addressing how they became layered 
with concerns about the relationship between organic (human) intelligence and artificial 
(machine) intelligence during and in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. In 
Allied nations, wartime brought with it a flurry of research into the relationship between 
neurology, information theory, and cybernetics.105 For the first time, the capacity for “thinking 
machines” to overtake the human mind in terms of information processing, memory, 
mathematical reasoning, and other cognitive abilities became not an abstract anxiety but an 
immanent reality. This cultural atmosphere, I suggest, brought with it new interest in 
understanding ignorance not as a derogatory term—denoting an undesirable frame of mind or a 
disinterest in understanding others’ lives—but rather as a fundamental aspect of human 
experience. 
Samuel Beckett’s oeuvre turns normativity on its head, so it is unsurprising that his 
wartime and postwar writings urgently participate in these questions of whether and how to 
reassess the potential social benefits of ignorance. In his corpus, “Conventional definitions of 
insanity no longer apply, as Beckett offers an inversion of the general perception of madness, 
illustrating that sanity and insanity are no polar opposites and that madness is not necessarily a 
negative state of mind” (White 5). Similarly, Beckett revalues ignorance as a cognitive 
																																								 																				
105 See Robert R. Kline, The Cybernetics Moment; Or, Why We Call Our Age the Information Age. 
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experience that does not necessarily indicate worthlessness, piteousness, or close-mindedness. 
My claim is that Beckett explores the affordances of ignorance by creating conditions for an 
unconventional mode of textual engagement I term “ignorant reading.” Beckett’s prose requests 
that readers become comfortable with feeling ignorant, and in doing so, it suggests an ethics for 
how to approach and interact with difference. Beckett’s writing thus champions ignorance as a 
potentially—though not necessarily—ethical position through which to engage with others by 
figuring it as a mode of interacting with the world that preserves the radical alterity of difference 
rather than arresting or subsuming newly acquired knowledge into preexisting frameworks. 
Beckett’s prose approaches ignorance by inviting readers to inhabit a matrix of feelings 
associated with intellectual debility, among them confusion, delayed understanding, and non-
comprehension. Following Jasbir Puar, I use the term intellectual debility to refer to a broad 
range of incapacitated cognitive experiences, including confusion, inattention, and non-
comprehension. Puar uses the heuristic of “debility” and “capacity” to examine the limitations 
and possibilities of embodiment.106 Within this framework, “debility” is an expansive category 
that refers to a range of ways that a subject might experience the limitations of embodiment, 
which include temporary or terminal illness, tiredness, toxicity, effects from climate change, and 
economic status. By contrast, in this chapter, I use the term intellectual disability to refer to 
subjects who identify or are identified as intellectually disabled. This distinction between debility 
and disability is important because I am not arguing that reading Beckett’s prose grants readers 
access to the experiences of intellectually disabled people. Rather, I contend that Beckett’s 
narrative strategies frustrate, decelerate, or otherwise debilitate reading as a process of acquiring 
knowledge about fictional worlds. These narrative strategies encourage us to linger in—rather 
than to repress or escape—feelings of incapacity, which, as Beckett’s characters reflect, are 
																																								 																				
106 See, for example, Puar’s “Prognosis Time: Towards a Geopolitics of Affect, Debility, and Capacity.” 
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unavoidable aspects of embodied experience.  
Beckett’s narrative strategies work against the notion that human intelligence can or 
should be enhanced to match the complexities of artificial intelligence, which were already 
coming into being in the midcentury, and thereby refuse to glorify cognitive styles that 
participate in efficient and intricate patterns of information processing. In doing so, Beckett’s 
texts opt out of what Robert McRuer argues is the logic of “compulsory able-bodiedness” (and 
able-mindedness), which is “the [assumption that] able-bodied identities, able-bodied 
perspectives, are preferable and what we all, collectively, are aiming for” (Crip Theory 372). By 
creating opportunities for feelings of ignorance, Beckett’s texts illustrate what debilitated 
cognitive experiences offer as a way to relate and respond to information about the world. 
Information theory tells us that information is the resolution of uncertainty. In 
information theory, “signal” refers to planned information while “noise” refers to random 
information. Both signals and noise are forms of information, but signals contribute to 
communication whereas noise interrupts order and meaning.107 Beckett’s narrative strategies 
both interrupt and withhold signal patterns and also make room for noise. By refusing to reduce 
the way that the world appears into familiar and consumable patterns of information, Beckett’s 
narrative strategies delay or aggravate what many cognitivist literary scholars suggest are the 
primary activities of reading narratives: locating, sorting, and inferring information about 
fictional worlds.108 Instead, Beckett’s narrative strategies preserve uncertainty: the moment 
before perceptual data becomes visible as information as it is sorted into the categories of 
																																								 																				
107 See James Gleick’s overview of the history of information theory (204-268). 
108 Many cognitive approaches to literature suggest that reading fiction is a cognitive process that involves 
locating, sorting, and inferring information about fictional worlds, as well as filling in narrative gaps with 
information that readers may possess from other contexts. For example, Bernaerts et al. describe reading 
as a form of “information processing” that entails both encountering textual evidence and supplementing 
this evidence with knowledge from other contexts (8). 
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“signal” and “noise.” In doing so, these narrative strategies encourage readers to participate in a 
practice of ignorant reading, in which readers defer the cognitive practices of converting 
observations into information and instead linger in feelings of ignorance. This practice can be 
understood as an ethical maneuver that attempts to preserve the noise of difference rather than 
reduce the complexities of the world into coherent, familiar, and stable signals. 
By encouraging rather than concealing or rejecting feelings of ignorance, Beckett’s texts 
remind us that although it is sometimes equated with social or ethical worthlessness, ignorance 
does not have an innate moral value. Rather, to be ignorant is simply to be “destitute of 
knowledge, either in general or with respect to a particular fact or subject; unknowing, 
uninformed, unlearned” (OED). Beckett’s prose leaves us “destitute of knowledge,” both in 
terms of what his prose might mean and—as one 1936 reader indicates—how and why we might 
read it: “How, in short, is he to be read, and what is the advantage of reading him?” (qtd. in 
Carver 147). In doing so, it encourages readers to become acquainted with the experience of not 
knowing how to maneuver signals or sort through patterns of meaning. 
My argument is that Beckett takes up common assumptions about intellectual debility as 
a state of cognitive slowness or mindlessness and recasts these assumptions in a positive light.109 
As Beckett composed his major novels, people with intellectual disabilities were segregated, 
confined, and imperiled in fascist Germany, as well as in Ireland and Great Britain, because of 
sinister beliefs about intellectual disability as a state of incurable ignorance that would denigrate 
																																								 																				
109 For a fuller discussion of the discursive relationship between slowness and intellectual disability, see 
Claire Barber-Stetson, “Slow Processing: A Minor Literature by Autists and Modernists.” She points out: 
“The adjective ‘slow’ carries a negative connotation associated with intellectual disability, which is 
particularly relevant in the context of disability studies. As a noun and a verb, ‘retard’ is synonymous 
with ‘delay,’ and both suggest physical and cognitive movement that progresses toward a specific goal 
more slowly than our society considers normal. Such behavior bears a cultural stigma that marks it as 
rude and undesirable, in need of eradication or amelioration. However, the recent emergence of 
movements like ‘Slow Food’ and ‘Slow Reading’ threatens the automatic cultural equation of ‘slow’ with 
‘bad’” (147). 
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a nation’s intelligence.110 Yet Beckett’s prose suggests that certain forms of ignorance are 
socially productive and may even be politically necessary. Beckett frames ignorance as a 
potential alternative to what Virginia Woolf notes in Mrs. Dalloway (1925) are the twin impulses 
of power: the erasure of difference and the demand of self-replication.111 Ignorance is a cognitive 
experience that resists these impulses because it is a position from which information is not (or 
cannot) be assimilated into a preexisting framework of perception. As such, experiences of 
intellectual debility offer the potential for productive escapes from the lures of information 
acquisition and rationality—the latter of which, as many critics have noted, is indicted 
throughout much of Beckett’s oeuvre.112 In other words, if our cognitive styles inform and shape 
how we experience our lived realities, Beckett’s prose asks readers to try on a cognitive style that 
frustrates or extinguishes the possibility of assimilating disorder into order for the purpose of 
cultivating a non-violent mode of engaging with the world.113 
My argument uses as one of its premises Vicki Mahaffey’s claim that “difficult” 
																																								 																				
110 Tobin Siebers summarizes the matrix of positive and negative eugenic policies that affected disabled 
people in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Europe and the United States: “The aesthetic 
disqualification of disabled people has remained remarkably consistent over time, linking the emergence 
of eugenics in the late nineteenth century and its applications in Great Britain, the United States, and Nazi 
Germany to unproductive and inaccurate stereotypes causally expressed today in discussions about health 
care, civil rights, neonatal testing, euthanasia, wrongful birth, reproductive care, assisted suicide, abortion, 
and quality of life” (“Aesthetics of Human Disqualification” 39). 
111 In Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf links proportion and conversation, which she casts as twin goddesses. While 
Proportion limits difference by “seclud[ing] [England’s] lunatics, for[biding] childbirth, penalis[ing] 
despair, and ma[king] it impossible for the unfit to propagate their views,” Conversion, Woolf notes, is 
“in the heat and sands of India, the mud and swap of Africa, the purlieus of London, wherever in short the 
climate or the devil tempts men to fall from the true belief which is her own—is even now engaged in 
dashing down shrines, smashing idols, and setting up in their place her own stern countenance” (97). This 
passage aligns the suppression of difference with the desire for self-replication, a pairing that I suggest 
Beckett also models. 
112 For example, of Watt, John Mood argues, “Beckett was constructing an apparently hyperrational man 
in the face of an irrational world. Watt is his most devastating depiction of the cul-de-sac of modern 
Western rationalistic philosophy” (255). 
113 Anita Silvers and Leslie Pickering Francis conceptualize intellectual disability as a cognitive style, 
suggesting that such a framework avoids the implicit binary, which suggests a subject has “all” or “no” 
cognitive ability, in formulations of intellectual disability and intellectual ability. 
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modernism such as Beckett’s is ultimately “pedagogical” as well as ethical (vii). In Modernist 
Literature: Challenging Fictions, Mahaffey examines “the possible social implications of 
interpretive (or readerly) passivity” (5), pointing out that “[i]f ethical action is only possible as 
the result of a deliberate, thoughtful choice between fully imagined alternatives, then a literature 
that confronts us with more difficult interpretive challenges offers a socially relevant discipline” 
(7). Mahaffey suggests, in other words, that difficult modernism trains the mind for ethical action 
by necessitating that readers actively evaluate and interpret complex situations rather than rely 
on the authoritative voice of an author or omniscient narrator to guide them through narratives. 
This chapter builds on Mahaffey’s claim in arguing that Beckett’s “difficult” narrative strategies 
prepare readers for ethical action by unsettling conventional forms of interpretive engagement. 
My reading of Beckett highlights how these conventional forms of interpretive engagement 
include not only passivity, but also replication—that is, the unreflective assimilation of new 
information into extant cognitive schemas. Unreflective assimilation takes the form of thoughts 
such as, “I’ve seen this before; I don’t need to examine it further” or “She must be that kind of 
person.” Thoughts such as these reflect a style of cognitive engagement that closes down the 
possibility of engaging with a percept on its own terms by assuming instead that it is a copy or 
another in a set of percepts with which one has already engaged. Replicative thinking, in other 
words, assumes that new sensory perceptions can be arranged into familiar categories of 
understanding rather than explored on their own terms. 
Through its invitation to experiences of ignorance, the difficulty of Beckett’s prose 
frustrates replicative thinking’s dispassionate style of information gathering and sorting. Like 
Watt, readers are often unpracticed in the art of accepting sensory data “for what they perhaps 
were, the simple games that time plays with space” (75), but Beckett’s prose attempts to train us 
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in the art of attentive acceptance that his characters typically reject. In this way, Beckett alerts us 
to the confluence between the concept of “mindlessness,” a state of presumed ignorance in which 
thought is rendered inactive, and the concept of “mindfulness,” a state of mental stillness and 
awareness available through deep attention. These comparable cognitive states, Beckett suggests, 
prepare us for deeper engagement with the world by inviting us to pause routinized patterns of 
thought; therefore, they pave the way for adopting previously unavailable perceptual standpoints 
from which to understand and interact with difference. 
Before turning to this chapter’s central analyses, it is worth explicitly acknowledging the 
ubiquity of debility within Beckett’s oeuvre. It may be no exaggeration to assert that every 
character in Beckett is in some way debilitated and, in many cases, physically or mentally 
impaired. To give only a few examples: Murphy is frequently described by critics as having 
psychotic tendencies; Nell’s and Nagg’s leglessness and confinement to dustbins shows that they 
experience immobility at the levels of embodiment as well as environment; and Mouth and the 
Unnamable exist as portions of bodies.114 Beckett’s attention to debility reconfigures 
conventional understandings of normality and abnormality by challenging the claim that 
incapacity and illness are exceptional embodied states. It also creates a “sensory poetics,” to use 
Amanda Dennis’s phrase, that embraces the inevitable faultiness of the body as a source of 
humor while celebrating the “explor[ation] and expan[sion of] the category of the meaningful” 
(103). At another level, we might notice how this pervasiveness of debility in Beckett asserts the 
cultural value of debility by calling us to notice and align ourselves with representations of 
debilitated subjects. Beckett’s perpetual returns to debility reinforce my claim that his texts work 
to reverse the notion that debility—and, in particular, the potentially debilitated state of 
intellectual disability—represents what David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder call “the master trope 
																																								 																				
114 Murphy (1938), Endgame (1957), Not I (1972), and The Unnamable (1953). 
	 136	
of human disqualification” (24). Instead, Beckett positions cognitive experiences of ignorance 
(and, by extension, intellectual debility) as potentially valuable. 
This chapter is organized into three sections. First, I clarify the connection I draw 
between affect and intellect, and, in doing so, link what I suggest is a palette of feelings 
commonly associated with ignorance to the moment in and around the Second World War. Next, 
I move to readings of Watt and then Molloy. While Molloy is typically considered within the 
context of The Trilogy as a whole, I claim that Watt and Molloy, written within a few years of 
one another, are more centrally concerned with the relationship between ignorance and 
information than are Malone Dies and The Unnamable. In Watt, the titular character hunts 
continuously for information about his environment, gnawing at uncertainty in repetitive 
sentences that Daniel Albright describes as “arithmetical, pre-compositional strategies, as if a 
computer had been given a list of intransitive verbs and body-describing adjectives and told to 
generate characters by means of word lists” (4). Yet the novel illustrates how Watt’s obsessive 
efforts to gather, sort, and assimilate information about the situations he encounters cloud rather 
than clarify the knowledge he seeks about his environment, other people, and his place in the 
world.  
Molloy, like Watt, stages a failed process of information gathering. In the second part of 
Molloy, a detective, Jacques Moran, attempts to apprehend a suspect; however, his pursuit is 
frustrated because he gradually imitates his suspect’s behavior to such a degree that seeker and 
suspect become indistinguishable. Molloy thus mocks Moran’s attempt to apprehend his subject, 
suggesting that such attempts may result only in replication rather than transformation. The 
words apprehend and comprehend share a Latin root, prehend (or prehens), which refers to the 
practice of seizing, grasping hold of, or holding onto (OED). The same root appears, for instance, 
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in the term prehensile. Beckett’s detective story, which correlates apprehension and 
comprehension, points to this shared root and its implications of force and control, captured in 
the image of a hand seizing, a hand grabbing onto something. Apprehension and comprehension, 
the text suggests, are parallel processes of possession that dissolve the distance between self and 
other, knower and object of knowledge. Moving away from the cognitive practice of 
comprehension involves releasing the desire to control information and instead remaining 
suspended in ignorance. 
Like Watt and Moran, readers of Watt and Molloy are likely to find that gathering 
information about Beckett’s fictional worlds becomes secondary; instead, reading these texts is a 
primarily affective activity in which feelings of ignorance are prioritized over processes of 
information gathering. In the sections that follow, I explore both how we might describe ignorant 
feelings and what it might mean to feel ignorant during the process of reading. I propose that 
Watt and Molloy celebrate partial or non-comprehension and embrace delayed understanding at 
the levels of both theme and form, encouraging readers to experience feelings of ignorance in 
order to resist, contra the characters Watt and Moran, information processing as a mode of social 
and political engagement. 
 
Feeling Ignorant 
My argument that the narrative strategies of Watt and Molloy encourage readers to feel 
ignorant relies upon the premise that affect and ignorance are closely coupled—particularly, as I 
establish in this section, in and around the Second World War. I first link recent critical attention 
to the conditions and affects of late modernism to what I see as a cluster of feelings associated 
with experiences of intellectual debility. Because intellect and affect are often (misleadingly) 
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opposed to one another, it may seem strange to suggest that intellectual debility is its own 
affective experience. But here, I highlight what we might regard, following Sianne Ngai, as a 
cluster of “ugly feelings”—including confusion, delayed understanding, and non-
comprehension—and suggest that these feelings frequently correspond to experiences of 
intellectual debility in Beckett.115  
To be clear, I am not arguing that ignorance is necessarily or only an ethical position 
from which to relate to others. In fact, as authors of the edited collection Race and 
Epistemologies of Ignorance point out, ignorance is often a violent cognitive position insofar as 
it divests subjects of responsibility for their actions and beliefs: when one does not know 
something is wrong, one cannot be bound to act against it. For example, critical race theorist 
Charles W. Mills identifies a mode of ignorance, generated and sustained on a “social-structural” 
level, in which “white racism and/or white racial domination” act out “crucial causal role[s]” 
(20). Mills’s point is that ignorance, chosen or not, is a necessary epistemic criterion for 
perpetuating structures of racial inequality. Yet as he sets up his argument, Mills claims that he 
examines only one “particularly pervasive—though hardly theorized form of ignorance” [italics 
mine] (15). Mills, in other words, acknowledges that ignorance emerges in multiple guises, each 
of which is available to qualitative differentiation.   
Mills’s allusion to ignorance’s multiple forms recalls Eve Sedgwick’s approach to the 
term. In Epistemology of the Closet, Sedgwick works against “the scornful, fearful, or 
patheticizing reification of ‘ignorance,’” which she argues “goes with the unexamined 
Enlightenment assumptions by which the labeling of a particular force as ‘ignorance’ seems to 
																																								 																				
115 Ngai’s project examines the aesthetics of negative emotions, a category of feeling that she suggests has 
been overlooked in aesthetic theory. According to Ngai, this may be because ugly feelings are “explicitly 
amoral and noncathartic, offering no satisfactions of virtue, however oblique, nor any therapeutic or 
purifying release” (6). Ugly feelings, in other words, are “weaker and nastier” than the affects typically 
explored within aesthetic theory (6). 
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place it unappealably in a demonized space on a never quite explicit ethical schema” (7). 
Sedgwick’s point is that the vilification of ignorance relies on the questionable premise that 
knowledge is necessarily good and ignorance is necessarily evil; this premise conceals its 
ideological underpinnings—which she links to the Enlightenment fascination with discovering 
and clarifying the exotic and strange—by failing to address the related question, “Knowledge or 
ignorance of what?” To address this problem, Sedgwick proposes the following: 
Rather than sacrifice the notion of “ignorance,” then, I would be more interested 
at this point in trying, as we are getting used to trying with “knowledge,” to 
pluralize and specify it. […] If ignorance is not—as it evidently is not—a single 
Manichaean, aboriginal maw of darkness from which the heroics of human 
cognition can occasionally wrestle facts, insights, freedoms, progress, perhaps 
there exists instead a plethora of ignorances, and we may begin to ask questions 
about the labor, erotics, and economics of their human production and 
distribution. Insofar as ignorance is ignorance of a knowledge—a knowledge that 
may itself, it goes without saying, be seen as either true or false under some other 
regime of truth—these ignorances, far from being pieces of the originary dark, are 
produced by and correspond to particular knowledges and circulate as part of 
particular regimes of truth. (8) 
Here, Sedgwick establishes that ignorance, like knowledge, always operates in relation to a 
particular “regime of truth”—ignorance, that is, only bears ethical meaning in relation to 
particular forms of knowledge. For this reason, Sedgwick suggests that there is a “plethora of 
ignorances,” each of which acts within particular contexts for what and how things should be 
known. While ignorance may certainly be a complicit or ethically compromised position from 
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which subjects shield themselves from the difficulties of accountability and obligation, it may 
also be an epistemic experience through which one opts out of problematic schemas that equate 
human cognition with knowledge acquisition.  
Feeling ignorant involves experiencing temporal suspension, or the sense that the 
information or meaning being sought is temporarily or perhaps permanently beyond the thinker’s 
cognitive capacity. This feeling of suspension corresponds to the affect of anxiety that numerous 
critics have suggested became increasingly heightened in the anticipatory years preceding the 
outbreak of the Second World War, as well as during the heightened nervousness of wartime 
itself. Beckett wrote Watt and Molloy in a literary-historical period some scholars refer to as “late 
modernism,” roughly corresponding to the years between the early 1930s and the late 1940s. A 
growing body of scholarship has highlighted how the cultural, political, and aesthetic concerns of 
late modernism challenge some of modernist studies’ dominant narratives. Late modernism, 
unlike the so-called high modernist moment of the 1910s and 20s, is frequently characterized in 
terms of resignation (rather than resistance) and reiteration (rather than innovation). In particular, 
scholars have suggested that the anticipation, event, and aftermath of the Second World War 
activated a very different form of modernism than did the previous generation’s Great War. For 
example, Jed Esty argues that unlike their predecessors—who tended to register skepticism at 
discourses emphasizing national particularity and insularity—late modernists often celebrate 
national culture, “absorb[ing] the potential energy of a contracting British state and convert[ing] 
it into the language not of aesthetic decline but of cultural revival” (8). Similarly, Marina 
MacKay argues that Britain’s “newly minor” status and sense of national vulnerability informs 
the literature of the Second World War (2). As a result, she claims that late modernism is not as 
clearly pacifistic as is much of the literature composed during the Great War; instead, she points 
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out that it frequently evokes a “complicated patriotism” (18). Maud Ellmann notes that the aerial 
warfare of the Second World War fostered feelings of intense paranoia and observes that late 
modernists expanded their palettes of wartime imagery to include previously innocuous subjects, 
thereby registering the apprehensive recognition that in aerial warfare, “the very medium in 
which we breathe becomes the source of our destruction” (78). More recently, Paul Saint-Amour 
highlights the “traumatizing power of anticipation” in pre-WWII literature (17), suggesting “we 
have long misrecognized [the 1920s] as roaring only with postwar gaiety” (8). This 
misrecognition, Saint-Amour argues, conceals what he suggests are the signs of a “pre-traumatic 
stress syndrome whose symptoms arose in response to a potentially oncoming rather than an 
already realized catastrophe” (7).116 Together, these critical works suggest that the dominant 
feelings of late modernism include anxiety, a feeling of vulnerability that emerges in response to 
an indefinite, or unknown, threat. 
Anxiety, for Freud, is explicitly linked to anticipated encounters with the unknown—or, 
in other words, to sources of potential harm of which one is ignorant. In Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, Freud distinguishes anxiety, fear, and fright according to one’s degree of knowledge 
about a potential cause of danger: 
“Fright,” “fear” and “anxiety” are improperly used as synonymous expressions; 
they are in fact capable of clear distinction in their relation to danger. “Anxiety” 
describes a particular state of expecting the danger or preparing for it, even 
though it may be an unknown one. “Fear” requires a definite object of which to be 
																																								 																				
116 John Whittier-Ferguson takes a slightly different approach to late modernism, noticing in it 
resignation, in which he writes we can discover “signs of consensus politics, of social and political 
accommodation, and of conscious acceptance of compromised and all-too-familiar choices”; this 
resignation, Whittier-Ferguson observes, corresponds to a heightened interest in recycled forms, themes, 
and images: “repetition rather than surprise becomes newly significant in the aesthetic landscape” (234). 
Whittier-Ferguson’s account of late modernism, in other words, emphasizes dulled affect rather than 
anticipation or anxiety. 
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afraid. “Fright,” however, is the name we give to that state a person gets into 
when he has run into danger without being prepared for it; it emphasizes the 
factor of surprise. (6) 
For Freud, anxiety occurs when someone is ignorant about a potential source of danger, whereas 
fear occurs when someone knows and recognizes a specific source of danger. This distinction 
suggests that the state of being ignorant—in the sense of being “unknowing, uninformed, or 
unlearned” (OED)—produces its own kind of anxious feeling, which emerges from an awareness 
that one does not (yet) know what may cause one harm. Freud suggests that this feeling involves 
a sensation of temporal suspension, in which a person “expect[s]” and even “prepar[es]” for 
danger, but has not yet acquired the information necessary to experience fear. This feeling of 
temporal suspension has epistemic value for both Freud and Jacques Lacan, the latter of whom 
theorizes that anxiety indicates a proximity to “the real”—that which cannot be symbolized or 
known directly.117 For this reason, Lacan suggests that anxiety can reveal something real 
whereas other affects lie. In this way, anxiety’s epistemic value comes about via its distance 
from comprehension. Beckett’s narrative strategies explore the feelings that correspond with this 
experience of being temporally suspended between moments of understanding, showing how not 
knowing produces specific, potentially generative forms of affect. In doing so, they press us to 
revise persistent formulations of the supposed distinction between intellect and affect, thinking 
and feeling. 
To feel this kind of temporal suspension between moments of understanding—or, in 
																																								 																				
117 In his seminar on anxiety, Lacan writes, “The specular image becomes the strange and invasive image 
of the double. This is what gradually happens at the end of Maupassant’s life, when he begins to not see 
himself in the mirror any longer, or when he perceives in a room something, a phantom, that turns its back 
on him, and of which he knows immediately that it is not without having a certain rapport with him, and 
when the phantom turns around, he sees that it is him. There you have what is involved with a [of object 
a] enters the world of the real, to which it is in fact simply returning” (98-99). 
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other words, to feel at least temporarily ignorant—must be a relatively familiar experience for 
any thinking being. And yet theorists have provided few critical accounts of this feeling. This is 
perhaps because, as Mel Chen points out, ignorance is frequently posited as the opponent of 
intellectual labor, particularly within the contemporary academy. Chen is one of the few critics to 
tackle this taboo subject, writing boldly about personal experiences of “feel[ing] far from 
intellectually optimal” (172). Chen terms this feeling “brain fog” or, following Donna Haraway, 
“partial cognition”:118 
“Feeling stupid” is a phrase I do not use, for its palpable anti-disability sentiment, 
its violent rejection of a particular cognitive range of being. Yet what better 
phrase is there, sometimes, for my force of disappointment and self-repudiation in 
comparison to what I expect of myself—particularly in this type of academic 
employ? [....] The kind of intellectual work we are asked to trade in, I venture, 
requires a comprehension—a word that suggests both finality but also a 
wholeness of grasp—something that feels impossible when brains are foggy. 
(172-173) 
For Chen, in other words, experiences of partial cognition stand in opposition to the imperatives 
of intellectual and academic labor, which include comprehending, “mastering,” and extending 
fields of knowledge. At the same time, Chen observes that feelings of cognitive fogginess are 
ubiquitous for embodied subjects, as they may arise from everyday experiences such as 
tiredness, aging, toxicity, or, as Woolf notes, illness (173).119 Partial cognition, then, is a nearly 
universal cognitive experience that is paradoxically coded—especially within the contemporary 
academy—as invisible, or, when it becomes visible, necessarily negative. For this reason, Chen 
																																								 																				
118 See Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of 
Partial Perspective.” 
119 See Woolf, “On Being Ill.” 
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points out that the inevitable partiality of cognition is concealed. Partial cognition is universal 
and inevitable because all cognition, by definition, is partial: although partial cognition is often 
“experienced as ‘less’ of a rationality” (173), no thought can fully exhaust its subject. Eileen Joy 
echoes this aspect of Chen’s argument, noticing that many academic disciplines, particularly 
within the contemporary academy, “are often suspicious of pleasure and enjoyment, privileging 
instead what some term ‘strong,’ ‘skeptical,’ ‘sober,’ ‘serious,’ and ‘rational’ critique [...], with 
its strong investments in post-Enlightenment modes of disenchantment” (34). While both Chen 
and Joy specifically indict the contemporary academy as a site that perpetuates fictions about 
humans’ capacity to fully comprehend a given subject matter, they observe that these fictions 
emerge from deep-seated assumptions about the human mind as a site of rationality, autonomy, 
and wholeness. 
Recognizing the ubiquity of partial cognition would necessitate challenging longstanding 
assumptions about what it means to be human. Many theories of the human define our species in 
terms of our relationship to knowledge, figuring us in terms of rationality, as thinking animals, or 
beings that can aptly process information.120 This formulation of the human frequently conceals 
embodied—and thus organic—experiences, which Chen points out inaugurate partial cognition. 
Chen’s attention to partial cognition exposes the fact that these formulations of the human 
require a denial of the body, thereby implicitly linking the human to the inorganic or the 
machine-like. Paradoxically, then, defining the human through our relationship to rationality and 
comprehension embed inorganicism into such definitions. Exploring what it means to feel 
ignorant, for both Chen and, I suggest, for Beckett, involves recognizing the human as an 
organic, error-prone, and fallible being. 
																																								 																				
120 For an overview of philosophical distinctions between humans and non-human animals, see Gilbert 
Simondon, Two Lessons on Animal and Man. 
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No longer rational or even consistently cogitating, the human in Chen’s paradigm 
emerges as a single node within a system of distributed and contingent cognition: 
Partial knowledge emerges […] as an alternative, post-human form of cognition, 
[in which] humans are one important part, but still, just one part of that. This 
cognition suggests the usefulness of shifting away from the perfect fantasy of 
repetitious and continuous comprehension; it gives up on this fantasy, reminds us 
of our shared thinking, and ensures that no ‘thinker’ is actually a thinker as they 
are imagined. (179-180) 
Being reminded of “our shared thinking,” for Chen, involves acknowledging that all intellectual 
pursuits take place in relation to others and that comprehension is only available as a community 
rather than as an individual. Recognizing the ubiquity of partial cognition, then, involves 
embracing rather than concealing the feelings of ignorance that arise from everyday embodied 
experiences, such as feeling hungry or tired, or from encountering new, unfamiliar, or 
challenging information. 
Chen advocates for “re-valuing” partial cognition and, in doing so, rejects the 
longstanding Western valorization of rationality and independent thought as cultural ideals (173). 
Chen’s argument draws from a central premise within critical disability studies, which is that that 
what is perceived to be different, non-normative, or incomplete need not necessarily be “less 
than.” Critical disability studies tells us that re-valuing a physical or mental characteristic not 
only recuperates otherwise discredited forms of experience but also has the potential to shed light 
on alternative forms of culture and ways of being human. The field of critical disability studies 
has re-valued many experiences associated with physical disabilities, including non- or different 
mobility, sightedness, and hearing. The field has also attended to some forms of cognitive 
	 146	
difference, especially autism and so-called madness.121 Yet to date, intellectual debility—or non- 
or different intellectual capacity, including experiences of intellectual disability—has received 
little critical attention within the field, despite its clear connections to the subject of disability.  
Philosopher Licia Carlson, one of the only scholars to publish a sustained examination of 
intellectual debility as opposed to other forms of cognitive difference, suggests that this 
marginalization of intellectual debility within critical disability studies emerges from the fact that 
it is frequently used as a contrast category through which to define the human. According to 
Carlson, the human is frequently theorized through opposition to or struggle against intellectual 
lack, which is in turn assumed to be an undesirable, bad, or tragic form of experience (10). She 
observes that while there are few references to intellectual debility in classical philosophy, 
intellectual debility is a prominent category of interest in contemporary philosophy, in which—in 
most cases—“the cognitively disabled are viewed as more akin to animals than humans” and 
“their condition is portrayed as static, making them an uncomplicated [and therefore 
conceptually flexible] case to examine” (139). Carlson points out that these assumptions about 
intellectual debility themselves draw from ignorance about the experiences of intellectual 
disabled people, many of whom may not communicate via language or may do so through non-
normative forms of language. In other words, Carlson observes that the category of intellectual 
debility is frequently conceived of as unknowable because of its limited relationship with 
normative language. For this reason, the experiences of intellectual disability may appear to 
escape the powers of language. The concept of intellectual debility, then, is linked to ignorance 
																																								 																				
121 See especially Mark Osteen’s Autism and Representation (2008), Margaret Price’s Mad at School: 
Rhetorics of Mental Disability and Academic Life (2011), and Disability Studies Quarterly’s special issue 
on “Autism and the Concept of Neurodiversity” (2010). Michael Bérubé’s The Secret Life of Stories: 
From Don Quixote to Harry Potter, How Understanding Intellectual Disability Transforms the Way We 
Read (2016) is one of the first monographs to address intellectual disability specifically within literary or 
critical disability studies. 
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in at least two ways. First, people experiencing intellectual debility are often presumed to be 
ignorant; second, the concept of intellectual debility provokes feelings of ignorance for 
intellectually normative subjects and within critical discourses because of its presumed 
unknowability through the resources of language.  
Carlson parses ignorance by distinguishing two primary modes of feeling ignorant. She 
observes that one form of feeling ignorant involves concerted efforts to “maintain one’s own 
position of power” (202). In this way of feeling ignorant, another’s experiences may be 
considered unworthy of understanding, or lack of knowledge may motivate or sustain the 
mistreatment of others. This first form of ignorance is one in which a lack of knowledge about an 
other is the seed of violence or exploitation because it forms the basis for misrecognizing the 
other as not deserving of ethical treatment; it is this form of ignorance that Emmanuel Levinas 
addresses when he argues that encounters with the Other call a subject into ethical being.122 
Carlson also introduces another form of ignorance, which she calls “loving ignorance.” 
According to her, this second form of ignorance involves “‘accept[ing] what we cannot know’” 
and using this acceptance, rather than knowledge or understanding, as the basis for our ethical 
orientation toward others (204). In other words, in this second way of feeling ignorant, one’s 
ethical orientation toward others is not activated by our understanding of them; instead, it is 
activated by our recognition and acceptance of difference even when it is incomprehensible or 
unrecognizable. This form of accepting, or “loving,” ignorance, Carlson suggests, may be an 
ethical mode of relation to many unknowable subjects and experiences including (but not limited 
to) the experiences of non- or differently linguistic intellectually disabled people because it “puts 
in relief the desperate need for a rethinking of authority, humility, and epistemic responsibility” 
(204). Loving ignorance operates from a position of comprehensive benevolence from which we 
																																								 																				
122 See Levinas, Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence. 
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accord empathy to the subjects and experiences regardless of our capability to understand them 
as like us in their humanness or in their similarity to our experiences or linguistic styles.  
Learning how to inhabit this second form of ignorance may have appeared especially 
urgent during and in the aftermath of the Second World War, as the violence that emerged from 
the willful non-recognition of others’ worth became increasingly apparent. There is a tension 
between the frequent characterizations of WWII’s violence as itself unthinkable or unknowable 
and the rapid development of information storing and sorting technologies that emerged 
alongside it. This tension suggests, if nothing else, that the relationship between information and 
human intelligence was radically revised during the Second World War. This revision emerged 
across disciplines, including—as Katherine Hayles documents—in a new theory of information 
proposed by American electrical engineer and AT&T employee Claude Shannon (Hayles 59).123 
In 1948, Shannon wrote a paper proposing that information and disorder (i.e., entropy), 
previously posited as opposites, were in fact one and the same. In other words, whereas earlier 
theories posited that greater amounts of information lead to greater order, Shannon “anticipated 
the contemporary insight that proliferating information is associated with the production of 
entropy. […] What we fear most immediately is not that the universe will run down, but that 
information will pile up until it overwhelms our ability to understand it” (Hayles 49). This 
approach to information paved the way for conceiving of information as distinct from or even at 
odds with human intelligence. I suggest that Beckett’s prose registers the feelings of ignorance 
that may emerge from the increasingly dominant cultural sense that increased information, 
including information about human activities and behavior during wartime, may challenge rather 
																																								 																				
123 Hayles points out: “Shannon worked for AT&T, a company that made its living by satisfying people’s 
curiosity. The more uncertain people were—about the stock market, national news or events in other 
cities—the more telegrams they sent, phone calls they made, information they required. No wonder 
Shannon thought of uncertainty as information’s ally, whereas Brillouin saw the two as antagonistic” 
(59). 
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than enrich human intelligence.124 
Late modernism was, after all, the cusp of the so-called “information age.” Beginning in 
the l940s, developments in digital technology paved the way for the expansion of information 
volume as well as the computer miniaturization that made this information increasingly 
accessible. At this same moment, information processing became an increasingly common 
metaphor for describing human cognition. Yet paradoxically, the Second World War continued 
to loom in the cultural imagination as an inconceivable example of human violence on a mass 
scale. The drive toward artificial acquisition and storage of information, in other words, 
coincides with an event the violence of which seems to exceed human understanding. Beckett 
proposes a mode of relating to the unknown that accepts and observes its impermeability with a 
form of attention that might be considered ignorant, mindful, or even reverent. For Beckett, 
learning to feel this form of ignorance—or, in other words, to accept the moments of partial 
cognition that color everyday human experience—refigures the thinker’s relationship to the 
unknown from one of anxiety (a la Freud) to one of acknowledgment. In this context, intellectual 
debility is re-valued: it emerges as a cognitive style in which our capacity to grasp information or 
to convert it into recognizable signals is recognized as limited. This cognitive style instead 
requests that we make peace with the ubiquity of our partial cognition and consequent feelings of 
																																								 																				
124 This notion that WWII is unthinkable appears, for instance, in Theodor Adorno’s frequently cited 
statement that poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. This passage is marked by a deep suspicion of both 
“intellectual progress” and “contemplation” itself: 
The more total society becomes, the greater the reification of the mind and the more paradoxical its 
effort to escape reification on its own. Even the most extreme consciousness of doom threatens to 
degenerate into idle chatter. Cultural criticism finds itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic of 
culture and barbarism. To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. And this corrodes even the 
knowledge of why it has become impossible to write poetry today. Absolute reification, which 
presupposed intellectual progress as one of its elements, is now preparing to absorb the mind entirely. 
Critical intelligence cannot be equal to this challenge as long as it confines itself to self-satisfied 
contemplation. (34) 
Here, Adorno suggests that cultural criticism must resist coalescing too strongly with the culture industry, 
a demand that implies the post-WWII moment necessitates new forms of thinking and new relationships 
to information. 
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ignorance.  
Beckett engages with intellectual debility in order to highlight the commonality of 
feelings of incapacity and, furthermore, to suggest that acknowledging and claiming incapacity is 
necessary for ethical forms of engagement with others. His prose endorses intellectual debility as 
a socially valuable position by figuring it as a point from which claims to knowledge and power 
are stalled or foreclosed. Whereas the modernism of the Great War might be described in terms 
of its optimism about the expansion of subjects available to representation—celebrating how new 
aesthetic forms, genres, and media may increase the capacity of art to reflect diverse and subtle 
experiences—late modernism tends to exhibit suspicion about feelings of mastery. Beckett 
invokes intellectual debility in order to suggest that our failure at mastery may be our best feature 
in that it holds the potential for non-coercive forms of engagement.  
 
Reading Watt Ignorantly 
Although Watt was not published until 1953, Samuel Beckett wrote his second novel 
between 1941 and 1945, while he was working as a courier for the French Resistance during the 
Second World War.125 As in most of Beckett’s work, almost nothing happens in Watt. The plot 
concerns Watt’s journey to the home of Mr. Knott, where he engages in a variety of domestic 
routines and wonders endlessly about the possible significances of the information he 
encounters. Watt’s mind, as we quickly learn, obsessively searches for meaning: “He was 
obliged, because of his peculiar character, to enquire into what [the simple games that time plays 
with space] meant, oh not into what they really meant, his character was not so peculiar as all 
that, but into what they might be induced to mean, with the help of a little patience, a little 
																																								 																				
125 See a discussion of Beckett’s activities and writing during the war years in The Letters of Samuel 
Beckett: 1941-1956 (xiv-xx). 
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ingenuity” (75). Watt’s obsession with uncovering information and contriving meaning about the 
world seems to get the better of him by section three, where he recounts his experiences to an 
interlocutor in what appears to be a mental hospital. Section four moves backward in time, to 
before Watt arrives at the home of his employer, and the novel closes with addenda that recycle 
concepts and details from the novel’s previous four sections. At the level of content, Watt 
dramatizes the experience of wrestling with information about the world; at the level of form, it 
withholds from the reader the possibility of smoothly converting textual information into 
narrative meaning. 
Beckett famously described Watt as “just an exercise” to pass the time as he waited for 
the war to end (Shaffer 228), and viewing Watt as an exercise—in the sense of a site of 
preparation or training—helps to explain its peculiar formal features. Watt is largely composed 
of lists, which, through their mechanical, automatic, algorithmic quality resemble the exercises in 
a student’s notebook. This section addresses the style of reading that is invited by this list-
saturated narrative form. Watt’s lists require readers to slowly encounter information and 
relinquish the expectation that a greater degree of information will lead to understanding. 
By “lists,” I am referring to the catalogs of (sometimes connected and sometimes 
disjointed) detail that appear throughout Watt. In section one, we first encounter Watt himself as 
an inscrutable list of unknown particularities. Mr. Hackett ticks off the qualities that he believes 
Mr. Nixon should know about his acquaintance Watt: “Nationality, family, birthplace, 
confession, occupation, means of existence, distinctive signs,” says Mr. Hackett. “You cannot be 
in utter ignorance of all this,” to which Mr. Nixon responds, “Utter ignorance” (21). Watt’s lack 
of socially recognizable identity is presented as a blank, yet-to-be-filled-in form, or list of 
identifying information. In sections two and three, Watt obsessively uses lists to inventory and 
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explore the possible meanings of his experiences as a domestic servant and to organize what he 
perceives to be the disorder of his experiences: 
This dish contained foods of various kinds, such as soup of various kinds, fish, 
eggs, game, poultry, meat, cheese, fruit, all of various kinds, and of course bread 
and butter, and it contained also the more usual beverages, such as absinthe, 
mineral water, tea, coffee, milk, stout, beer, whiskey, brandy, wine and water, and 
it contained also many things to take for the good of the health, such as insulin, 
digitalin, calomel, iodine, laudanum, mercury, coal, iron, chamomile and 
wormpowder, and of course salt and mustard, pepper and sugar, and of course a 
little salyic acid, to delay fermentation. (87) 
The final scene of section four chronicles a list of glances exchanged among a row of nearly 
indistinguishable men: “Mr Nolan looked at Mr Case, Mr Case at Mr Nolan, Mr Gorman at Mr 
Case, Mr Gorman at Mr Nolan, Mr Nolan at Mr Gorman, Mr Case at Mr Gorman, Mr Gorman 
again at Mr Case, again at Mr Nolan, and then straight before him, at nothing in particular” 
(246). And Watt’s final section—the addenda that include the novel’s most well known phrase, 
“no symbols where none intended” (254)—serve as a list of loosely organized additional details 
about the sparse actions that take place in the rest of the text. Julia Jordan observes that the novel 
“follows Watt’s labyrinthine contortions of consciousness as he runs through possibilities of 
everything that might happen in minutely ordered lists,” which are designed to stave off 
“epistemological disorder” (7). But, of course, Watt’s desire to examine an increasingly wide 
array of information results instead in increased disorder, particularly, perhaps, on the part of the 
reader. Watt’s devotion to lists—or repetitive groupings of parallel information—create stutters 
in the novel’s narrative fabric, which delay the linguistic coupling of subject and verb, object and 
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action. As a formal strategy, then, lists slow down and frustrate attempts to use reading as a tool 
for understanding information and gaining knowledge. 
Listing as a narrative strategy cognitively challenges to the reader. These challenges, I 
propose, can be understood as a process of narrative debilitation in that they assert various 
systemic barriers that rearrange the conditions for reading. Critical disability studies scholar Simi 
Linton describes the social model of disability as one in which individuals experience physical, 
sensory, intellectual, or psychological variations, but she emphasizes that it is the environmental 
constraints and social attitudes towards these variations that produce what is recognized as 
disability.126 Following this insight, what I am suggesting is that Watt produces a series of 
environmental constraints for the reader through its reliance on lists. These constraints debilitate 
the reader by denying us the normative criteria we use to navigate literary texts. One of the 
ironies of Watt is, then, that the reader encounters a mirror image of our cognitive experience in 
Watt himself as we read. Watt is a character that appears alternately paranoid, obsessive, or 
mentally unstable, and we encounter Watt’s mind through a reading experience in which we are 
similarly invited to take on the similarly non-normative cognitive style of intellectual debility. 
Before discussing the cognitive challenges presented by Watt’s lists, I would like to say 
more about how I am defining the term “list.” As a linguistic pattern, lists are not grounded in the 
logic of cause and effect; they can go on forever, offering a sense of inexhaustible potential and, 
at the same time, formal constriction. On the one hand, lists are an endlessly open-ended 
narrative strategy that can provide the occasion for a diverse range of syntactic patterns: any 
word or word cluster can be listed. Sam, Watt’s interlocutor, illustrates this explicitly when he 
documents Watt’s unusual idioms for his experiences at the home of Mr. Knott in section three. 
																																								 																				
126 See Linton’s Claiming Disability: Knowledge and Identity, which provides a frequently cited 
definition of the social model of disability. 
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Sam offers examples of and then analyzes Watt’s unusual linguistic “manners,” which include 
the following:  
Day of most, night of part, Knott with now. Now till up, little seen so oh, little 
heard so oh. Night till morning from. Heard I this, saw I this then what. Thing 
quiet, dim. Ears, eyes, failing now also. Hush in, mist in, moved I so. (164) 
 
Ot bro, lap rulb, krad klub. Ot murd, wol fup, wol fup. Ot niks, sorg sam, sorg 
sam. Ot lems, lats lems, lats lems. Ot gnut, trat stews, trat stews. (165) 
 
Dis yb dis, nem owt. Yad la, tin fo trap. Skin, skin, skin. Od su did ned taw? On. 
Taw ot klat tonk? On. Tonk ot klat taw? On. Tonk ta kool taw? On. Taw to kool 
tonk? Nilb, mun, mud. Tin fo trap, yad la. Nem owt, dis yb dis. (168) 
Despite the variance of the syntactic patterns in these idioms, we might agree that they all 
resemble lists insofar as they sequence a hypothetically limitless set of related items.  
Yet on the other hand, while lists are theoretically unbounded, their internal rhythms and 
repetitions prepare the reader for what’s going to happen next. Lists, in other words, tend toward 
monotony; they train the reader to anticipate similarity within the category of information that is 
being presented. We might say, then, that lists are a paradoxical syntactic form in that they are 
characterized both by the potential for limitlessness and also by the constraint of predictability. 
In her discussion of epic catalogues, Jan Felix Gaetner points out that as a linguistic form, 
lists “are alien to narrative proper; they form a digression and cause a retardation of subsequent 
events” (299). Watt’s lists distort the grandiosity of the epic catalogue through their engagement 
with Watt’s humdrum routines and seemingly baseless paranoias; rather than acting as tools of 
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rhetorical power that place special emphasis on items of importance, Watt’s lists resemble 
automatically produced ticker tape. And while it is true that Watt’s lists often unfold according to 
a set of predetermined, mathematical rules, as Albright argues, it is equally true that the lists 
point to the insufficiency of rational or symmetric patterns to convey meaning and describe 
experience. Amanda Dennis points out that through what she terms its “erratic glitches and 
stammering permutations,” Watt performs an acerbic critique of rationality and, furthermore, it 
mocks the desire for language to act as a perfectly logical system (107). To extend Dennis’s 
point, what I am proposing is that Watt’s attachment to lists slyly exposes and unsettles the 
reader’s attachment to conventional engagements with language as a path to meaning. Reading 
list-like patterns such as these will not yield understanding; instead, these patterns invite us to 
accept our inability to convert them into narrative momentum and meaning and instead to 
experience feelings of ignorance. 
Lists, therefore, create moments of suspension; they interrupt the drive to connect actor 
and event upon which normative subject-verb linguistic structures are based. We read to uncover 
meaning through encounters with language, and we might describe a normative style of reading 
as one in which these encounters with language allow us to gain understanding about how events 
and experiences affect one or more character(s). But as we read Watt, this normative style of 
reading is constantly tested, stalled, or frustrated. Instead, Watt’s lists perseverate on a series of 
parallel words and word clusters, inevitably slowing down the glimpses of action that subject-
verb relations provide. What I am suggesting is that Watt offers more than a critique of 
rationality or a glimpse of language’s inability to act as a rational system; instead, I’m arguing 
that Watt withholds normative linguistic structures in order to disable conventional modes of 
reading. It invites us to instead inhabit a mode of reading that is not predicated on gaining 
	 156	
understanding or acquiring knowledge.  
Lists in Watt present at least three cognitive challenges to the reader. First, Watt 
overwhelms us through the sheer amount of information it provides about almost every aspect of 
Watt’s experiences. Following Albright, we could just as easily say that Watt’s lists are 
generated for, as much as by, a computer program, in the sense that they test the capacities of 
normative human understanding, concentration, and memory. This description of the behavior of 
the voices that Watt hears is a good example of the cognitive overload present in many of Watt’s 
lists:  
Watt heard nothing [that Mr. Spiro said] because of other voices, singing, crying, 
stating, murmuring, things unintelligible, in his ear. With these, if he was not 
familiar, he was not unfamiliar either. So he was not alarmed, unduly. Now these 
voices, sometimes they sang only, and sometimes they cried only, and sometimes 
they stated only, and sometimes they murmured only, and sometimes they sang 
and cried, and sometimes they sang and stated, and sometimes they sang and 
murmured, and sometimes they cried and stated, and sometimes they cried and 
murmured, and sometimes they stated and murmured, and sometimes they sang 
and cried and stated, and sometimes they sang and cried and murmured, and 
sometimes they sang and cried and stated and murmured, all together, at the same 
time, as now, to mention only these four kinds of voices, for there were others. 
(29) 
This list seems designed to overwhelm, frustrating the cognitive desire for apprehension of 
patterns and insisting on what Dennis has termed a sensory poetics, which, through sound and 
rhythm patterns, “creates effects in excess of what the understanding can yield” (110). In Watt, 
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the Cartesian proposition of mind/body dualism that fascinated Beckett throughout his career is 
used to make a mockery of the mind’s resources: when presented with this block of text, the 
reading eye can easily gloss its difficulty and humor, but it is unlikely that the reading mind can 
plough through and grasp all of these logical permutations without obsessive study. We might 
say that the inadequacies of the reading mind are revealed through the inundations like this one, 
which overpowers our cognitive resources and our attention.  
A second cognitive challenge is that lists invite a narrative fixation on concrete detail. In 
this sense, Watt takes up the metaphysical problem of figure and ground that fascinates his 
earlier incarnation, Murphy, but comes at the problem from the opposite perspective. In 
Beckett’s 1938 novel, Murphy’s tutor Neary tells him that “all life is figure and ground” (7). In 
other words, all life is either particular details or the abstracted background against which they 
are set—“The face […] against the big blooming buzzing confusion,” in Neary’s formulation (7). 
Murphy is obsessed with the possibility of experiencing pure ground, a desire he pursues through 
experiments with sensory deprivation and self-erasure that ultimately lead to his death. After 
Murphy is cremated, his ashes are unceremoniously strewn across the floor of a pub; in this 
moment, he achieves his wish for non-being by being mixed with the residue of the literal 
ground.  
Watt, by contrast, is captivated by figure. We see from Watt’s lists that Watt refuses all 
abstracted shortcuts; instead, he details the particulars of every logical possibility. Ross Posnock 
observes that this obsession with particularity constitutes one of the novel’s central paradoxes: 
while on the one hand Watt is “not a realistic novel in a traditional sense, in another aspect it is 
hyper-realistic” (n.p.). The traditional realist novelist presents an arbitrarily selected set of 
specific details, which anchor the novel in a recognizable location and historical moment that we 
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accept as a reasonable reproduction of “reality.” Watt takes this practice to its logical extreme by 
fixating on particulars, refusing to omit any detail, no matter how trivial, or on any possibility, no 
matter how unlikely. The effect for most readers is likely to be one of exhaustion. The process of 
normative reading, as Watt makes us aware, is a pattern of attention and inattention: we tune into 
particulars and gloss over abstractions, a rhythm of oscillation that allows for moments of 
cognitive respite. Watt challenges our capacity to focus by rejecting the convention of abstraction 
and including everything. 
A third cognitive challenge is the sheer boredom that Watt makes available through 
encounters with lists. In addition to the repetition inherent in their structure, lists are a syntactic 
structure associated with routine and work, as in the proverbial “to-do list.” Watt emphasizes the 
tedium of lists by cataloging the mundane activities that Watt experiences as a domestic laborer. 
By navigating the humdrum routines of domestic work such as preparing food, emptying slops, 
and feeding a dog through list-making, Watt reminds us that domestic experiences often involve 
experiencing boredom. In this sense, at the level of content, Watt (somewhat surprisingly) 
implicitly calls our attention to the mundaneness of women’s lives when they are sequestered—
or re-sequestered, as was the case for many women following the Second World War—to the 
domestic sphere. On reviewer of Watt described it as practicing “the art of tedium,” and it is safe 
to assume that the novel’s form as much as its content contributes to this perception (Smith 814). 
I suggest that lists invite us into a cognitive experience of disengagement—we are, I suspect, not 
particularly driven to uncover what might happen next to Watt, and we are more likely to take in 
many of the novel’s passages with a quick glance before flipping the page than with close 
attention or absorption. I am arguing that these cognitive challenges debilitate the reader, 
withholding many of the practices of normative reading, especially the discovery of new 
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information that quells the desire to uncover “what happens next” in a narrative. 
Watt’s cognitive challenges seem designed to stump readers and slow us down. I am 
suggesting that they are also designed to unsettle our comfort with conventional linguistic 
patterns as vehicles for understanding information by refusing to engage with the ways in which 
language can provide a tool for seizing and incorporating knowledge. Watt’s lists request a 
cognitive mode in which the reader explores a text not as a detective, a voyeur, or a thrill-seeker, 
but rather as an “idiot,” a figure whose “ignorance” emerges from the necessity of slowing down 
and inhabiting a cognitive style in which “we don’t consider ourselves authorized to believe we 
possess […] what we know” (2). 
I began by discussing how Watt’s schematic form resembles the inscriptions in an 
exercise book. Here, I reframe my argument by claiming Watt’s narrative technique can also be 
understood as an exercise in another sense: a cognitive exercise, or a “brain game,” that trains the 
reader to acquire a new relationship with the experience of reading. Lists, I argue, invite the 
reader to embrace reading as a meditative practice—a practice of attention that does not aim to 
uncover an end goal or benefit. Instead, reading meditatively—or mindlessly—coaxes the reader 
into a position of non-activity and non-action, without expectations or preconceptions about the 
novel’s narrative development and without moments of discovery which allow us to unveil a 
text’s patterns or meaning. In this sense, the reader of Watt may learn to be very much unlike 
Watt, who remains obsessed with uncovering, concocting, and explaining what information may 
mean. Instead, the reader is invited to allow the persistent, percussive textures of lists to wash 
over us and to not necessarily use these patterns as an instigation to understand. 
As a novel written during and in the aftermath of war, Watt invites us to reflect on how 
knowledge can be a tool of power and seeking understanding can be process of violence. Watt, as 
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I have been arguing, invites us to forego these activities by creating formal conditions that 
request we settle for a while in the confusion of lists, which provide information without offering 
up meanings about this information. To be prevented from accessing a normative style of 
reading, and to read ignorantly, requires that we acknowledge, rather than reject, our cognitive 
limitations—to become comfortable with experiences of intellectual debility or feelings of 
ignorance rather than to conceal them or shun them from our self-conception. Watt proposes an 
ethics of not knowing and not seeking to know, which in turn urges us to preserve the territory of 
the unknown. This ethics, forged in the violence of the Second World War, calls us to maintain 
the integrity of the incomprehensible. 
 
Reading Molloy Slowly 
In the previous section, I argued that Watt invites readers to become comfortable with the 
feeling of not understanding something by encouraging us to engage in an ignorant or “mindless” 
style of reading. Here, I argue that Molloy urges us to participate in a style of reading we might 
term “slow” in that it involves slowing down conventional cognitive strategies for engaging with 
narrative. Molloy reveals how replicative thinking often comes about through an attachment to 
speed, or the desire to move hastily past new information rather than carefully understanding it 
on its own terms. As Claire Barber-Stetson points out in her study of modernism and slow 
processing, “Speed mediates, distancing us from the materials and conditions of production—
whether they are the ingredients from which our food is made or the components of a text” (147). 
Barber-Stetson focuses on the ways in which texts requesting slowness from readers can promote 
“unusual ways of processing and interpreting familiar information,” which, in turn, “disclose 
new futures” (149); here, I make the related point that slowness can be a means by which to 
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work against authority. Molloy proposes that slowness may be a method of refusing familiar 
structures of power.   
Before turning to my reading of Molloy, I point to some of the confluences between the 
style of “slow reading” embraced by Beckett’s novel and the practice of “close reading” 
endorsed by many camps within the contemporary discipline of literary studies. For decades, the 
practice of reading slowly and carefully, often called “close reading,” has informed literary 
studies pedagogy. Close reading became a staple of many college English courses in the mid-
twentieth century, when so-called “New Critics” urged readers to attend to “the work itself” as 
opposed to the biographical or historical conditions that inform its production. Although many 
instructors of college English now reject New Criticism because of its devotion to a restricted, 
predominantly white male canon, the methods of close reading have, for the most part, survived 
this backlash. In recent years, critics from a surprising range of theoretical categories—including 
postcolonial studies, feminist theory, and Marxist criticism—have defended close reading as a 
method for engaging with literature.127 For example, Jane Gallop argues that close reading is a 
fundamentally ethical practice in that it involves overriding the preconceptions we bring to 
literary texts. Instead, close reading, for Gallop, is a method of engaging with particular literary 
texts in granular detail: 
In explaining what I mean by close reading, I often tell my students to read not 
what SHOULD BE on the page but what IS. Over the years since first learning to 
read, we acquire the habit of reading what we think OUGHT TO be there rather 
than what actually is […]. It’s amazing how much reading is really projection. In 
fact, I would say that most of the time most people read not what is in front of 
																																								 																				
127 These include Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Jane Gallop, and Terry Eagleton. See Cecily Devereaux’s 
overview of the revival of close reading within literary studies. 
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them but what they expect to find in front of them. (8; 10) 
Here, Gallop writes that close reading involves confronting and discarding the impulse to 
recognize, understand, and respond to literature according to normative frameworks. For Gallop, 
close reading offers the possibility of new orientations, away from “what we think ought to be” 
or “what [we] expect to find in front of [us]” and toward the peculiarities of texts themselves. 
Close reading scales observation down, defamiliarizing readers from conventional narrative 
patterns and directing attention toward the inimitable particularity of specific texts. 
What I would like to highlight about this definition of close reading is that it emphasizes 
slowness. Elsewhere, Gallop writes, “Close reading slows us down, stopping us at words, getting 
us to look around at the context of the words” (12). Gallop suggests, in other words, that reading 
slowly affects the cognitive styles of readers, slowing “us” down by providing a method for 
quieting our desire for immediate comprehension. Close reading urges us to bracket the cognitive 
shortcuts that we typically employ to save time and effort when navigating the world. For this 
reason, experiencing slowness becomes imperative for producing unexpected and meaningful 
textual encounters and, in Gallop’s words, “undoing the training that keeps us to the straight and 
narrow path of main ideas” (8). Viewed in this way, close reading might be understood as a 
meditative art that asks us to think differently about literary texts and—as Gallop argues toward 
the end of her essay—the people and experiences that literary texts represent.  
We might say that practicing slow reading is one aspect of inhabiting crip time. “Crip 
time,” to follow Alison Kafer’s definition, is “a challenge to normative and normalizing 
expectations of pace and scheduling” (26). Reading slowly might mean coming to an 
understanding of a language pattern gradually; it might mean moving circularly through texts by 
glancing back at earlier passages in order to uncover repeated words or symbolic patterns; it 
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might mean reevaluating our suppositions about what constitutes significant or insignificant 
information. It also means inhabiting denigrated cognitive positions associated with slow tempi. 
Reading slowly requires that we modify our most familiar cognitive strategies and inhabit non-
normative forms of temporality. 
Understood as an epistemology of slowness, intellectual debility provides a model for the 
experience of slow reading. Intellectual debility is a category of cognitive experiences in which 
time extends and stretches outside the normative; consequently, it is a cognitive style that 
generates ways of knowing that become invisible at normate speeds. In many discourses, 
intellectual debility and intellectually disabled people are associated with slowness. For instance, 
a contemporary slur for intellectually disabled people, “retard,” suggests that intellectual 
disability is an ontology based on delay.128 I am not suggesting that the practice of slow reading 
grants readers access to the cognitive experiences of intellectually disabled people; rather, I am 
suggesting that slow reading asks the reader to practice cognitive strategies that are often 
negatively associated with intellectual debility and intellectually disabled people. This practice 
thereby promotes the value of delaying comprehension and stilling assumptions in order to 
nurture new ways of knowing and resist instinctive replication. I am arguing, in other words, that 
close reading implicitly asserts the cultural value of intellectual debility and people with 
disabilities by promoting experiences of delay, deferral, and not knowing. 
Molloy explores this pedagogical practice and asserts the potential value of cognitive 
slowness by binding together slow reading and intellectual debility. Molloy, the first novel in 
Beckett’s Trilogy, was originally published in French in 1951; its English translation was 
published in 1955. It is divided into two sections. In the first section, Molloy recollects a recent 
																																								 																				
128 According to the OED, “retard” is a modernist term. One of the first instances of the use of this word 
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journey to his mother’s house. On this journey, he has traveled by bicycle; gets arrested for 
behavior that is considered to be lewd and is subsequently released; encounters a series of bizarre 
characters; and—in a disturbing scene—confronts a man in a forest, whom he attacks and beats. 
In the novel’s second section, a private detective, Moran, embarks on a quest to arrest Molloy, 
taking with him his son. On his journey, Moran acquires a bicycle and encounters a succession of 
strangers, one of whom he murders in a forest. After this event, Moran, whose physical 
appearance and linguistic style increasingly imitate those of Molloy in the first section, makes 
his way to a house, where he begins communicating with a voice that ultimately requests that he 
compose a “report” on his activities (92).  
The fact that Molloy and Moran appear to merge with one another over the course of the 
text might be read as a caution against the desire for hasty styles of comprehension, which is 
often enacted through quick reading of texts, bodies, and behavior. In section two, we see that 
Moran, in his hurry to apprehend his suspect Molloy, in fact becomes him, appearing to replicate 
the violence and confusion that characterizes Molloy’s experiences in section one. In doing so, 
Moran loses his own identity and becomes the subject he had attended to apprehend. For 
example, after receiving orders from a mysterious agent to track down Molloy, Moran reflects on 
what he knows about his subject. Moran describes Molloy in terms of a contradictory 
temporality that is both confining and accelerating: “He had very little room. His time too was 
limited. He hastened incessantly on, as if in despair, towards extremely close objectives. Now, a 
prisoner, he hurled himself at I know not what narrow confines, and now, hunted, he sought 
refuge near the centre. […] He was forever on the move. I had never seen him rest” (113). 
Molloy, in other words, is trapped by the strength of his focus on his objectives; paradoxically, 
this entrapment manifests in incessant movement. This passage points to the ways in which 
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cognition directed by replicative thinking can appear to result in understanding while in fact 
closing out the world, thereby restricting a thinker to familiar territory.  
Replicative thinking, Moran insinuates, also transforms the thinker. Moran observes that 
in just thinking about Molloy, he becomes him: “Occasionally he stopped and glared furiously 
about him. This was how he came to me, at long intervals. Then I was nothing but uproar, bulk, 
rage, suffocation, effort unceasing, frenzied and vain. Just the opposite of myself, in fact. It was a 
change” (113). This passage shows how the process of contemplating Molloy has an 
unintentionally imitative effect on Moran, who begins to absorb and duplicate Molloy’s identity, 
becoming “just the opposite of [him]self.” We should remember that as a detective, Moran is a 
kind of reader: a detective is “one whose occupation it is to discover matters artfully concealed,” 
according to the OED, from the verb detect: “to uncover, lay bare, [or] expose.” Moran’s method 
of reading, or uncovering his knowledge of Molloy, takes place quickly and automatically. He 
describes his cognitive practices as “methodical” (98), and, over the course of section two, grows 
increasingly agitated at the events and characters that delay him on his quest to find Molloy. We 
see, in other words, that in his hurry to detect Molloy, which Moran undertakes by hurriedly 
reenacting what is most familiar to him, limits the interpretive possibilities available to him; this 
process ultimately transforms him into the object of his inquiry—the prey he sought to hunt 
down. 
Meanwhile, Moran’s son, Jacques, stands apart from Molly’s and Moran’s duplicated 
narrative. Moran describes Jacques in terms of silence and slowness. “[M]y son rarely spoke to 
me unless I spoke to him,” notes Moran, “And when I did so he answered […] as if it were with 
reluctance” (102). Jacques, unlike Moran, does not rely on established patterns to navigate 
reality. As a result, most of his utterances appear in the form of questions. For example, as they 
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prepare to depart on their journey, Jacques asks, “Which shoes am I to wear?” (103). Moran 
responds by reminding Jacques of the social conventions that are meant to alleviate this 
ambiguity: “You have two pairs of shoes […]. One for Sundays and one for weekdays, and you 
ask me which you are to wear” (103). Moran’s point is that living within the guardrails of habit 
reduces occurrences of everyday indeterminacy. Later, Jacques asks, “Where are we going, 
papa?” “How often had I told him not to ask me questions,” thinks Moran, and then responds: 
“Do as you’re told” (103). Moran resists the questions he receives from Jacques, which open up 
the possibility of alternative patterns of behavior, by assuming the role of a paternal authority.  
These examples suggest that Jacques’ lack of knowledge about what is expected of him 
constitutes a slowing down of the status quo, as well as a temporary interruption of his father’s 
power over him. Jacques questions signal misunderstanding or non-comprehension, which 
emerge as tools for probing and illuminating the forms of authority to which one is subject. 
Jacques eventually grasps the information his father communicates to him and, consequently, 
obeys his father’s directives, but these instances of delayed comprehension quell Moran’s power 
and, by the end of the text, appear to allow Jacques an escape from the replicative worlds 
inhabited by Molloy and later Moran.  
The novel associates Jacques’s style of delayed cognition with intellectual debility and 
intellectual disability. Throughout the second section, Moran refers to his son with a number of 
offensive epithets for intellectual disability, including “half-wit,” “idiot,” and “fool” (130; 133; 
130), positioning Jacques as an idiot figure who remains separate from narrative momentum yet 
sheds light on its structures and meanings. In this sense, the Jacques of Molloy resembles another 
Jacques, the Jacques of Eleutheria, Beckett’s first completed drama. Beckett composed 
Eleutheria in 1947, between Watt and Molloy. The play opens with a dramatization of Jacques, a 
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manservant, temporarily not understanding what is being requested of him: 
A knock. Silence. Another knock. 
Mme. Krap: (with a start) Come in. 
Enter Jacques. He holds a tray out to Mme. Krap; it has a visiting card on 
it. She takes the card, looks at it, puts it back on the tray. 
Well? 
Jacques doesn’t understand. 
Well? 
 Jacques doesn’t understand. 
What an idiot! 
 Jacques hangs his head. (9) 
In the action that follows, Jacques grasps the source of Madame Krap’s disappointment and 
escorts in her (undesired) visitor. The scene’s opening, however, stages an experience of delayed 
comprehension, or intellectual debility. The Jacques of Molloy resembles his predecessor both in 
terms of his servitude and in terms of his gradual (and partial) understanding of his father’s plans 
for their journey. In Molloy, this delay emerges as productive insofar as it stalls the drive toward 
apprehension that ultimately ensnares Moran, shifting him from an authority figure to a figure 
who is pursued. At the end of the text, Jacques abandons his father on his journey, literally 
exiting the narrative in which Moran grows increasingly entangled. By slowly working against 
the social and narrative patterns he encounters, Jacques achieves liberation, which is the 
antithesis of authority as well as the means of its resistance. 
Molloy demurs to affirm a final version of itself, allowing, in the end, multiple 
possibilities: perhaps Moran has become Molloy; perhaps the Molloy to whom we were 
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introduced in section one has been Moran all along; perhaps section two is actually a prequel to 
section one, the text of the “report” that Moran is encouraged to write at the end of section two. 
Reading Molloy is an exercise in becoming comfortable with the unknown and in stalling the 
desire to comprehend “what happened,” a desire that often motivates our encounters with 
narrative. Through these methods, Molloy ultimately endorses Jacques’s style of slowly and, 
therefore, newly reading and interpreting the events he encounters, in part because the 
experience of reading the text as a whole accords to Jacques’s cognitive style. Arguably, Molloy, 
like Beckett’s oeuvre as a whole, de-prioritizes comprehension as the object of reading and 
instead promotes for the reader cognitive experiences often understood as negative: confusion, 
frustration, boredom. Like the character of Molloy, who, in the text’s opening paragraph, reflects 
about some ambiguous pages he receives that “they are marked with signs [he doesn’t] 
understand” (7), the reader of the text Molloy is urged to linger in textual uncertainties, parsing 
them for meanings that emerge slowly through processes of close reading and re-reading. Molloy 
promotes slow textual absorption, revealing through the character of Jacques how pauses, 
deferrals, and delays are essential for producing new kinds of sense and new versions of self and, 
furthermore, for escaping the snares of authority that would rope into submission attempts at 
freedom. 
Molloy shows how experiences of cognitive slowness, including those that we are invited 
to nurture through the practice of close reading, are socially productive and potentially important 
for working against authoritative structures. Making a similar point, bell hooks in Teaching to 
Transgress argues that slow reading and listening offer the potential to diminish our drive for 
both comprehension and acquisition: “in the patient act of listening to another tongue we may 
subvert that culture of capitalist frenzy and consumption that demands all desire must be satisfied 
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immediately” (174). Her point is that slowness provides a way to resist rather than simply to 
adapt to a structure of power as diffuse and omnipresent as capitalism. Beckett and hooks both 
affirm that cognitive habits shaped by commitments to normative temporality zombify thinkers, 
making them susceptible to methods of control. Beckett’s staging of the intimate relationship 
between slow reading and intellectual debility allows us to recognize what many forms of 
literary studies pedagogy have long implied: that experiences of cognitive delay are vital for 
cultivating compassionate, equitable, and non-violent futures.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that Beckett’s prose invites readers to embrace, rather than 
to reject, feelings of ignorance by presenting us with “difficult” narrative strategies and forms, 
including lists (Watt) and replication (Molloy). Beckett’s prose invites readers to slow or stall 
conventional reading strategies and instead to “read ignorantly”—that is, without the expectation 
that information will be converted into narrative meaning and, consequently, that narrative 
meaning will lead to understanding about a fictional world. Furthermore, I have argued that this 
style of reading—“ignorant reading”—emerges as a potentially ethical practice insofar as it 
offers the reader a way to avoid the antisocial fixation on details or the swift drive toward 
comprehension that frustrates many of Beckett’s characters (Watt and Moran, respectively). By 
urging us to revise our relationship to information from a position in which knowledge is desired 
to one in which non-comprehension is practiced, Beckett proposes an ethics that is potentially 
based on acceptance of irreducible difference rather than the acquisition of knowledge about 
others. I have suggested that this re-valuation of the cognitive strategies typically associated with 
experiences of intellectual debility and intellectual disability in Beckett’s prose coincides with a 
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broader cultural shift during and in the aftermath of the Second World War in which seeking to 
fully understand information is reimagined as both impossible and as potentially undesirable. 
Perhaps, as early “thinking machines” threatened the automation of information processing, 
labor, and violence, the human experience of feeling ignorant was re-appraised because it 
appeared increasingly unavoidable.   
At the same time, it is important to note that ignorant reading, which defers rather than 
requests processes of critical interpretation from the reader, potentially engenders passivity. If 
ignorant reading is a practice of Carlson’s second form of ignorance, “loving ignorance,” which 
involves “‘accept[ing] what we cannot know’” (204), then it may foster the acceptance of cruelty 
towards others as much as acceptance of differences. In other words, it may be difficult or 
impossible to translate ignorant reading, and perhaps loving ignorance more broadly, into action, 
given that loving ignorance stills inquirers’ drives toward comprehension but does not demand a 
change in their attitudes toward others on the basis of increased information or understanding. 
Therefore, even as Watt and Molloy proffer the practice of ignorant reading, they also 
highlight the gap that often persists between ethical thought and ethical action. These texts, as I 
have argued, encourage the reader to observe information while withholding understanding; at 
the same time, they invite ignorant reading to occur through engagement with fictional worlds 
and characters that are characterized as almost always inactive, static, and in decline. This 
connection between ignorant reading and inactivity suggests that this style of textual engagement 
could potentially prepare one to accept a fixed world on the basis of its incomprehensible 
complexity rather than to resist methods of disparity and discrimination. An irony threaded 
throughout Watt and Molloy is that even as they propose ignorant reading as a potentially ethical 
approach for encountering difference within the world, they also highlight the limitations of their 
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own approach by modeling the potential closeness between acceptance and passivity. A central 
question raised but not resolved by these novels, then, is this: when does the acceptance of 
difference become a facet of complicity? 
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Chapter 4: Cognitive Citizenship and the Welfare State in Harold Pinter and Peter Nichols 
 The previous chapter examined how two novels by Beckett model the potential 
drawbacks of propagating intelligence to the exclusion of other cognitive styles, such as 
ignorance. Yet, as this chapter shows, intellectual disability continued to indicate the threat of 
national and communal disruption long after the Second World War. In the 1950s and 60s, the 
efficacy of Britain’s welfare state was a matter of public debate. This debate hinged on whether a 
national community should prioritize unlimited care for its subjects in cases when such care 
threatens to diminish collective efficiency and productivity. Participating in these debates, 
literary authors turned to intellectually debilitated and disabled characters for their power to 
foreground questions about who belongs in imagined communities. The texts examined in this 
chapter ask, What is a satisfactory compromise between the welfare state’s dual goals of 
providing universal care regardless of need and providing efficient and standardized 
infrastructure and services for its citizens? Imagined to be at the margins of personhood, 
intellectual disability provided a conceptual tool for mapping the possible consequences of 
various manifestations of this compromise. 
This chapter explores a cluster of dramas that employ intellectually debilitated and 
disabled characters to appraise the welfare state in Britain’s postwar years: Harold Pinter’s The 
Dumb Waiter (1957) and The Caretaker (1960) and Peter Nichols’s A Day in the Death of Joe 
Egg (1967) and The National Health (1969). While there has been much critical debate about the 
extent to which Pinter’s early plays are political, when read through the lens of Britain’s postwar 
expansion of social services, Dumb Waiter and Caretaker can be understood as explorations of 
what subjects must become in order to adapt to the welfare state’s often-invisible modes of 
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authority.129 Both of these plays turn to intellectual debility to illustrate the potential 
incongruence between individual difference and the social requirements associated with the 
welfare state’s infrastructure. Meanwhile, Nichols’s Joe Egg and National Health provide 
ambivalent critiques of the welfare state’s centerpiece in Britain: the National Health Service 
(NHS). These critiques are in conversation with the overt political commentary in the theatre of 
the Angry Young Men, which had begun to receive attention a few years earlier.130 Joe Egg and 
National Health register uncertainty about the availability and quality of publicly funded 
healthcare, suggesting that this expansion of social services may enervate Britain. The plays 
imagine Britain as a nation of invalid subjects whose impairments and senility, far from being 
cured by the NHS, would be further exacerbated in contrast to what they figure as the energy, 
sexuality, and work-capacity of non-white immigrants to the United Kingdom. In other words, 
Joe Egg and National Health employ a palette of tropes and anxieties that link disability, 
immigration, and race to express concerns about Britain’s welfare state.  
Dumb Waiter, Caretaker, Joe Egg, and National Health participate in a broader cultural 
reassessment of the welfare state in and around the 1960s. The decades following the Second 
World War saw massive changes in the relationship between state and subject in Britain—
changes that many conservative critics, whose views were increasingly influential in this decade, 
																																								 																				
129 Rebecca Dyer provides a concise overview of this debate (148-149). She concludes that while Pinter in 
the 1950s and 60s was clearly less politically vocal than some of his contemporaries, “he was neither 
apolitical nor unwilling to represent race and class conflict or abuses of power in postwar British settings” 
(149). 
130 John Osborne’s Look Back in Anger (1956), which excoriated the class pretensions of traditional 
British society, is generally regarded to have transformed English theatre. Osborne became one of the key 
figures in a group known as the Angry Young Men, which vituperatively rejected British class 
hierarchies. To describe Look Back, the term “kitchen-sink realism” was coined “to emphasise its 
naturalistic lower-class setting and implicit rejection of the ‘Loamshire play’ or middle-class drawing 
room” (Pattie 148). David Pattie argues, “Look Back revived the tradition of the state-of-the-nation play. 
The plays that followed in its wake—by Arnold Wesker, John Arden, Edward Bond and later Howard 
Brenton and David Hare, for instance—turned the state once again into a forum where political and social 
opinions could be vented. […] Thanks to Look Back, from 1956 on, drama rivalled, even surpassed, 
fiction in its ability to unlock contemporary reality” (150). 
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characterized as an expansion of state-sponsored care in exchange for the diminution of personal 
liberties and choices. In the late 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, the United Kingdom rebuilt war-
damaged cities; established green belts around major urban areas to contain development; 
introduced “functional zoning” to distinguish residential, commercial, and industrial land uses; 
began construction on a national motorway system to support massive increases in car 
ownership; constructed a large number of modernized schools and universities; made education 
more widely accessible; and developed the NHS with the goal of providing free health services 
to all citizens.131 These major changes in access to services and infrastructure reflect a significant 
shift in British public policy, from a model based on “the negative and selective concept of 
means” before the Second World War to one based on “the positive principles of universality 
and need” (Royle 240).132 In the postwar years, in other words, policy-makers reimagined the 
British state as a guardian of an individual wellbeing, regardless of that individual’s capacities or 
contributions to society.  
 The rise of the welfare state in Britain was, of course, not without controversy. This was 
particularly the case in early 1960s, when “Britain’s relatively low rate of economic growth had 
belatedly been recognised” (Lowe 305). The 1960s saw a decline in Britain’s economy, which 
has been attributed to the retraction of the British Empire, the deterioration of Britain’s 
manufacturing industries, and the loss of some of its power as a global leader as other countries, 
notably the U.S., improved their standings in the international markets after the Second World 
																																								 																				
131 See Katie Williams’s overview of the history of postwar infrastructure in Britain in “Urban form and 
infrastructure: a morphological review” (2014). 
132 The Beveridge Report (1942) addressed “five giants”: “Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and 
Idleness” (Finlayson 257). Its goal was to expand public goods and social protections for citizens. 
Historian Geoffrey Finlayson observes, “there can be little disagreement that the state did grow [as a 
result of the Beveridge Report]—not, indeed, in a straight, linear development, but towards greater 
involvement in social welfare matters, and towards a great fulfillment of the citizenship of entitlement to 
social rights” (259).  
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War. These economic conditions prompted the conservative argument that “the welfare state was 
not only failing to resolve, but institutionally could not resolve, Britain’s problems” (Lowe 305-
306). The welfare state’s authority over subjects’ lives received intensified criticism in the 
Conservative Party in the 1960s. Rather than a source of benefit and protection for individuals, 
the welfare state was increasingly characterized in public discourse in terms of poor design and 
inefficiency.133 For example, in a 1965 letter to the editor, Conservative MP Ian Macleod decries 
a proposal to implement speed limits on motorways. “Doesn’t he [the Minister of Transport] 
realise that his new restriction is unenforceable as it is undesirable?” writes Macleod, indicating 
that speed limits are too complex and burdensome to effectively enforce (11). Macleod’s letter 
was one of the first to use the phrase “nanny state,” a gendered term that indicates an 
overprotective government interfering with its citizens’ choices. Throughout the 1960s, these 
Conservative critiques gained traction. By the 1970s, the government of Margaret Thatcher 
gained power by characterizing itself as a solution to what it framed as the bloated and inept 
welfare system. Thatcher promised to “roll back the state”; the Thatcher government’s first white 
paper, published in 1979, asserted, “Public expenditure [in the form of welfare state protections] 
is at the heart of Britain’s present economic difficulties” (HM Treasury 1). 
 In addition to intensified criticisms of the welfare state in the 1960s, the postwar years 
also witnessed a surge in immigration to the U.K., particularly by non-white subjects of colonies 
and former colonies. In 1948, the British Nationality Act created a new citizenship category, 
“citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC),” for people born or naturalized in either 
																																								 																				
133 Debates about the functionality of the welfare state, centered around the somewhat hyperbolic slogan 
“the crisis of the welfare state,” began almost as soon as its policies began to be enacted. In 1952, The 
Times ran the first of many editorial debates entitled “The Crisis in the Welfare State” (Lowe 10). 
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the U.K. or its colonies (Hansen 35).134 This Act paved the way for a massive influx of 
immigrants in the 1950s, predominantly from the West Indies and India, a process that Ashley 
Dawson describes as “colonization in reverse” (1). By 1961, between 50,000 and 100,000 people 
immigrated to the U.K. per year (Royale 91), a migration pattern that noticeably affected 
Britain’s racial demographics.  
In xenophobic corners of the postwar public imaginary, the correlation between this 
postwar immigration boom and Britain’s increasing economic precarity was framed as causative; 
these beliefs spurred a period of heightened racial violence in the 1950s and 60s. For example, in 
August 1958, a public argument between a Swedish woman and her Jamaican husband sparked 
race riots in Notting Hill: 
Mobs numbering in the hundreds roamed the streets of Nothing Hill during the 
following nights, attacking any west Indians they could lay their hands on. 
Despite the eerie calm that reined over the rest of London during the rioting, 
groups of primarily young working-class men flooded the streets of Notting Hill 
from surrounding parts of the city and began wreaking havoc. Although a few 
members of the white community defended their black neighbors, during the 
rioting the majority of the neighborhood’s whites kept a complicit silence as lynch 
mobs roamed the streets. (Dawson 28) 
																																								 																				
134 Randall Hansen writes that citizenship “was defined in the United Kingdom for the first time in 1948” 
with the passage of the British Nationality Act (35). The British Nationality Act developed as a response 
to the Canadian Citizenship Act of 1946, which, to many British officials, threatened to fragment the 
unity of the Commonwealth by allowing for the possibility of competing definitions of subjects and their 
relationship to their governments in that Commonwealth. The Act created six categories of citizenship: 1) 
citizens of the United Kingdom and its colonies; 2) citizens of independent commonwealth countries; 3) 
Irish British subjects; 4) British subjects without citizenship; 5) British protected persons; and 6) aliens. 
The Act was not intended to spur a mass migration to Britain; “no one imagined such a movement 
possible” (Hanson 53). Instead, its main goal was to protect the right of all British subjects to enter the 
United Kingdom. See Hanson for a fuller discussion on the British Nationality Act and its consequences 
for understandings of British citizenship (35-79).  
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In 1962, in response to mounting anti-immigration sentiments, Parliament passed the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which limited immigration from Britain’s former colonies by 
permitting only people with government-issued employment vouchers to settle in the U.K. 
(Royale 91). Postwar fears surrounding immigration, which fueled and were fueled by racist 
characterizations of immigrants as undesirable drains on public resources, circulated and 
accentuated anxieties about the purpose and sustainability of the welfare state.  
 In this context, politicians, economists, voters, and—as this chapter suggests—literary 
texts increasingly highlighted what many perceived to be the fundamental paradox of the welfare 
state. On the one hand, a goal of the welfare state was to provide basic assurances to every 
citizen. This universalizing impulse is apparent in “Social Insurance and Allied Services,” 
sometimes called the Beveridge Report (1942), which is widely regarded a foundational 
document of the British welfare state: “The [social insurance] plan covers all citizens without 
upper income limit, but has regard to their different ways of life; it is a plan all-embracing in 
scope of persons and needs, but is classified in application” (9).135 On the other hand, a second 
goal was to foster an orderly and productive society by improving the British economy, which 
welfare state proponents asserted would come about by strengthening the public sector, thereby 
limiting the potentially disruptive effects of private sector market fluctuations. Maynard Keynes, 
another economic architect of the welfare state, reflects this desire for control over national 
prosperity by stating that the future’s central problem is “how to organize material abundance to 
yield up the fruits of a good life” (qtd. in Marcuzzo 198).136 In the 1960s, these two goals 
																																								 																				
135 According to Beveridge, “social insurance” included a range of “schemes and services,” including 
“health insurance, unemployment insurance, old age pensions, widows’ and orphans’ pensions, 
workmen’s compensation for industrial accident and disease, non-contributory pensions for old age, 
public assistance and blind assistance” (Pillars of Security 59). 
136 Political economist Maria Marcuzzo observes, “The two pillars of the Welfare State—distrust of 
market forces and, with it reliance on government intervention to bring about full employment on the one 
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appeared to be particularly in conflict as Britain re-evaluated its commitment to the provisions 
and problems of the welfare state. 
 This tension—between the desire for a state to provide for all citizens and the desire for 
an economy to operate efficiently—inaugurates the question: Who is infrastructure for? By 
infrastructure, I mean a country’s social infrastructure: its hospitals, schools, community 
facilities, and social security.137 Infrastructure is, in other words, forms of politicized space. Far 
from being an inert set of social arrangements, infrastructure is “infused with social meanings 
and reflective of larger priorities and attentions” (Howe et al. 548). It, furthermore, “has a certain 
set of presumptions regarding the future built into it” (Howe et al. 554). How a society designs 
its infrastructure thus exposes its biopolitical orientation toward the future. If the state’s primary 
goal is to provide for all its citizens, regardless of dependence or difference, then infrastructure 
must be available to everyone; if the state’s primary goal is to operate efficiently by enhancing 
its economy and optimizing its communities, then infrastructure may not necessarily be available 
to everyone, particularly debilitated and disabled subjects, whose diverse needs are often 
perceived to be burdensome for public resources.138 Exploring the degree to which infrastructure 
can and should be expansively available is thus necessary in order to address the following 
questions: What are the priorities of the state? To whom does the state have obligations? Should 
(and, if so, when should) a state disregard certain individual needs for the interests of a political 
community? 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
hand, and lack of confidence in the power of liberalism to achieve economic security and social stability 
on the other, again making the case for government intervention—were formulated independently and, 
perhaps, even in opposition to one another” (198). 
137 Han et al. (2012) address these categories in their discussion of the meanings of social infrastructure.  
138 Donna Lero, Carolyn Pletsch, and Margo Hilbrecht discuss this construction of disability-as-burden, 
noting, “individuals with disabilities are often identified as a ‘burden’ to society, an assumption 
reinforced as normative by prevalent bio-medical and economic paradigms” (n.p.).  
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 Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that intelligence is constituted as a criterion 
for belonging in twentieth-century literature and culture. The texts examined in this project 
propose and circulate ideas about intelligence and its corollaries, intellectual debility and 
intellectual disability, to address the question, Who belongs? According to this argument, 
attention to intelligence in twentieth-century literature and science reveals how social boundaries 
within communities, particularly national communities, are designed and maintained. This 
chapter picks up this argument by examining these four dramas, each of which circulates ideas 
about intellectual debility and intellectual disability to explore the affordances and limitations of 
Britain’s postwar welfare state. While Pinter and Nichols were certainly not alone in their 
theatrical investigations of the welfare state’s twin goals—inclusivity and efficiency—they each 
do so by recalibrating what I have argued is a distinctly midcentury concern with the nature and 
meaning of intelligence. In doing so, they extend a familiar modernist question: To what extent 
should individuation be subordinated to cohesion for the purposes of forming and cultivating 
collectivities? 
  
Harold Pinter 
Writing outside of most chronological demarcations of literary modernism, Pinter 
consistently engages with a core modernist concern: the relationship between individuated 
mental privacy and collective mass consciousness. Varun Begley describes Pinter’s oeuvre as the 
“twilight of modernism”; for him, Pinter is “a late-modern playwright who evokes modernism 
while anticipating its decline” (4). For this reason, Pinter challenges literary critics and audience 
members who recapitulate the most familiar division of British playwrights in the 1950s and 60s 
as belonging either to the camp of the supposedly apolitical absurdists, inspired by Beckett or 
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Ionesco, or to the camp of the Angry Young Men, inspired by Brecht and more easily recognized 
as politically earnest.139 Both absurdist and political, Pinter stretches our understanding 
modernism’s relationship to the postmodern and contemporary by showing it to be one of 
continuity rather than division.  
Dumb Waiter reflects this continuity by turning to a common early-twentieth-century 
understanding of intellectual debility as a form of mental privacy capable of contrastively 
revealing how certain cognitive styles affirm and reproduce dominant social values. This form of 
intellectual debility, embodied by Gus, emerges as a socially illegible form of mind that allows 
literary audiences to assess normative cognitive styles and the role of these styles in producing 
certain worlds. Recalibrated for the postwar context of the faltering British welfare state, 
intellectual-debility-as-mental-privacy in Dumb Waiter fails to operate according to the 
mechanisms of authority because it does not comprehend them. This non-comprehension proves 
to be socially (and literally) fatal in the text. At the same time, Dumb Waiter indicts mass 
consciousness, embodied by Ben, with its uncritical and obedient relationship to authority, as 
mindless and “dumb”—both in misapprehension of violence and its muteness in response to 
power. Holding up both of these two cognitive styles as inadequate for confronting authority, 
Dumb Waiter uses intellectual disability to warn against both extreme individualism and extreme 
obedience.  
Dumb Waiter symbolically links the absent voice of authority to the mechanism of a 
dumb waiter. In doing so, the play suggests that infrastructure reflects the desires of power. It 
also suggests this infrastructure is unresponsive to the livelihood of Gus, a cognitively singular 
character who fails to adapt to—and live in—a world dominated by mechanistic adherence to 
																																								 																				
139 Charles Grimes argues that audiences in the 1950s and 60s typically places British playwrights either 
in the Beckettian/Ionesco absurdist camp or that of the Angry Young Men inspired by Brecht. 
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authority. Characterized as confused, curious, and dependent in the sense that he requires 
explanation and translation from others in order to navigate his world, Gus is unable to 
acclimatize to the mechanistic flows of information that organize his profession, his built 
environment, and the decisions of his companion, Ben. 
Dumb Waiter opens as Gus and Ben, two hitmen, wait in a basement room for their 
assignment. The play centers on the differences between their minds. Ben’s mental attention is 
frequently trained outward, toward distractions from their violent task, such as his newspaper, 
woodwork, and model boats (36; 40). Gus, on the other hand, focuses on his immediate sensory 
perceptions. In the basement room, Gus notices a photograph on the wall, the condition of the 
crockery, and an envelope that appears from under the door (39; 41; 45). These different loci of 
attention point toward Ben’s and Gus’s different cognitive styles. While Ben responds to stimuli 
with succinct, apathetic explanations, appearing to comprehend and consequently dismiss new 
information as quickly as he notices it, Gus diligently ponders his surroundings. He asks 
repeatedly about his environment and circumstance, and he often acknowledges his own 
ignorance. These different cognitive styles are encapsulated in how each character responds to 
the persistent sound of the lavatory flushing: 
Gus: Well, I was going to ask you something. 
Ben: What? 
Gus: Have you noticed the time that tank takes to fill? 
Ben: What tank? 
Gus: In the lavatory.  
Ben: No. Does it? 
Gus: Terrible. 
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Ben: Well, what about it? 
Gus: What do you think’s the matter with it? 
Ben: Nothing. 
Gus: Nothing? 
Ben: It’s got a deficient ballcock, that’s all. 
Gus: A deficient what?  
Ben: Ballcock. 
Gus: No? Really? 
Ben: That’s what I should say. 
Gus: Go on! That didn’t occur to me. (39)   
Ben, barely aware of the tank’s faultiness, quickly attributes it to a “deficient ballcock”; Gus, 
ignorant of the problem’s cause—as well as Ben’s crude joke and the fact that he is likely being 
misled—appears astonished at this remark: “Go on! That didn’t occur to me.” 
The differences between Ben’s and Gus’s attention and thought inform how each 
understands their work as hitmen, the mysterious food orders they begin receiving from the 
dumb waiter, and, ultimately, the appropriate response to authority. Ben, the more experienced of 
the two, waits coolly for instruction from their boss, Wilson. Gus, by contrast, complains about 
their work and questions Wilson’s behavior: “Half the time he doesn’t even bother to put in an 
appearance, Wilson. […] I find him hard to talk to, Wilson. Do you know that, Ben?” (51). In the 
play’s main event—which proves to be an apt metaphor for the absent, inscrutable, and all-
powerful Wilson—an unknown interlocutor requests increasingly obscure foods via notes sent 
downstairs on the dumb waiter, a “serving-hatch” manipulated by pulleys (53). “What do you 
think of that?” Gus asks of the first message they receive. “That’s a bit—that’s a bit funny, isn’t 
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it?” (54). Ben responds: “No. It’s not funny. It probably used to be a café here, that’s all. 
Upstairs. These places change hands very quickly. […] We’d better send something up” (54-55). 
Gus is understandably perplexed by these orders; his instinct is to question them as “a bit funny.” 
Ben, on the other hand, chooses to act on codes rather than to interpret them. Gus’s perpetual 
confusion and Ben’s obedience converge tragically and ironically in the play’s final moments, 
when Gus is revealed as the target of the killing and Ben as the sole hitman. 
In most dramatizations of Dumb Waiter, the audience becomes aware that Ben is in on 
the “joke” even though he continues to play along in their quotidian dialogue as if he is not. In 
some productions, Ben knows about Gus’s imminent death all along and toys cruelly with his 
unawareness; in others, Ben learns that Gus is the target of his next kill via the messages he 
receives (presumably from Wilson) on the dumb waiter. It is Ben, after all, who not only 
explains the meaning of these messages to Gus but reads them aloud in the first place, actions 
that suggest he may be concealing the truth of their instructions from his companion. Therefore, 
through Ben, the audience observes Gus’s ignorance from a position of superior understanding. 
Francesca Coppa compares this dynamic to that of Freud’s theory of jokes, in which he 
understands jokes as expressive of repressed hostilities. For Freud, this is evident in that joke-
telling requires at least three people: a teller, a subject (the “butt” of the joke), and a listener. The 
teller and listener bond over their shared hostility toward the subject of the joke, at the same time 
releasing aggression. For this reason, Freud understands humor as a conscious expression of 
thoughts that are usually suppressed or prohibited.  
According to Coppa, Dumb Waiter reiteratively plots Freud’s theory of jokes, with Ben 
in the position of teller, Gus in the position of subject, and the audience in the position of 
listener. The audience, then, is lulled into coalition with Ben (and, by extension, Wilson) even as 
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we become aware of the violence they intend to commit. “By the end of the play,” Coppa writes, 
“Pinter has trained us to see that the content of the joke-exchange is meaningless: what is 
important is the structure the alliances and antagonisms it reveals” (48). Jokes, in other words, 
are not meaningless absurdities, but vehicles for nefarious and sometimes invisible forms of 
power. What is important about Freud’s theory of jokes for my reading is that it explains the 
peculiar form of community that the play encourages between Ben and the audience, who over 
the course of the play grow to share a collective understanding of impending violence and its 
victim. This same mechanism solidifies the association between Gus and mental privacy. While 
Ben and Wilson (and the audience) think alike in that they regard Gus, ultimately, as a target, 
Gus misinterprets his own role in the play until its last moments. 
Gus’s persistent ignorance earns him a place in the discursive category of “idiocy.” This 
is not to say that Gus is an intellectually disabled or neurologically impaired character, but rather 
that his dialogue and behavior reflect the cognitive style often associated with representations of 
idiocy. Elsewhere in this dissertation, I have established how idiocy’s etymological and cultural 
meanings include a position from which one stands apart from the forms of understanding that 
bind a community. For this reason, idiot figures work against seemingly intransigent forms of 
knowledge by questioning their assumptions without recapitulating their totalizing logic. Martin 
Halliwell claims that the idiot is a flexible figure who on some occasions serves as “a symbol of 
childlike innocence in contrast to a corrupt or overly rational adult world” (2). Gus’s questioning 
of Ben, Wilson, the dumb waiter, and the anticipated killing reflect this aspect of idiocy. 
Through Gus’s confusion the audience is able to perceive the depth of the manipulation and 
cruelty he suffers. His ignorance of the social circumstances in which he finds himself allows 
him to name and alert us to what he himself has not yet recognized. For instance, near the end of 
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the play, Gus unwittingly identifies himself as the object of the killing as he repeats Ben’s 
“instructions” (64): 
Ben: He won’t see you. 
Gus: (absently) Eh? 
Ben: He won’t see you. 
Gus: He won’t see me. 
Ben: But he’ll see me. 
Gus: He’ll see you. 
Ben: He won’t know you’re there.  
Gus: He won’t know you’re there. 
Ben: He won’t know you’re there. 
Gus: He won’t know I’m there. 
Ben: I take out my gun. 
Gus: You take out your gun. 
Ben: He stops in his tracks. 
Gus: He stops in his tracks. 
Ben: If he turns round— 
Gus: If he turns round— 
Ben: You’re there. 
Gus: I’m here. (65) 
Gus misses the significance of Ben’s subtle pronoun slippages; “he” (the object of the killing) 
becomes “I” (Gus). If Gus were a more suspicious observer, this wordplay would reveal his 
intended position opposite Ben’s gun. When Gus does in fact embody this position at the end of 
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the play, the audience experiences it as a recapitulation; we, unlike Gus, could predict this 
violence on the basis of the preceding dialogue. Through Ben, words become events; the 
audience experiences this progression because Gus can articulate but not resist the brutality of 
the social arrangement in which he finds himself. 
So far, I have argued that Dumb Waiter recapitulates the functions of idiot figures that 
played out elsewhere in midcentury modernist literature. The play also stages a competing 
understanding of idiocy, which grew up alongside literary modernism. This latter understanding, 
I now argue, is one in which idiocy came to also indicate the potential inflexibility of mass 
consciousness.  
In the twentieth century, this first understanding of idiocy—the discursive position of 
someone who is outside a community and can, consequently, unwittingly speak the truth about 
it—was layered with new assumptions about so-called mental deficiency. Mathew Thomson 
observes, “The term ‘mental deficiency’ emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. It 
extended the medical differentiation between ‘lunatics’—those who had acquired a mental 
illness, often a temporary or curable state—and those who had permanent mental damage or 
incapacity from birth” (7). In the medical imaginary, the distinguishing features of mental 
deficiency, in other words, were its permanency and stasis.140 These qualities imbue the so-called 
mentally deficient with a lack of temporality and individuation, coating idiocy with a sense of 
durable automatism. In her breathtaking philosophical exploration of the related concept of 
stupidity, philosopher Avital Ronell offers several examples from nineteenth- and twentieth-
century literary history that express this sense of permanence and stasis. She quotes Gustav 
Flaubert, for instance, who writes that idiocy “is something unshakeable. Nothing attacks it 
																																								 																				
140 Licia Carlson also makes this point, suggesting that idiocy is often envisioned as a permanent state 
(30). 
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without breaking itself against it. It is the nature of granite, hard and resistant” (qtd. in Ronnell 
16). Similarly, in a 1933 essay entitled “Ruminations of a Slow-Witted Man,” Austrian author 
Robert Musil observes that it is the obduracy of idiocy that makes it a magnet for collective 
violence, both as its object and its subject. Idiocy, he claims, is both the key to and product of 
what we now call—a la George Orwell—“groupthink.” “Stupidity begins when we say ‘we’ 
instead of ‘I’” (Ronnell 65), Musil writes, observing that idiocy is the relative of fascism in that 
fascism demands the relinquishment of the intellect. Outside the scope of Ronnell’s analysis, 
Gustave Le Bon affirms this link between idiocy and collectivity when he writes, “This very fact 
that crowds possess in common ordinary qualities explains why they can never accomplish acts 
demanding a high degree of intelligence. […] In crowds it is stupidity and not mother-wit that is 
accumulated” (17). Together, these examples suggest that idiocy is increasingly aligned with 
mass consciousness in modern literary thought even as it retains its paradoxical association with 
social separation. 
In the twentieth century, in other words, the concept of idiocy, and its cognates mental 
deficiency and stupidity, becomes aligned with stasis and permanence, which connect to 
pervasive modernist concerns about mass thought, media, and culture as potentially corrosive to 
individual thought and identity. That is, in the twentieth century, idiocy becomes associated both 
with the mind of the figure that stands outside the mass and the mind of the mass itself. For this 
reason, idiocy is at once singular, separate, and distinct from normative mentality and also at the 
heart of group consciousness. This tension between idiocy as cognitive otherness and idiocy as 
the cognitive essence and byproduct of the mass sheds light on cultural anxieties about both 
radical asociality and radical collectivity in the twentieth century. Both positions signal the 
potential erosion of an individual’s cognitive sovereignty.  
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It is Ben, not Gus, who enacts this second sense of idiocy as cognitive collectivity. Ben, 
whose experience and quick explanations suggest that he is more knowledgeable than Gus, also 
emerges as unthinkingly compliant with the commands of higher powers. Ben absorbs 
instructions and automatically acts on them with little reflection about their connections to 
broader systems of meaning. This mechanistic approach to information is evident from the play’s 
opening exchange, when Ben tells Gus a story, presumably from the newspaper he is reading: 
Ben: A man of eighty-seven wanted to cross the road. But there was a lot of 
traffic, see?  
He couldn’t see how he was going to squeeze through. So he crawled under a 
lorry. 
Gus: He what? 
Ben: He crawled under a lorry. A stationary lorry.  
Gus: No? 
Ben: The lorry started and ran over him. 
Gus: Go on! 
Ben: That’s what it says here. 
Gus: Get away. 
Ben: It’s enough to make you want to puke, isn’t it? 
Gus: Who advised him to do a thing like that? 
Ben: A man of eighty-seven crawling under a lorry! 
Gus: It’s unbelievable. 
Ben: It’s down here in black and white. 
Gus: Incredible. (36)  
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Gus is skeptical about what he hears (“Go on”; “Get away”) and voices his characteristic 
suspicion of invisible forms of power: “Who advised him to do a thing like that?” With this 
question, Gus suggests that no person would act so self-destructively without a directive from 
someone else. In contrast, Ben’s understanding of the story is literal and even “mindless,” as 
Robert Gordon observes.141 Ben repeats, “A man of eighty-seven crawling under a lorry!” and 
affirms the story’s factuality on the basis that it is printed “in black and white.” If Gus is an idiot 
figure because he never fully grasps the nature of his work, Ben is an idiot figure because he 
performs his work thoughtlessly, acting on the instructions he receives without interpreting their 
import. 
Dumb Waiter, then, models two forms of mindlessness, posing to the audience the 
question: Who is the real dumb waiter? At the end of the play, Gus, who is both incredulous and 
ignorant, waits as he stares down the barrel of Ben’s gun; Ben, who is both obedient and 
informed, waits to act on the information he has received. From the audience’s perspective, it is 
probably easier to empathize with Gus’s position. After all, Gus has been duped. But there is 
tragedy in Ben’s position as well. When he pulls the trigger, he will accept his role of authority’s 
tool, becoming, literally, a hired gun. Gus will lose his individuality in the sense that he will die, 
but Ben will lose his individuality through his subservience to Wilson and his association and the 
mechanized dumb waiter, which acts only according to the will of others. Ben’s situation 
reminds the audience to be wary of our relationship to information, which, particularly when it 
emanates from figures of authority, may coax us into complicity rather than leading to greater 
wisdom. Although Ben ostensibly knows more than Gus because he views the play’s central 
problem from the perspective of an insider, his perspective proves to be equally as “mindless” as 
																																								 																				
141 Gordon describes both Gus and Ben as “mindless,” pointing out that Ben, in the play’s final moments, 
“goes into a ritual of repetition, ordained by his superior, because that’s the only way he can feel secure 
from the moral responsibility for killing his partner; he won’t have to think, he can just act” (251). 
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Gus’s. 
Pinter’s play ends with a tableau of waiting. The final stage note instructs, “They stare at 
each other” (71). The characters’ ocular gridlock signifies how cognitive positions associated 
with skepticism and compliance, questions and explanations, ignorance and information, are 
equally indicted by the end of the play. The tableau leaves the audience with evidence of the 
potential for unreflective minds to enact harm and for uninformed minds to experience harm. 
Cognitive style, Dumb Waiter tells us, prepares us for our relationship to power and its 
concomitant forms of violence.  
 Following Irving Wardle’s assessment of Pinter’s early dramas as “comedies of menace,” 
Dumb Waiter is most often interpreted as an absurdist investigation of the forms of play that take 
place between agents and victims of destruction.142 According to this critical framework, Dumb 
Waiter comments on abstract forces of power rather than the specific political forces of its 
cultural moment.143 Pinter’s early “comedies of menace” are often distinguished from his later, 
explicitly political commentary, most notably The Hothouse (1980) and One for the Road 
(1984). Yet the fact that he began work on Hothouse in 1958, between writing Dumb Waiter and 
Caretaker, points us toward a political early Pinter. In fact, Pinter himself claims that his “earlier 
plays, far from being apolitical, worked as political metaphors, implicitly critical of the abuses of 
authority” (qtd. in Milne 196).  
  It is no accident that Dumb Waiter’s dumb waiter—through its connections to the absent 
Wilson—becomes associated with absent, unfeeling forms of authority. In the context of postwar 
Britain’s welfare state, the dumb waiter can be understood as symbolic of structural changes to 
																																								 																				
142 Gordon explains, “early critics latched on to labels like Irving Wardle’s ‘comedies of menace’ to 
indicate the peculiar—and unresolved—mystery that characterizes each of these fragmented thrillers of 
working-class life” (5). Wardle later retracted this descriptor for Pinter’s theatre. 
143 Drew Milne makes this point, observing, “his earlier plays, far from being apolitical, worked as 
political metaphors, implicitly critical of the abuses of authority” (196). 
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the nation’s resources and services. Intended as a device that will serve individuals equally as 
they transport messages and objects between floors, by the end of the play, the dumb waiter, in 
serving certain individuals above others, exposes this equitable intention as a fantasy. At the end 
of the play, the dumb waiter and Ben will, presumably, live to transfer information another 
day—the dumb waiter by lifting messages up and down, and Ben by deploying bullets from his 
gun on behalf of Wilson. Gus is excluded from this symbiotic relationship between Ben and the 
dumb waiter. The dumb waiter, as a conduit for information, form of technology, and vehicle for 
power, does not serve him. Not all minds, the play suggests, will benefit from the workarounds 
that infrastructure provides; some will be depleted by their encounters with automation—as is 
Gus, when, following Ben’s directions, he sends all their food upstairs—and some will be 
excluded altogether. 
 Three years later, Pinter clarifies this message in Caretaker, his first commercial success. 
Caretaker dramatizes the interactions of three men. Aston, the audience learns in an extensive 
monologue at the end of Act II, was previously committed to a mental hospital, where he 
received electro-shock “treatment” that left him permanently brain-damaged. Always cognitively 
non-normative, his former garrulous storytelling—fueled, apparently, by hallucinations—
disturbed café patrons to such an extent that they called for his confinement. In the present action 
of Caretaker, Aston is often silent and inscrutable. He frequently speaks about building a shed in 
the garden while ignoring the tasks necessary for the upkeep of his flat, which has fallen into 
disrepair.  
The play opens when Aston brings home Davies, a homeless man he has rescued from a 
bar fight. Davies drives the majority of Caretaker’s dialogue with his relentless and hateful 
observations, which center on the condition of Aston’s flat and non-English “aliens,” including 
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Scots, Poles, Greeks, and, especially, “Blacks” (6). John Stokes argues that Davies’s dominant 
characteristic is his racism: “his refusal to concede to others the right to relocation that he 
demands for himself,” Stokes writes, “makes him, if not the first, then certainly the most 
authentic, portrait of a contemporary racist in modern British drama” (35). Davies frequently 
fabricates aspects of his past and masks his own poverty and homelessness with claims to class 
pretension. For instance, describing his supposedly discriminating tastes as a bar fly, he 
comments, “I went to the pub the other day. Ordered a Guinness. They gave it to me in a thick 
mug. I sat down but I couldn’t drink. I can’t drink Guinness out of a thick mug. I only like it in a 
thin glass” (17). These fabrications are belied by Davies’s present position, which is troubled, as 
the audience learns, by the fact that he lacks access to “papers” proving his identity (18).  
 Mick, Caretaker’s third character, is Aston’s aggressive younger brother and the owner 
of the flat. After lurking in the home to spy on Davies, Mick attacks him as he begins to 
rummage through Aston’s belongings. Later, Mick slyly pretends to trust Davies and invites him 
to act as caretaker of the flat, ostensibly because Aston is incapable of doing so.144 Davies, 
overcome with an inflated sense of his own importance, brags to Aston about how he will 
redecorate. Aston responds, “I don’t think we’re hitting it off” and asks him to leave (66). Davies 
returns with Mick, whom he triumphantly expects will defend him. But Mick sides with his 
brother, and the play ends as the brothers observe but ignore Davies’s pleas and excuses for his 
past behavior. Before this series of silent denials, a stage note requires that Mick and Aston “look 
at each other. Both are smiling, faintly” (73). In some productions, this note inaugurates the 
suggestion that the brothers’ treatment of Davies has been a setup all along, perhaps part of what, 
for them, is a familiar and pleasurable pattern of torment and rejection of an outsider. 
																																								 																				
144 Earlier in the play, Aston asks Davies to take on this same role. 
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 Most dramatizations and critical accounts of Caretaker focus on the play’s triangulation 
of Davies, whose exclusion by the brothers seems at once humorous (Davies spouts absurdities 
and grandiosities; he is also laden with stereotypes of poverty, long coded as humorous in British 
literature), justified (he is antagonistic, boorish, and xenophobic), and potentially heartbreaking 
(his attempts at forgiveness and acceptance at the end of the play continually fall on indifferent 
ears). The complexity of his character arises from the fact that the play’s structure requests the 
audience’s disavowal of Davies’s ideas, words, and actions while at the same time asking, in its 
closing moments, for our recognition of his personhood and inevitable need for care by others. 
Yet, due to his cognitive difference as a result of electroshock therapy, Aston’s claims to 
belonging are as ambiguous as Davies’s. For instance, in Act Two, Mick asks if he can ask 
Davies’s advice about Aston. “I’m… I’m a bit worried about my brother,” says Mick. “He 
doesn’t like to work. […] It’s a terrible thing to have to say about your own brother” (46-47). 
This confession is not necessarily genuine; Mick, the audience realizes in most productions, slyly 
shares this information to earn Davies’s trust, making it easier to dupe him later. But regardless 
of its authenticity, this exchange points to the ease with which the characters’ alliance against 
Davies could be reconfigured to instead exclude Aston.  
Aston is, after all, “a funny bloke,” as Davies recognizes (48). His electroshock therapy 
has left his verbal style halting and hesitant, and he fixates on what seem to Mick and Davies to 
be irrelevant details of his environment. And, as Aston’s monologue at the end of Act Two 
reveals, the electroshock therapy he received has not “cured” but only recalibrated his cognitive 
strangeness. In the monologue, Aston recalls the moment when he received his diagnosis: 
Then one day… this man… doctor, I suppose… the head one… he was quite a 
man of… distinction… although I wasn’t so sure about that. He called me in. He 
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said… he told me I had something. He said they’d concluded their examination. 
That’s what he said. And he showed me a pile of papers and he said that I’d got 
something, some complaint. He said… he just said that, you see. You’ve got… 
this thing that’s your complaint. And we’ve decided, he said, that in your interests 
there’s only one course we can take. He said… but I can’t… exactly remember… 
how he put it… he said, we’re going to do something to your brain. (53-54)  
In this recollection, Aston is an outsider to the medical knowledge that shapes his life. At the 
time, he knows only that he has “some complaint”; in the present, he can’t remember “how he 
put it”—or, in other words, how the doctor explained the procedure that Aston received. This 
monologue shows that Aston’s experience, like Davies’s, has frequently been affected by his 
lack of access to information. Aston can be understood as intellectually debilitated in that he has 
a tenuous and partial relationship to information and normative styles of thought.  
 Caretaker primarily signals Aston’s debilitated state through his approach to the 
infrastructure of his home. For instance, Davies becomes aware of Aston’s mental singularity 
through his observations about Aston’s unkempt flat. A stage note indicates that the setting 
should include “A bucket hang[ing] from the ceiling” (4), which prevents water from leaking in; 
a sack is draped over the window, which leaves the room—as Davies continually complains—
“draughty” (9). The garden outside is also untended (15). In Act III, Mick reiterates the flat’s 
messiness by observing that it is filled with “Clobber”—“old iron” that is “no good to anyone” 
(59). Davies and Mick fantasize how they might improve the space, making it, as Mick imagines, 
“A palace” (59). But Aston focuses instead on constructing a shed in the garden. In other words, 
Davies and Mick share a vision of improving the flat, making it a more comfortable place to live; 
Aston, whose attention is directed elsewhere, is untroubled when entropy takes its course in his 
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home. As symbols of his cognitive style, Aston’s cluttered flat and unfinished shed signify his 
fractured mind in the wake of electroshock therapy. Physically distanced from the flat itself, the 
shed also signals the fact that Aston’s interior world is largely inscrutable to Davies, Mick, and 
the audience, all of whom attempt to decipher his interiority through his silences and 
fragmentary, disordered form of speech. More invested in the shed than the flat, Aston trains his 
attention on a structure that is isolated and separate from the public architecture of the apartment 
building. 
Davies also registers his distaste for the un-staged immigrants with whom they share the 
building through his concerns about the quality and cleanliness of shared space. Davies—who is 
obsessed with nationality and race—persistently complains about the “Family of Indians” that 
rents the adjacent rooms (11).145 He abhors sharing the toilet with them, and he hopes that Aston 
never invites them into his own room, “Because, you know… I mean… fair’s fair” (16). When 
he discusses his plans for the flat with Mick, Davies comments: 
I told him [Aston] the other day, see, I told him about them Blacks, about them 
Blacks coming up from next door, and using the lavatory. I told him, it was all 
dirty in there, all the banisters were dirty, they were black, all the lavatory was 
black. But what did he do? He’s supposed to be in charge of it here, he had 
nothing to say, he hadn’t got a word to say. (57) 
Associating the family with “dirt,” Davies seeks to exclude them from the bathroom and Aston’s 
room. He activates a popular contemporaneous (and contemporary) position on immigration 
when he describes the presence of immigrants as a threat to the places to which he imagines he 
belongs. In one of his earliest lines in the play, he recollects that he could not find a seat in the 
																																								 																				
145 One irony of his fixation on categories of nationality and race is that Davies’s own nationality appears 
indeterminate to both Mick and Aston. Aston asks if Davies is Welsh (23). 
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bar where he met Aston because “All them Blacks had it, Blacks, Greeks, Poles, the lot of them, 
that’s what, doing me out of a seat, treating me like dirt” (6). Here, Davies implies that the 
presence of immigrants excludes him from the spaces to which he is accustomed. For him, 
immigrants foul his familiar environments and denigrate him (“treating [him] like dirt”), thereby 
robbing him of the inclusion and respect he believes he is owed.  
Both the potential exclusion of Aston and of the actual immigrant family are imagined 
spatially: in the case of Aston, social separation is signified through the image of the shed, and in 
the case of the family, it is signified through what Davies hopes will become their restricted 
access to the building’s common areas. Intellectual debility and foreignness become linked 
through their shared status as spatial outsiders, with limited interest in (for Aston) and limited 
access to (for the Indian family) public infrastructure. 
This connection becomes clearer through the symbolic implications of Aston’s Buddha 
statue, one of the only decorations present in the flat, which binds the play’s logic of spatial 
exclusion in the cases of foreignness and intellectual debility. Early in the play, Davies asks 
Aston about the statue: 
 Davies: What’s this? 
 Aston (taking and studying it): That’s a Buddha. 
 Davies: Get on. 
 Aston: Yes. I quite like it. Picked it up in a… in a shop. Looked quite nice to me.  
Don’t know why. What do you think of these Buddhas? 
  Davies: Oh, they’re… they’re all right, en’t they? 
  Aston: Yes, I was pleased when I got hold of this one. It’s very well made. (15) 
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Davies’s questions about the Buddha statue immediately precede the first articulation of his fears 
about sharing a bathroom with the Indian family, suggesting that the presence of both the statue 
and the family signal, for him, the potential corruption of familiar spaces. While it is clear that in 
the xenophobic world of Davies the statue represents foreignness, the Buddha also represents a 
form of mindlessness coded positively in Buddhist thought. Caretaker plays with the association 
between Aston as a “thoughtless”—or intellectually debilitated—character and the states of 
mindlessness valued in Buddhism when Aston nearly fails to remember where he obtained the 
Buddha statue (“Picked it up in a… in a shop”) and why it appeals to him (“Don’t know why”). 
In these lines, Aston is “thoughtless” in the sense that he does not have access to the memories 
he is seeking. The Buddha statue remains on stage until the play’s final moments, when Mick, in 
a fit of rage, shatters it by throwing it against the wall (72). Its material presence onstage 
throughout the production can be understood as a continual reassertion of the connection 
between foreignness and intellectual debility, both of which have tenuous relationships to shared 
space and both of which raise questions about what it means to belong in Britain’s welfare state.  
 This association between foreignness and intellectual debility is historicized and 
politicized in the text’s attention to the question of who benefits from the resources of the state. 
One of Davies’s continual refrains is that he is attempting to travel to Sidcup in order to get his 
identification “papers” (17). According to Davies, he changed his name and the absent papers 
prove who he is: 
Jenkins. Bernard Jenkins. That’s my name. That’s the name I’m known, anyway. 
But it’s no good me going on with that name. I got no rights. I got an insurance 
card here. (He takes a card from his pocket.) Under the name of Jenkins. See? 
Bernard Jenkins. Look. It’s got four stamps on it. Four of them. But I can’t go 
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along with these. That’s not my real name, they’d find out, and they’d have me in 
the nick. Four stamps. I haven’t paid out pennies, I’ve paid out pounds. I’ve paid 
out pounds, not pennies. There’s been other stamps, plenty, but they haven’t put 
them on, the nigs, I never had enough time to go into it. (18) 
Of course, Davies’s claims to the papers and the identity of Bernard Jenkins ring as suspect, 
especially given his parasitic tendencies and inconsistent relationship with the truth. But this 
passage touches on the importance of government-issued identification as a tool for social 
recognition. Without the proper papers, Davies (he claims) is denied services from the state, 
including health care. Mick recognizes—and mocks—the precarity of Davies’s position as an 
undocumented citizen, which he learns about by eavesdropping in Act One. In Act Two, Mick 
pretends to offer Davies a room to rent in the building. In the false offer, he lists off an 
increasingly absurd list of verifications that would validate Davies’s identity and financial 
position: 
So what do you say? Eight hundred odd for this room or three thousand down for 
the whole upper storey. On the other hand, if you prefer to approach it in the long-
term way I know an insurance firm in West Ham’ll be pleased to handle the deal 
for you. No strings attached, open and above board, untarnished record; twenty 
per cent interest, fifty per cent deposit; down payments, back payments, family 
allowances, bonus schemes, remission of term for good behaviour, six months 
lease, yearly examination of the relevant archives, tea laid on, disposal of shares, 
benefit extension, compensation on cessation, comprehensive indemnity against 
Riot, Civil Common, Labour Disturbances, Storm, Tempest, Thunderbolt, 
Larceny or Cattle all subject to a daily check and double check. Of course we’ll 
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need a signed declaration from your personal medical attendant as assurance that 
you possess the requisite fitness to carry the can, won’t we? Who do you bank 
with? Who do you bank with? (34-35) 
Davies, as Mick well knows, cannot participate in this bureaucratic system of partial social 
protections because, while he is a human in need of shelter (zoe), he is not, without the proper 
paperwork, recognized as a citizen entitled to benefits from the state and its apparatuses (bios).146 
Mick, in other words, points to the incongruity between Davies’s needs as a human and needs as 
a citizen. By highlighting the disjuncture between these aspects of Davies, Caretaker confirms 
that even as the state expands its protection of the most vulnerable through expanded public 
goods, it also reproduces patterns of exclusion by recognizing claims to these goods only if they 
originate from persons with socially legible identities. 
 Mick’s tirade, which begins when Mick claims that Davies does not “belong in a nice 
place like this” (33), touches on a core question of the play: What does one need to do—or who 
does one need to be—in order to belong in ways that are recognizable to the state? Davies, 
Aston, and the Indian family all prove to have fragile claims to state belonging. For instance, in 
the play’s final moments, Mick’s insults toward Davies invoke categories of citizenship by 
referring to him as a “barbarian”: “You’re nothing else but a wild animal, when you come down 
to it. You’re a barbarian” (72). This comment, which locates Davies outside of a shared national 
identity, indicates the ease with which categories of citizenship can be manipulated by redrawing 
the boundaries of belonging. Elsewhere, Mick again links the connection between Davies’s 
status as an outsider to foreignness. “You remind me of my uncle,” Mick remarks when he first 
meets Davies (29). “He was always on the move, that man. Never without a passport. […] I think 
																																								 																				
146 In Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Giorgio Agamben distinguishes between two forms 
of life: “bare life” (zoe) and life imbued with social and political meaning (bios). 
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there was a bit of the Red Indian in him. […] Your spitting image he was. Married a Chinaman 
and went to Jamaica” (29). Caretaker draws on the heated immigration debates of Britain in the 
1960s to animate its investigation of the requirements for social and national legibility.  
An irony of Caretaker is that the only character whose claims to belonging are not called 
into question is Mick, the flat’s owner. The most volatile and violent of the characters, Mick also 
has the strongest sense of entitlement to the shared space, and the dialogue of other characters 
never calls this into question. Through Mick, Caretaker indicts the concept of citizenship, 
suggesting that shared identities protected so vehemently from outsiders may, as a consequence, 
become corrupted from within. 
Throughout this section, I have suggested that Caretaker braids together multiple 
narratives of social exclusion in order to explore the mechanisms of belonging in Britain’s 
postwar welfare state. Far from abstract in its cultural sensibilities, Caretaker invokes the 
concerns of a particular political moment—especially concerns regarding immigration and 
documentation—in order to explore the version of national identity that emerges through the 
regulation of belonging to a national community. By continually framing the question of who 
belongs in the flat in terms of nationality and foreignness, the play figures the flat (and the 
building in which it exists) as a metonym for the nation as a whole. Questions about who has a 
right to the shared space of the building map onto broader questions about who has a right to the 
resources of the national community. 
The perilous presence of the Indian family and Davies show that race and citizenship are 
central categories for determining social legibility. Yet, in addition, Caretaker’s investigation of 
Aston shows that rubrics for belonging include cognitive style. In fact, the core actions of 
Caretaker—the presence of Davies, the invitation that Davies serve as caretaker, the expulsion 
	 201	
of Davies—unfurl because Aston invites Davies into the home for which he has neglected to 
care. We might call this a failure to perform cognitive citizenship. Aston’s mind is misaligned 
not only with others’ expectations for social behavior, resulting in his incarceration in the asylum 
and subsequent electroshock therapy, but also with expectations for interacting with the flat. By 
metonymically linking Aston’s intellectual debility to the flat’s disrepair, the play suggests that 
orderly infrastructure requires a form of cognitive citizenship to which Aston, as an intellectually 
debilitated figure, does not belong. 
 Like Dumb Waiter, Caretaker imbues infrastructure with social meaning, suggesting that 
it is not politically inert, but rather active in demanding and forming particular cognitive styles. 
Furthermore, the play suggests that infrastructure enacts processes of inclusion and exclusion 
according to the status of a subject’s cognitive citizenship. Whereas in Dumb Waiter, the 
mechanistic dumb waiter becomes linked to Ben’s uncritical obedience to authority, in 
Caretaker, the flat’s disrepair points toward the demands of cognitive citizenship and the 
difficulty of addressing these demands. The plays animate questions of social (in Dumb Waiter 
and Caretaker) and national (in Caretaker) belonging by turning toward the category of 
intellectual debility, which provokes questions of how communities—including imagined 
communities—are constituted and who they exclude.  
 
Peter Nichols 
 Like Pinter, Nichols in Joe Egg and Health mines intellectual debility for its social 
indeterminacy to test the welfare state’s methods of inclusion and exclusion. Unlike Pinter, 
Nichols directs these aesthetic inquiries toward a specific object, one of the welfare state’s core 
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apparatuses: the National Health Service.147 In both of these semi-autobiographical dramas, 
intellectual debility showcases the limitations of the NHS. Both Joe Egg and Health present Tory 
critiques of the welfare state by suggesting that the NHS’s goal of providing universal healthcare 
to all citizens might be in conflict with the welfare state’s other central goal of cultivating an 
efficient, streamlined, and productive society. In Joe Egg and Health, as in Dumb Waiter and 
Caretaker, the category of intellectual debility proves to be a “rough edge” that does not cohere 
easily, or, in some cases, at all with state formations requiring citizens to set aside differences in 
order to engage similarly with the public goods. 
Nichols’s critiques of the NHS are not without hope. In the 1960s, Nichols, a socialist, 
very much believed in both the ongoing project of the British welfare state and the capacity of 
dramatic art to provoke meaningful political change.148 Indeed, Alec Patton regards Health as 
“cautiously optimistic” about Britain’s potential future as a multi-racial welfare state (444). 
Despite this optimism, both Joe Egg and Health engage with contemporaneous criticisms of the 
NHS and the welfare state as a whole, pointing toward the potential incongruity of the welfare 
state’s twin goals: inclusivity and efficiency. Joe Egg and Health expose and sometimes satirize 
the NHS as both hopelessly bureaucratic and hopelessly bungling: unfeeling and impersonal 
when confronted with the lives of individuals, while at the same time capriciously animated by 
personal investments and feelings. The plays suggest that the welfare state operates coldly and 
efficiently according to eugenic logic of exclusion on the basis of capacity, which has made it a 
poor system for difference and debility; at the same time, they imply that the state’s inefficiency 
																																								 																				
147 In 2013, The Guardian ran an article on Peter Nichols’s “revival.” Although Joe Egg has seen a steady 
stream of productions since its initial staging, most of Nichols’s drama has remained untouched since the 
1960s. Alfred Hickling of The Guardian notes, “there has been a clutch of Nichols revivals late—not 
enough to suggest a sea change, but significant nonetheless” (n.p.).  
148 In fact, Nichols published a rather pedantic volume entitled Aristophanes’ Novel Forms: The Political 
Role of Drama in 1998 in which he argued that the dramatic arts are central to “political or civic 
education” (11). 
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stems from its universalizing impulse to provide for individuals regardless of degree of 
dependence or debility.  
These dramas levy their multidirectional critique of the welfare state by presenting 
multiple, overlapping generational perspectives on the relationship between the NHS and 
intellectual disability. This section argues that Joe Egg and Health frame the NHS as 
simultaneously an incompetent producer, an officious protector, and an apathetic bystander of 
intellectual disability. In other words, the NHS does not straightforwardly “cure” or manage 
intellectual disability; instead, its mechanisms of supervision also debilitate subjects and are 
animated by debility. This multivalent framing of the relationship between debility and state 
services points to a cultural logic in which intellectual disability is positioned as both the 
antagonist and the protagonist—the central burden and the raison d’être—of the welfare state. 
Joe Egg conveys the welfare state’s ambivalent relationship to intellectual debility by 
dramatizing the circumstances of a young couple struggling to care for their ten-year-old child, 
Joe, who has multiple and indefinite disabilities, including speechlessness and intellectual 
difference.149,150 The stage note emphasizes Joe’s intellectual difference, observing that while she 
is “physically normal but for the stiffness of her legs and arms,” “Her face is pretty but vacant of 
expression” (16-17). Joe’s parents, Bri and Sheila, hold incompatible but equally toxic views on 
her disability. Sheila sees her daughter’s disability as evidence that she has no developmental 
trajectory; she infantilizes Joe and, by referring to her both as a “sweet flower” (83) and a 
“vegetable” (36), implies that her experience does not include the supposedly temporal 
																																								 																				
149 Joe Egg remained a staple of British secondary school reading lists in the 1970s and 80s.  
150 Joe’s masculine name is not explained in the play, but it recalls the fact that intellectually disabled 
figures are almost always gendered male in twentieth-century literature.  
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complexities of humans or non-human animals.151 Bri, on the other hand, understands Joe’s 
disability as a symbol of what he perceives to be Sheila’s promiscuous behavior prior to their 
marriage. Bri is obsessed with Sheila’s sexuality, quizzing her on the details of her experiences 
with former partners (23) and accusing her of present affairs (22). He urges Sheila to admit that 
“it [Joe’s disability] was because [Sheila had] been promiscuous, yes, and [her] subconscious 
was making [her] shrink or withdraw from motherhood” (28). For both parents, Joe’s disability is 
a screen onto which they project their fantasies and anxieties.152  
 Joe’s screen-like function is literalized in lengthy sequences in which Bri and Sheila 
imagine Joe is a non-disabled child, a prim middle-aged lady, or an easily offended interlocutor. 
This imaginative yet disturbing play constitutes the majority of Bri’s and Sheila’s dialogue when 
they are on stage together. Bri points out that if Joe had been non-disabled, “she’d only have had 
one personality. As it is, we’ve given her dozens down the years” (42). Sheila remembers seeing 
“she had even less character than the other children. So we began to make them up for her” (42-
43). Both parents describe the process of creating Joe’s invented personas as a narrative activity 
that they (and the audience) share.  
Although Joe’s imagined personas vary in terms of age and attitude, Bri and Sheila 
commonly figure her as a stereotypically patriotic and conservative older woman. In this fantasy, 
Joe is not a disabled child, but a middle-aged lady with a “powder-pink felt hat, white gloves, 
																																								 																				
151 Bri and Sheila’s treatment of Joe recalls the contemporary case of Ashley X, “a disabled girl whose 
parents in 2004 had obtained approval from doctors and the ethics committee at the Seattle Children’s 
Hospital to pursue medical treatment that would stop her growth and sexual development. Asserting that 
Ashley would always have the motor and cognitive skills of a three-month-old baby, those who supported 
this treatment claimed the treatment would improve her quality of life by preventing future discomfort 
and trauma and by making it easier for her parents to take care of her” (Hall 1). Others, including many 
disability activists and scholars, condemn the parents’ decisions on the basis of what they see as its 
infantilization and sexualization of Ashley X. For a fuller description of the Ashley X case, see Kim Q. 
Hall’s discussion of feminist perspectives on disability studies (1-3). 
152 See disability theorist Ato Quayson, who describes the process of narrative generation that also 
accompanies representations of disability as “aesthetic nervousness.”  
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Cuban heel shoes, [and] swagger-coat” (43). She “Loves the Queen” and also Jesus, whom she 
sees as “an eccentric English gentleman. Sort of Lawrence of Arabia”; she is generally 
“disapproving of pleasure” but adores “A nice Julie Andrews film with tea after” (43). These 
characterizations draw on clichéd British sensibilities and allegiances, parodically framing Joe as 
a national type. In these passages, Joe becomes a metonym for a nostalgic British past, which 
Sheila and Bri contrast with their chaotic present.  
Sheila and Bri’s present world is saturated with experiences of large-scale social change, 
which they register as difficult to navigate and indicative of national deterioration. For instance, 
Bri is a schoolteacher working in the context of the (still relatively new) Education Act of 1944. 
The Act, part of the welfare state’s social service reforms, made education more widely 
available, particularly to girls and members of the working class.153 But Bri’s opening 
monologue—the first words spoken in the play—frames this social change as a catalyst in the 
formation of disordered, unruly social spaces: 
 That’s enough! (Pause. Almost at once, louder.) I said enough! (Pause. Stares at  
audience […]). Another word and you’ll all be here till five o’clock. Nothing to 
me, is it? I’ve got all the time in the world. (Move across without taking his eyes 
off them.) I didn’t even get to the end of the corridor before there was such a din 
all the other teachers started opening their doors as much as to say what the hell’s 
going on there’s SOMEBODY TALKING NOW! (Pause, stares again, like 
someone facing a mad dog.) Who was it? You? You, Mister Man?... I did not 
accuse you, I asked you. Someone in the back row? (Stares dumbly for some 
seconds. Relaxes, moves a few steps. Shrugs.) You’re the losers, not me. Who’s 
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that? (Turns on them again.) Right—hands on heads! Come on, that includes you, 
put the comb away. Eyes front and sit up. All of you, sit up! (9) 
Bri acts the part of an ineffective and unimpressive authority, whose attempts to instruct his 
“students” (i.e., the audience) in proper decorum continually fall flat and require repetition. His 
inconsistent enactments of power are reflected in his wishy-washy demeanor. Pinter’s stage note 
describes Bri as “Hardly ever at rest […]. Clowning may give way to ineffectual hectoring and 
then self-piteous gloom” (9). However he is played—as a poor man’s dictator, a manipulative 
comedian, a whiner, an inadequate egomaniac—the monologue emphasizes Bri’s inability to 
control the behavior (and interpretive capacities) of his addressees. This failure is, on the one 
hand, a nod to art’s autonomy in its interpretive interchange with an audience; like Bri, a 
playwright or director has little control over how her or his “instruction” is received by the actor 
or the audience. But this self-deprecating statement about artistic authority is particularized in the 
context of a postwar classroom, which Bri later dismissively describes as overcrowded with 
“forty or fifty council-house types and blackies” (18). This passage contrasts with Bri’s fantasy 
of a prewar classroom, which he understands through Sam Wood’s 1939 film (based on a 1934 
novella by James Hilton) about an aging and beloved school teacher: “Oh, we keep them off the 
streets, you know. Eyes front hands on heads […]. It’s not exactly Good-bye Mister Chips” (53). 
These passages suggest that welfare state policies, including education and immigration policies, 
have resulted in a tumultuous society that fails to respond to the efforts of control and regulation. 
 Sheila, like Bri, experiences challenges in a society that has recently experienced 
dramatic change. Unlike Bri’s mother—whom Sheila describes exclusively in terms of her 
maternal role: “She gave him the kind of suffocating love that makes him think the world 
revolves around him” (27)—Sheila has a life outside the home and apart from her husband and 
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child. While Joe attends a school program for children with disabilities, Sheila leaves to act in a 
play. Sheila’s newly available public life is both a source of freedom (as a member of the theatre 
company, she both gets to “see some people” and to enjoy “Plenty of whiskey afterwards” [16]) 
and a source of domestic turmoil: Bri is discomfited about being left to care for their daughter in 
the evening while Sheila is at rehearsal, and he is jealous of Freddie, a socialist Sheila meets 
through her participation in the theatre. Bri frequently complains about Sheila’s theatrical 
involvement, which he perceives as a threat to his masculinity that leaves him “Stuck in here 
every night like Joe Egg” (51). His continual expressions of jealousy and fear about Sheila’s life 
outside the home speak to the reiterative erosion and reassertion of patriarchal power, which, 
many believed, was increasingly endangered in the welfare state. 
 As it happens, like those of her parents, Joe’s life has been considerably altered through 
her interaction with the welfare state. When they are not authoring new personas for Joe, Bri and 
Sheila most frequently discuss the possible sources of her disability. A lengthy sequence at the 
end of Act I suggests that Joe received brain damage as in infant from a bureaucratic, 
impersonal, and negligent NHS. In this sequence, Bri and Sheila relive Joe’s birth and the first 
few months of her life, acting out the parts of the medical providers with whom they interacted. 
The fact that Bri and Sheila voice the providers themselves, as opposed to interacting with new 
characters onstage, gives the impression that they are rehearsing familiar lines that they have 
frequently discussed together.  
Their narrative of Joe’s birth paints a picture of an irresponsible healthcare system in 
which untrustworthy providers both over-medicate and neglect their patients. The sequence 
begins as Bri recollects that Sheila was in labor for five days because the “doctor kept on 
drugging [her]” (29). Sheila remembers she “couldn’t make anyone understand! I couldn’t 
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salivate or swallow so I stayed hungry” (30). During this time, Bri remembers, “the G.P. would 
pop in to see me with his boyish grin. […] And we’d piss ourselves. […] And have another 
Scotch” (30). This medical abandonment continues after Joe comes home with her parents. 
Sheila says, “Soon I began to notice these funny turns. We asked our friends who’d had babies 
but they said it was most likely wind. So in the end we took her to our new G.P.” (31). This 
second doctor confuses Joe’s gender (32) and uses what Bri and Sheila consider to be the 
unconvincing analogy of a car engine to describe Joe’s health: “Look at it this way. You know 
when you get a starter-motor jammed? Seems serious at the time but put it in second gear and 
rock the whole shoot back and forth, she’s soon as right as rain” (34). His best advice for Bri and 
Sheila comes in the form of directions, when he informs them about which bus they should take 
to reach the children’s hospital, about which he knows nothing. The fact that Joe’s care is 
dispersed across two hospitals underscores the sequence’s broader indictment of the welfare 
system as dislocated and therefore difficult to navigate. 
At the children’s hospital, Bri and Sheila encounter a pediatrician intended to be played 
with a strong German accent. This accent (in Bri’s re-presentation of the encounter) reinforces 
Joe Egg’s play with national stereotypes. After examining Joe, the pediatrician, unreceptive to 
the parents’ concerns, assures them that she has been appropriately tested and is sure to remain 
docile: 
Vell, mattam, zis baby off yours has now been soroughly tested and ve need ze 
bets razzer battly so it’s better you take her home. I sink I can promise she von’t 
be any trouble. Keep her vell sedated you’ll hartly know she’s zere. (35) 
The figure of the emotionally distant German pediatrician, more concerned with social planning 
(“ve need ze bets razzer battly”) than with individual circumstance or need, may have registered 
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to audiences in 1967 (and still today) as a Nazi caricature, suggesting that the NHS shares with 
fascism the prioritization of efficient social organization as opposed to the protection of 
individual citizens. The pediatrician’s tenuous grasp of English also serves as a justification for 
why he cannot provide any specific information about Joe’s condition; he has “trouble vis 
Englisch werbs” (36). Yet his observation that Joe has “no organic malformation of ze brain,” 
coupled with the worrying scar that Bri and Sheila observe on her head, suggests that he may be 
a source of harm rather than help (35). The scar implies that the pediatrician’s medical 
intervention heightened or even produced Joe’s disabilities, damaging what it was meant to 
repair. After these disappointing and menacing encounters with socialized medicine, each of 
which has left them without information about Joe’s disability or a plan for her care, Bri and 
Sheila give up on the NHS and begin to understand their daughter as “a living parsnip” (39). 
Through their experiences, the play critiques a system that operates mechanistically but 
imperfectly, producing disability rather than treating illness. 
 The strongest defender of the welfare state is Sheila’s acquaintance Freddie, who visits 
their home along with his wife, Pam, in Act Two. Freddie is a proponent of social engineering, 
including the social changes brought into being by the welfare state, on the basis of that it 
cultivates a more productive society. Bemoaning his factory position, Freddie remarks, “That’s 
what’s so galling to me as a Socialist. The waste! Since school, as a matter of fact, I saw nothing 
of [my father] till six months ago. On a train to Town. I leaned over and said, ‘Dum spiro spero 
mean anything to you?’ […] Our school motto. Where I live I hope” (50). Freddie’s reference to 
“waste” points both to his training in Latin, which poorly prepared him for his work in industry, 
and to the work and opportunities he might have pursued otherwise. His indictment of “waste” 
suggests an orientation toward both social organization and self-reliance as bases for communal 
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improvement. He regards dependence and the difficulties of individual circumstance as problems 
to be solved. For instance, of Shelia and Bri’s life with Joe, he comments, 
I don’t want to sound authoritarian or fascist but there’s only one useful approach 
to any human problem and that’s a positive one. No use saying: “This is no way 
to live, in every night with a hopeless cripple.” No use at all. Same with problem 
teenagers. You don’t say, “Naughty boy, go stand in the corner.” You say, “Get 
hold of these nails and a hammer!” Then you’re in business. (51) 
In particular, Freddie views Joe’s disability as a problem that can be solved by the institutions of 
the state. He encourages Bri and Sheila to effectively replace Joe by having another child, with 
the help of “fertility boosters” and a gynecologist he knows in London (54), or through adoption: 
“If all else fails, I’ll get the adoption machinery moving. Takes some time as a rule but I can put 
some ginger under the right people. Get it moved to the top of the in-tray. Always back out later 
if you find you’ve hit the spot” (55). Meanwhile, Joe, he suggests, should be institutionalized. 
“I’m on the board of a wonderful place,” he offers. “They’re not prisons, you know, not these 
days. They’re run by loving and devoted teachers—hideously underpaid, but I’m doing what I 
can in that direction—” (55). At this suggestion, Sheila protests, “I don’t care how good the 
nurses are—she knows!” (55). Sheila’s remark asserts Joe’s individuation and the particularity of 
her subjective experience (“she knows!”). If Freddie is interested in streamlining difference by 
“strip[ping] it [the family’s situation] down to essentials” (56), Sheila is invested in reaffirming 
Joe’s uniqueness as an individual. According to her, Joe cannot easily fit into the mold of 
services that society has designed for individuals with disabilities; her difference exceeds the 
social planning that Freddie promotes and points to its flimsiness when it comes to accounting 
for differences among people. 
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 So far, I have suggested that Joe Egg critiques the welfare state on the basis of 
bureaucratic excess and uncaring incompetence, which account poorly for individual variance. 
Joe’s extraordinary body and mind, which exceed and evade the expectations of her doctors, her 
parents, and Freddie, routinely highlights these impersonal aspects of the welfare state. Yet Joe 
Egg’s critique of the welfare state cuts in another direction when it contrasts Bri and Sheila’s 
present with their wartime childhoods. At one point, Bri comments, 
Spare the rod spoil the child, Mum. […] Welfare State. Life’s all too easy these 
days—free milk, show-jumping. Physiotherapy. Singing and candles. What 
singing and candles did we have at her age? Air-raids and clothing coupons and if 
we didn’t like that, my mother used to say, “That be all you’re getting, my 
sonner.” (19-20) 
Here, Bri suggests that the welfare state coddles its citizens, forming lazy and untested citizens 
who lack the resourcefulness of the wartime generation. Elsewhere, Sheila reinforces this point 
by claiming that even as Bri’s mother complains about how inflation has affected her (66), she 
and her neighbor have enough prosperity to “sit in [their] perfectly insulated houses each with 
[their] own TV and stove and lawn-mower and empty garage, each complaining continually 
about being a blooming nun” (73-74). And elsewhere, Freddie remarks ominously, “The whole 
country’s giggling its way to disaster” (57). These passages highlight how Joe Egg critiques the 
welfare state on the basis of what it figures as capacious inclusion as much as uncaring 
exclusion. The characters’ complaints about the welfare system arise as much from its 
indiscriminate practices of care as its apathy about Joe’s medical circumstances. 
 The welfare state, emblematized through the NHS, is thus indicted at two levels in Joe 
Egg. The play figures the welfare state as hopelessly bureaucratic and inept, but it also figures 
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the welfare state as dangerously benevolent in the benefits it provides to citizens—which, as 
Bri’s remark implies, threaten to “spoil” citizens by making things too easy for them (19). These 
seemingly contradictory concerns converge in the figure of Joe, whose intellectual debility both 
stands as a continual reminder of the worst aspects of the NHS and also requires continual care 
from her parents. 
 At the center of Joe Egg is Bri’s increasing resentment of this care, which he disdains in 
part because he sees at as a threat to his masculinity. “I’m not the new nannie,” Bri responds 
when Sheila asks him to change Joe’s “nappy” (21-22). Later, he highlights Joe’s inactivity by 
remarking, “Lovely soft hands you’ve got. Like silk. Lady’s hands. They’ve never done rough 
work” (24). This resentment reaches its climax at the end of the play, when Bri, who appears to 
have improperly medicated Joe while she was under his care, takes Joe out to the car, apparently 
in an attempt to euthanize her. “Left her lying in the back of the car,” Bri says (82). “I was going 
to leave her in the garden but I couldn’t— […] So in the end I put her in the car. I don’t know 
what I wanted—just to stop them saving her again” (82). The strong implication is that Bri 
believes he is undoing the effects of NHS care, which preserved Joe’s life while damaging her 
brain. Bri operates from the eugenic perspective that people unable to contribute to society in 
certain ways are unworthy of life. By dramatizing Bri’s approach to intellectual debility, the play 
invokes intelligence as a criterion for a worthwhile life. 
Despite Bri’s malevolent efforts, Joe lives because Sheila rescues her. But Joe’s life is 
irrevocably changed in that the incident inspires Sheila to send Joe part-time to a residential 
hospital. The promise of her occasional absence offers to restore Bri and Sheila’s relationship 
and to reinstate normative gender roles in their marriage. To Bri of his actions, Sheila says: 
	 213	
I don’t blame you. Honestly. It was my fault, I’ve been asking too much. Not 
now—d’you know what I’m going to do? I’m going to look for a residential 
hospital where I’m sure she’ll be well looked after and won’t pine. And when I’ve 
found it, d’you know what? (She is facing down. He looks at her.) You and I will 
leave her there—oh, I don’t know—several weeks, even a month, every year. 
Means we’ll be able to go abroad. Haven’t been abroad for eleven years. Second 
honeymoon. All right? And let’s start now. (Her hands are all over him.) (87)  
Even though Bri has tried to kill their daughter, Sheila does not hold him responsible; instead, 
the stage notes suggest that she is aroused by his actions. The affective coding of Sheila’s closing 
lines depends on staging: Is she relieved? Numb? Frightened by Bri and attempting to placate 
him? The play’s narrative structure frames the exclusion of intellectual debility in the residential 
hospital as imperative for the reassertion of the expected power relations between husband and 
wife within the social institution of the patriarchal family. Disturbingly, Joe Egg is based on 
experiences from Nichols’s own life. According to Vincent Canby, who reviewed a 1972 film 
adaptation of Joe Egg for The New York Times, 
   The first child of the playwright and his wife was a spastic daughter,  
described by Mr. Nichols when interviewed here four years ago as “a meaningless 
accident.” 
“We used to make up fantasies about the child, but we are not the parents 
in the play,” he said. “We put our child in a home, which, of course, is what the 
parents in the play should have done.” Instead of despairing, the Nicholses had 
two more children, both normal. (n.p.) 
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These shocking quotes indicate that Nichols regards institutionalization to be the proper path for 
intellectually disabled children and suggest that he himself regards the play’s end as a happy one. 
 In this section, I have argued that Joe Egg holds the welfare state responsible for Joe’s 
intellectual debility. Instead of a propagator of normativity, the NHS, and, by extension, the 
welfare state, is figured as the cause and sustenance of Joe’s disabilities. In other words, Joe Egg 
proposes that in a welfare system, the state proliferates non-normativity rather than mandating 
standards of identity and behavior. It is only by working against the logic of the welfare state that 
Bri is able to restore some continuity and order in a world that he and Sheila otherwise perceive 
to be overwhelmed by an unmanageable flood of difference. At the same time, Joe’s exile to an 
institution at the end of the play points to the ways in which the proliferation of debility justifies 
the expansion of infrastructure in the welfare state. Ostensibly operating in order to provide care, 
the NHS in Joe Egg acts as an apparatus of capitalism, creating need in order to mollify it with 
new goods. This aspect of the play highlights how the twin drives of the welfare state, care and 
economic efficiency, come into conflict. 
 As in Pinter’s work, intellectual debility in Joe Egg inaugurates questions of belonging. 
These questions are directed at specific apparatuses within the welfare state with the goal of 
uncovering the forms of citizenship they produce or require. The sinister suggestion of Joe Egg 
is that instead of raising citizens’ quality of life, the welfare state debilitates its citizens, literally 
(in the case of Joe) or figuratively (in the case of the pampered citizens about whom Bri and 
Sheila complain). Joe Egg can be understood as using intellectual debility to leverage a warning 
against the forms of mindless, babied life that the welfare state often was and is accused of 
promoting.  
	 215	
 Two years later, in National Health, Nichols takes up a similar set of concerns. The play, 
which is absurdist and non-linear in its plot structure, focuses on two settings: an under-funded 
NHS hospital housing several elderly male patients and a romanticized medical soap opera that 
airs on the hospital’s television. The transitions between these two settings are signaled by 
musical and lighting cues. The boundary between these two settings is porous, however. Some 
characters drift between the two worlds, and hospital patients frequently comment on the events 
in the soap opera, and the soap opera characters sometimes attend to the hospital patients. 
In the hospital, the patients often misremember the reasons for their hospitalization and 
the social expectations of the hospital. Their nurses, in turn, frequently respond to these signs of 
confusion and dementia with infantilizing platitudes. For instance, when Rees, a former doctor, 
wakes up believing he has forgotten to leave the hospital and return home to his wife, Nurse 
Sweet placates him: 
  Nurse Sweet: Not being naughty again, are we, doctor? 
  Rees: This gentleman’s kindly offered to fetch my clothes. 
  Sweet: What about some bye-byes?  
  Rees: Earlier on a lady brought me a message from my wife about the taxi… but  
my eyes are going… perhaps you— [….] 
  Sweet: Now shall we tuck in nice and cosy— 
  Rees: Only the meter will be ticking away down there… 
  Sweet: —and get some sleepy-byes? 
  Rees: Some what? 
  Sweet: D’you want a bottle? (15-16) 
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The patients, some of whom reference their former military service in the Second World War,154 
are dismissively reduced to bodies in need of care. They are usually imagined to lack meaningful 
subjectivity by practitioners with whom they interact.  
Entangled with these instances of intellectual debility resulting from aging is the narrative 
of an increasingly absurdist soap opera, “Nurse Norton’s Affair,” which dramatizes a love affair 
between a nurse who has recently immigrated from the West Indies and a svelte Scottish doctor. 
Near the end of their melodramatic love story, Nurse Norton volunteers to donate a kidney to her 
lover, an act that convinces his previously recalcitrant father of her merits as a future wife. 
Although music and lighting cues signal the distinction between the NHS hospital and the soap 
opera, both worlds are simultaneously embodied on the stage. Several characters (including 
Nurse Norton herself) cross between the hospital and the soap opera, confirming the function of 
film and television as media as one of identification and projection.155 Barnet, a medical 
attendant who sometimes voices the narrative cues of the soap opera, sutures together the two 
narratives.  
The play sets up an ironic contrast between the sentimentalized world of what in 1969 
was a new genre of popular media—the televised medical drama156—and the “actual” world of 
NHS hospitals. At the same time, it aligns the audience with the pacified patients who are 
trapped in the hospital and consume the soap opera. By the end of the play, the audience shares 
																																								 																				
154 For instance, Flagg and Loach both mention previous military service (66). 
155 Roland Barthes discusses these aspects of film in “Leaving the Movie Theatre”: “I press my nose 
against the screen’s mirror, against that ‘other’ image-repertoire with which I narcissistically identify 
myself […]. What I use to distance myself from the image—that, ultimately, is what fascinates me: I am 
hypnotized by a distance; and this distance is not critical (intellectual); it is, one might say, an amorous 
distance” (420-421). 
156 See Janine Marchessault’s discussion of midcentury televised medical dramas. One of the most famous 
midcentury medical dramas was Dr. Kildare, which aired in the 1960s. Dr. Kildare, a fictionalized doctor 
created in the 1930s, had previously appeared in short stories, novels, magazines, comics, and on the 
radio. The first episode of Dr. Kildare aired on NBC in 1961. 
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the category confusion that patients such as Rees experience when they are unable to separate 
fantasy from reality. The play’s final scene plays up this category confusion by combining the 
play’s two stories into a gratuitous musical spectacle. The scene’s stage note indicates: 
     Music, lights and a pantomime transformation. Stained glass in the Gothic 
windows, church bells and a wedding march.  
  A carpeted staircase comes down centre and two bridal pairs appear […], the 
grooms in kilts, the brides in white. 
 The patients, quick and dead, appear with the nursing staff from both sides, 
throwing confetti, streamers, rice, and waving Union Jacks. (108) 
The presence of the flags underscores National Health’s explicit critique of the NHS as an aspect 
of national infrastructure, which takes place through a diptych addressing ideas about the NHS 
alongside its “actual” functionality. Through garish black comedy, the play ultimately suggests 
that the NHS fails to live up to its reassuring identity in the public imaginary. The play warns the 
audience against the cognitive bewilderment of the patients, who increasingly confuse the 
squalor of their circumstances with the idealized world of the soap opera. 
 Central to National Health is the relationship between the NHS and Britain’s national 
policy on immigration. As in Joe Egg—which, through Bri, voices the fear that British citizens 
will appear fragile in comparison to the immigrants who arrived in the U.K. in the postwar 
years—National Health poses Englishness and whiteness as potentially threatened. Most of the 
nurses are identified as West Indian, and while they are young and sexually appealing, the 
British patients are aging, ailing, and enervated. “Shocking sight,” Rees remarks while watching 
one of his fellow patients be fed (23); elsewhere, Nurse Lake comments of the patients—in a 
parody of a racist remark—“They all look the same to me” (13). National Health’s care dynamic 
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figures white, male, British characters in passive and obedient roles in contrast to the (mostly) 
immigrant nurses. 
This care dynamic opens up questions about British citizens’ dependency on the NHS 
system, which in turn is linked to Britain’s history as an imperial power and its exploitation of 
immigrant and subaltern labor. Many characters comment on the reliance of the NHS on lenient 
immigration policy. In one exchange, Nurse Sweet wonders why her colleague and her 
colleague’s husband would want to continue to support British infrastructure with their labor: 
Sweet: Your husband drives a bus full of white passengers and you look after a  
ward of white patients—Don’t you ever get hopping mad, Beth? 
  Lake: Mad? No, Joyce. Why? 
Sweet: When you think of the way some white people treat coloured people, I  
wonder you’re not tempted to turn off their saline solutions into 
something… 
  Lake: Oh, no, those people shouldn’t be hated. They should be pitied. And  
understood. 
Sweet: And when you think that the Health Service would pack up tomorrow if  
you all went back where you came from. Crikey! I’m surprised you bother 
to stay, Beth, honestly! (27) 
Regardless of the affects at work in the delivery of these lines, this exchange plants the 
suggestion that the NHS could not be supported without the structural racism and inequality 
retrained in the aftermath of the British Empire. The NHS, in other words, is imagined to rely on 
non-white labor to execute its least appealing forms of labor. This connection escalates to 
paranoia by the end of the play, when Barnet suggests that immigrants working in the NHS may 
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depart, taking with them the skills to form their own hospitals in their countries of origin: “When 
he’s carried the bedpans for a couple of weeks, he’s going back to Timbuktu and run [sic] this 
brand new hospital they’re building” (98). The rampant racism voiced by several characters in 
the play conceals their reliance—both as citizens and receivers of care—on the labor of 
immigrants.  
As in Caretaker and Joe Egg, anxieties about immigration, race, and citizenship are 
evaluated and tested against concerns about the intellectual debilities of white male patients 
whose families have lived in the British Isles for generations. One of the patients, Mackie, voices 
this constellation of eugenic concerns in relation to Flagg, one of the most ailing patients. “He’s 
barely conscious,” says Mackie to a fellow patient, “Can’t even hear you” (57). He then indicts 
the NHS for its focus on sustaining subjects he deems to be useless: 
This state we’re in. This ward. Where men are prevented from death by poverty or 
curable sickness even the least intelligent… least healthy or useful… […] Can’t 
cure loneliness—boredom—ugliness… but at least you can see they’re lonely on 
clean sheets… ugly on tapioca pudding… […] I’m dying of stomach cancer and 
the pain’s only bearable with pethedine and morphine. I’ve asked them to let me 
die… but because of their outdated moral assumptions they have to keep me 
going— (59) 
Here, Mackie frames Flagg’s life, and his own, as lives not worth living, citing their increasingly 
deteriorated physical conditions. He suggests that while the NHS has been able to reframe and 
extend the conditions of biological life—he states, “My heart’s stopped once already, which used 
to be called death… now they bring you back” (59)—it has neglected to address the problems 
that prevent life from being meaningful: “loneliness—boredom—ugliness.” Like Bri in Joe Egg, 
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Mackie sees mentally and intellectually debilitated life as inherently impoverished and unworthy 
of extension. For Mackie, “Good life” [italics original] is “Useful life” (59)—good life, in other 
words, is that which is not dependent on others in the sense that it does not require a network of 
care for its continuance. The indeterminate value of immigrant life in National Health is thus 
contrasted with life in the “state we’re in”: a state that Mackie frames in terms of debility and 
dependency. 
 National Health frequently assesses the “state we’re in” through discourses of intellectual 
debility, which, in turn, points to pervasive anxieties about national degeneration. We have 
already seen that the play uses memory integrity (Rees) and intelligence (Mackie) as criteria for 
health. In the crescendo toward the disorienting final scene, Nichols draws on the connections 
between developmental delay and idiocy to portray complete deterioration: 
From the left, downstage of the armchairs, Ken crawls on all fours. His head is 
still bandaged and he wears gown and slippers. He hides from ASH then raises 
both fists and points his index fingers. He imitates gunfire. 
Ash: Now, Kenny, old son, what are you up to, eh? 
 
(KEN is now an idiot. His efforts at speech are incoherent but the others are used 
to his condition and talk over the noise.) 
In response to Ken’s garbled “efforts at speech,” Ash asks, “D’you know, son, we speak the most 
beautiful language in the world? That’s our heritage. The tongue that Shakespeare spake” (107). 
These lines invoke nostalgic understandings of Englishness as lexically harmonious, which are 
contrasted—ironically—with the cacophonous verbal performance of Ken the “idiot.” This 
exchange hammers home the play’s consistent connection between individual health, including 
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intellectual integrity, and the health of the nation. In other words, Ash voices the belief that 
Ken’s verbal performance signals the degradation of English “heritage” by corrupting the 
language of Shakespeare. The play’s endorsement of this belief is certainly under question—the 
play’s absurdity and melodrama demand unserious stagings—but it is a connection that 
nevertheless requires engagement in Nichols’s play. 
 Scenes such as this one recalibrate turn-of-the-century eugenic concerns about the health 
of the nation for a 1960s audience. These concerns prove to not be as straightforward as the 
typical narrative of degeneration, which locates threats to society in the culture and biology of 
foreigners and the poor. Instead, in National Health, immigrants appear youthful, attractive, and 
able while simultaneously propelling the NHS as an apparatus of health. Meanwhile, the hospital 
patients become increasingly needy and their behavior becomes increasingly clownish. The play 
raises the question: What categories of personhood and thought are worthwhile, both for an 
individual to perform and for a nation to support through its infrastructure? 
 National Health ends with a satirical scene of total inclusion, in which “the whole 
company” appears onstage in a lavish parody of a wedding between Nurse Norton and her suitor. 
The hospital, in other words, has become a place where everything and everyone belongs: every 
medical condition, character, and narrative. Combining in an explosion of signification in 
different tonal registers—including “Gothic windows, church bells and a wedding march” 
alongside “Barnet in black-face” (108-109)—the final scene mixes the concerns of the hospital 
and the soap opera, which to this point have been kept at least ostensibly separate. The hospital, 
in short, ceases to function as a hospital; its nurses and patients “quick and dead” have fully been 
converted into the fantasies produced and sustained on the television screen, demonstrating for 
the audience a shift toward total inclusion that results in an increasingly incoherent imagined 
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community (108). National Health does not stage a process of exclusion, as do Dumb Waiter, 
Caretaker, and Joe Egg. Instead, it stages the messiness of total inclusion, which declines to 
discern even at the level of dominant narrative. 
 Like Caretaker and Joe Egg, National Health confirms the links between discourses on 
immigration and intellectual debility at midcentury. The connection between these two 
discourses suggests a broader concern about evaluating non-normative forms of life in terms of 
race, citizenship, and cognitive style. These plays suggest that as the British Empire—and the 
hierarchy of identities enforced through the mechanisms of empire—continued to dissolve, 
intellectual debility continued to serve as a resource for assessing and evaluating the features of 
shared national identity in Britain. Pinter and Nichols frame British national identity as 
beleaguered and depleted, suggesting it might benefit from embracing—not rejecting—outsiders, 
including immigrants. At the same time, these plays indict Britain’s welfare state by suggesting 
that it demands conformity and a docile relationship to authority in exchange for access to 
infrastructure and public goods. In all of these plays, claims to inclusion are ultimately belied by 
the rejection of cognitive styles that have not or cannot adapt to the expectations of 
infrastructure. 
 
Staging Intellectual Debility 
 Throughout this chapter, I have outlined a moment in midcentury drama in which 
intellectual disability contributed to shifting understandings of national belonging in Britain. As 
the effects of immigration policy, concerns about the welfare state, and the gradual dissolution of 
the British Empire continued to reshape what it meant to be a British citizen, literature—
particularly the politically charged domain of theatre in midcentury England—addressed these 
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newly animated questions of belonging. The cluster of plays I have analyzed here show that in 
this midcentury context, discourses concerning intelligence and intellectual disability were 
recalibrated to assess the mechanisms of national belonging. Clare Hanson and others have 
shown that eugenic approaches to intellectual debility had long, unsavory afterlives in the 
postwar years.157 This chapter demonstrates that while eugenic attitudes continue to be voiced on 
the midcentury stage, the relationship between the state and the subject presumed in an earlier 
eugenic moment is inverted. Whereas in an earlier eugenic moment, “the state and the individual 
embarked on an unprecedented quest to renew an idealized national community” (Turda 8), in 
these midcentury plays, the welfare state is rendered suspect in its opposition to individuals. Its 
claims to universal inclusion, which it performs through recently proliferated public goods and 
infrastructure, are revealed by Pinter and Nichols to be inauthentic. Dumb Waiter, Caretaker, 
and Joe Egg show that infrastructure in the welfare state demands particular forms of cognitive 
citizenship that require the suppression or erasure of difference and debility. Meanwhile, 
National Health reveals the belief that everyone would have access to infrastructure in the 
welfare state to be a fantasy. In these plays, discourses of intellectual debility both provide a 
familiar referent for decisions of social inclusion and exclusion and also test the parameters of 
cognitive citizenship in the welfare state. 
Disability theorist Tobin Siebers argues that the shock of recognizing mental disability in 
the sphere of aesthetics “dissolves the essence of what art is” (15), suggesting a breakdown of 
the methods by which we segment art into a distinct, often privileged, modality of perception. 
Encountering intellectually debilitated and intellectually disabled characters, including those 
examined in this chapter, involves a perforation of this conceptual distinction between art and 
																																								 																				
157 See especially her chapter “Defective Humans: Mental Deficiency in Post-war Britain” (39-65), which 
argues that the category of mental deficiency continued to carry discursive power during the 
reconstruction years. 
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life. One way to understand these literary texts is as evidence of how a web of discourses 
defined, manipulated, and instrumentalized notions of intelligence in the twentieth century to 
establish criteria for inclusion or exclusion in categories of personhood and community. These 
texts, also, might be encountered as models of the social arrangements to work against in the 
present—as technologies for turning our attention outward, into the world. 
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Conclusion 
 D.H. Lawrence, in his 1929 poem “A Tale Told By an Idiot,” compares “modern life” to 
the utterances of an idiot figure: 
Modern life is a tale told by an idiot;  
flat-chested, crop-headed, chemicalised women, of indeterminate sex, 
and wimbly-wambly young men, of sex still more indeterminate, 
and hygienic babies in huge hulks of coffin-like perambulators— 
The great social idiot, it must be confessed, 
tells dull, meaningless, disgusting tales, 
and repeats himself like the flushing of a W.C. (522) 
Drawing on a frequently cited soliloquy from William Shakespeare’s Macbeth, Lawrence 
disparages what he views as the erosion of differences between male and female bodies wrought 
by the social conditions of interwar modernity.158 This moment, Lawrence writes, is one in 
which categories of people have begun to blur with one another, becoming “indeterminate,” or 
impossible to distinguish from one another. The image of children in “coffin-like perambulators” 
suggests, furthermore, confusion between the beginnings and endings of life. The deathly 
perambulators register unease about the future of the species with increasing capacity to 
scientifically manipulate sexual life—manipulations that would produce, in Lawrence’s view, 
“chemicalised women” and “hygienic babies.” The cognitive corollary to such distorted 
categories of personhood and life, for Lawrence, is a “great social idiot” who speaks reiteratively 
“like the flushing of a W.C.” The idiot’s speech, in other words, is both impure in its content and 
																																								 																				
158 The same year, on the other side of the Atlantic, William Faulkner published his own meditation on 
the relationship between Shakespeare’s “tale told by an idiot” and modern life, The Sound and the Fury.  
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automatic in its form, recalling the mechanization of flush tanks rather than the spontaneity and 
vitality that Lawrence associated with creative thought.159 
 In this poem, the figure of the idiot, far from “meaningless,” registers what this 
dissertation has argued is a distinctly midcentury concern with the nature and meaning of 
intelligence for imagined communities. The speech of the idiot, as Shakespeare (and William 
Faulkner) indicate, may be “full of sound and fury / Signifying nothing” (Macbeth V.v 27-28), 
but the style of this speech, and the fact that the idiot speaks at all, signals the potential 
proximities between personhood and non-personhood, death and life, seeming and being, and 
confusion and significance that concerned literary authors in and beyond the interwar years. For 
Lawrence and many other midcentury thinkers, idiocy puts pressure on the forms of familiar 
social arrangements; by extension, intelligence offers the possibility of stabilizing the boundaries 
between categories of being.  
The literary authors examined in this dissertation take up intelligence and intellectual 
disability in their explorations of the criteria by which communities may form and re-form 
themselves in the unsettled aftermath of world war, showing the power of these concepts to act 
as heuristics for belonging in this cultural moment. Intelligence and intellectual disability 
appeared to offer measures for establishing a non-violent world order (Chapter 1), to point 
toward the fragility of shared language for community meaning-making in a moment of global 
upheaval (Chapter 2), to recall the generative possibilities of human ignorance in contrast to 
artificial forms of intelligence (Chapter 3), and to highlight the criteria and apparatuses through 
which the midcentury welfare state in Britain made its claims to inclusion and care (Chapter 4). 
																																								 																				
159 In “D.H. Lawrence: Spontaneity and Revision as Aesthetic,” Michael Black writes, “He [Lawrence] 
always wrote fast, and could produce a draft in days or weeks rather than months. He then often laid aside 
what he had written for a future reworking, while he embarked on something else. In this way he had at 
any given time a number of works in progress, at different stages of composition” (150). 
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In the politically and culturally turbulent moment of the mid-twentieth century, intelligence 
appeared to offer a method for forging the shared bonds of imagined communities and, 
conversely, for identifying the individuals, experiences, and forms of being that do not easily 
conform to imagined communities based on such principles. For this reason, intellectually 
disabled characters, which emerged as conceptually distinct from mentally ill or “mad” 
characters, direct literary texts toward themes of category confusion, community organization, 
and belonging. In the literature of this moment, intellectually disabled characters inaugurate 
specific literary questions about the processes and measures by which categories of people 
become coherent groups. More than simply reflecting contemporaneous eugenic anxieties about 
the quality of a population’s intelligence or the interactions of intellectually disabled subjects and 
the public, these literary texts turn to questions of intelligence and intellectual disability to work 
through the ways in which imagined communities form and reform through collectively shared 
ideas about cognition.  
By drawing on Macbeth’s idiot figure—a figure from a drama who himself recalls “a 
poor player / That struts and frets his hour upon the stage” (Macbeth V.v 24-25)—to register 
concern about the indeterminacies inaugurated by modern life, Lawrence highlights a key feature 
of intellectual disability for midcentury literary authors: its capacity to bend narrative into drama 
by shifting aesthetic attention away from the mind’s interior and toward the subject’s meaning 
for the community with which she or he interacts. Each of the texts examined in this dissertation 
point to the affordances of drama by registering, in some way, the sociality and performativity of 
dramatic productions. H.D.’s and Moore’s thought experiments about collective cognition 
address the social aspects of producing the written word, and West and Wells build arguments 
designed to persuade their audiences—embodied audiences, in the case of Wells, who first 
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delivered his thoughts on the world brain to listeners via radio and address. Woolf’s Between the 
Acts shifts toward the dramatic mode, suggesting skepticism about the capacity of novels to 
forge bonds among minds in order to create collectivities. Beckett’s Watt mixes free indirect 
discourse with long stretches of direct discourse, seemingly mathematically produced, which 
recalls the stripped down dialogue of his later dramas; Molloy, meanwhile, points to the perils of 
taking on another identity, which is the basis of acting. And Pinter and Nichols shift midcentury 
fascination with intellectual debility to the stage in a moment when English theatre moved 
increasingly toward representations of everyday experiences and concerns, recalibrating familiar 
tropes about the relationship between intellectual disability and community formation in the 
public—and freshly politicized—domain of the theatre.  
The dramatic and, in some cases, performative aspects of these texts indicate that for 
many midcentury authors, the concept of intellectual disability offered a device through which to 
explore the boundaries of narrative. While modernist literature often offers glimpses into the 
minds of individuals, the texts examined in this project register a degree of dissatisfaction with 
narrative as a method for imagining and representing collectives. Recalling the capacity of drama 
to equalize focus between the dialogue of speakers and the reactions of other actors upon a stage, 
these texts toy with the ingredients of the dramatic mode for the purpose of extending aesthetic 
attention to imagined communities. In doing so, they push away from modernism’s characteristic 
granular focus on individual experiences and perception.160 They also register skepticism about 
the extent to which individual experience can be universalized in order to communicate meaning 
to others—a skepticism that some critics, notably Frederic Jameson and Jean-François Lyotard, 
																																								 																				
160 In Granular Modernism, for example, Beci Carver surveys a range of modernist texts that chronicle 
individual perceptions, providing “the exhaustive description of experiences that do not appear to merit 
exhaustive description […], but also a refusal to generate meaning out of detail” (2). 
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have named as one of the key features of postmodernism.161 By pointing aesthetic attention 
outward, to the ways in which cognitive styles can affect social arrangements, these literary texts 
raise questions about the means by which relationality is produced as well as the extent to which 
narratives can forge relationality in representation and reality. 
Lawrence’s “A Tale Told By an Idiot,” which concludes with an image of an idiot figure 
speaking in the style of a toilet flushing, also highlights an approach to idiocy that took on new 
energy in the later decades of the twentieth century: imagining idiocy to be a site of convergence 
between the natural and the artificial, or the human and the machine. The poem, in other words, 
raises questions not only about the distinction between personhood and non-personhood, but also 
the distinction between life and non-life. This latter question would become increasingly 
captivating for literary authors as the twentieth century—its biomedical imaginaries becoming 
biomedical realities—progressed. 
This formulation of intellectual disability appears, for example, in Graham Swift’s 
Waterland (1983), which was nominated for the Man Booker Prize and later adapted for film.162 
Waterland chronicles the childhood memories of Tom, a history teacher, many of which include 
his “potato-head” older brother, Dick (27). For Tom, Dick is enigmatic:  
When Dick was moved, only his eyelids showed it. The muddy complexion 
neither flushed nor paled; the mouth remained limp; the eyes themselves stared. 
The eyelids alone registered emotion. But although they registered emotion it was 
impossible to tell merely from their movement what emotion was being signaled. 
(23) 
																																								 																				
161 See Jameson, Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism and Lyotard, The Postmodern 
Condition. 
162 Stephen Gyllenhaal directed the film adaptation, which appeared in 1992. 
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Here, Tom recognizes that his brother experiences emotions, but he understands these emotions 
as “impossible” for others to understand. Dick, whose inscrutability resembles that of 
intellectually disabled figures from earlier midcentury literature, troubles Tom’s comprehension 
of his family and his memories. Like the murky water of the East Anglian Fens to which he is 
often compared in the novel, Dick blurs expected categories and confuses the narrator’s methods 
of knowing. At the same time, Dick expresses forms of knowledge and emotion that are 
inaccessible to the narrator. For example, of his brother’s favorite hobby, Tom recalls, 
Dick has a way with machines. Every day he coaxed into continued action the 
antiquated gear of a bucket-dredger which, were it not for the war, would have 
been declared obsolete long ago. […] It could be said that Dick’s love of 
machines, if love it is, springs from the fact that Dick himself is a sort of 
machine—in so far as a machine is something which has no mind of its own and 
in so far as Dick’s large, lean and surprisingly agile body will not only work 
indefatigably but will perform on occasion quite remarkable feats of dexterity and 
strength. (31) 
Appearing to the narrator to lack legible interiority, Dick instead resembles the bucket-dredger 
that he restores each day, which operates repetitively, like Dick, in “continued action.” For this 
reason, Dick himself comes to resemble “a sort of machine” in his supposed mindlessness and 
impressive physicality. In this passage, both man and machine are stripped of the complexity of 
mentality; instead, they act in automated concert, “work[ing] indefatigably” to dredge the Fens 
by separating the earth and its debris from the water. This image, like Lawrence’s idiot figure 
who “repeats himself like the flushing of a W.C.,” shows the fragility of language as an 
epistemological resource—a medium by which meaning can be expressed to and understood by 
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others—while also signaling closeness between the laboring bodies of humans and machines. 
Balancing on the edge between categories of personhood and non-personhood and life and non-
life, intellectual disability in these examples animates not only questions about the criteria by 
which people constitute imagined communities but also the criteria by which a form is 
recognized as human at all.  
 The twin concepts of intelligence and intellectual disability signify, for many twentieth-
century thinkers, debates about the nature of language, sociality, and humanness. With the 
cultural trajectories of these concepts in mind, twentieth-century deliberations about the 
relationship between biopolitics and imagined communities come more sharply into focus. So, 
too, does an image of midcentury literary production, which grapples both with the legacies of an 
earlier modernism and with the question of how literary art might offer up potential forms of 
community for its readers. These texts in this project thus highlight the means by which literature 
maps out the pasts and futures of the cultural discourses with which it engages. 
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